Conditioning is crucial in applied science when inference involving time series is involved. Belief calculus is an effective way of handling such inference in the presence of epistemic uncertainty -- unfortunately, different approaches to conditioning in the belief function framework have been proposed in the past, leaving the matter somewhat unsettled. Inspired by the geometric approach to uncertainty, in this paper we propose an approach to the conditioning of belief functions based on geometrically projecting them onto the simplex associated with the conditioning event in the space of all belief functions. We show here that such a geometric approach to conditioning often produces simple results with straightforward interpretations in terms of degrees of belief. This raises the question of whether classical approaches, such as for instance Dempster's conditioning, can also be reduced to some form of distance minimisation in a suitable space. The study of families of combination rules generated by (geometric) conditioning rules appears to be the natural prosecution of the presented research.

Probability theory is far from being the most general mathematical theory of uncertainty. A number of arguments point at its inability to describe second-order ('Knightian') uncertainty. In response, a wide array of theories of uncertainty have been proposed, many of them generalisations of classical probability. As we show here, such frameworks can be organised into clusters sharing a common rationale, exhibit complex links, and are characterised by different levels of generality. Our goal is a critical appraisal of the current landscape in uncertainty theory.

Several forms of iterable belief change exist, differing in the kind of change and its strength: some operators introduce formulae, others remove them; some add formulae unconditionally, others only as additions to the previous beliefs; some only relative to the current situation, others in all possible cases. A sequence of changes may involve several of them: for example, the first step is a revision, the second a contraction and the third a refinement of the previous beliefs. The ten operators considered in this article are shown to be all reducible to three: lexicographic revision, refinement and severe withdrawal. In turn, these three can be expressed in terms of lexicographic revision at the cost of restructuring the sequence. This restructuring needs not to be done explicitly: an algorithm that works on the original sequence is shown. The complexity of mixed sequences of belief change operators is also analyzed. Most of them require only a polynomial number of calls to a satisfiability checker, some are even easier.

When developing AI systems that interact with humans, it is essential to design both a system that can understand humans, and a system that humans can understand. Most deep network based agent-modeling approaches are 1) not interpretable and 2) only model external behavior, ignoring internal mental states, which potentially limits their capability for assistance, interventions, discovering false beliefs, etc. To this end, we develop an interpretable modular neural framework for modeling the intentions of other observed entities. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach with experiments on data from human participants on a search and rescue task in Minecraft, and show that incorporating interpretability can significantly increase predictive performance under the right conditions.

Answer set programming (ASP) is a popular nonmonotonic-logic based paradigm for knowledge representation and solving combinatorial problems. Computing the answer set of an ASP program is NP-hard in general, and researchers have been investing significant effort to speed it up. The majority of current ASP solvers employ SAT solver-like technology to find these answer sets. As a result, justification for why a literal is in the answer set is hard to produce. There are dependency graph based approaches to find answer sets, but due to the representational limitations of dependency graphs, such approaches are limited. We propose a novel dependency graph-based approach for finding answer sets in which conjunction of goals is explicitly represented as a node which allows arbitrary answer set programs to be uniformly represented. Our representation preserves causal relationships allowing for justification for each literal in the answer set to be elegantly found. Performance results from an implementation are also reported. Our work paves the way for computing answer sets without grounding a program.

Bayesian inference provides a uniquely rigorous approach to obtain principled justification for uncertainty in predictions, yet it is difficult to articulate suitably general prior belief in the machine learning context, where computational architectures are pure abstractions subject to frequent modifications by practitioners attempting to improve results. Parsimonious inference is an information-theoretic formulation of inference over arbitrary architectures that formalizes Occam's Razor; we prefer simple and sufficient explanations. Our universal hyperprior assigns plausibility to prior descriptions, encoded as sequences of symbols, by expanding on the core relationships between program length, Kolmogorov complexity, and Solomonoff's algorithmic probability. We then cast learning as information minimization over our composite change in belief when an architecture is specified, training data are observed, and model parameters are inferred. By distinguishing model complexity from prediction information, our framework also quantifies the phenomenon of memorization. Although our theory is general, it is most critical when datasets are limited, e.g. small or skewed. We develop novel algorithms for polynomial regression and random forests that are suitable for such data, as demonstrated by our experiments. Our approaches combine efficient encodings with prudent sampling strategies to construct predictive ensembles without cross-validation, thus addressing a fundamental challenge in how to efficiently obtain predictions from data.

Recent approaches to goal recognition have leveraged planning landmarks to achieve high-accuracy with low runtime cost. These approaches, however, lack a probabilistic interpretation. Furthermore, while most probabilistic models to goal recognition assume that the recognizer has access to a prior probability representing, for example, an agent's preferences, virtually no goal recognition approach actually uses the prior in practice, simply assuming a uniform prior. In this paper, we provide a model to both extend landmark-based goal recognition with a probabilistic interpretation and allow the estimation of such prior probability and its usage to compute posterior probabilities after repeated interactions of observed agents. We empirically show that our model can not only recognize goals effectively but also successfully infer the correct prior probability distribution representing an agent's preferences.

Deciding what's next? is a fundamental problem in robotics and Artificial Intelligence. Under belief space planning (BSP), in a partially observable setting, it involves calculating the expected accumulated belief-dependent reward, where the expectation is with respect to all future measurements. Since solving this general un-approximated problem quickly becomes intractable, state of the art approaches turn to approximations while still calculating planning sessions from scratch. In this work we propose a novel paradigm, Incremental BSP (iX-BSP), based on the key insight that calculations across planning sessions are similar in nature and can be appropriately re-used. We calculate the expectation incrementally by utilizing Multiple Importance Sampling techniques for selective re-sampling and re-use of measurement from previous planning sessions. The formulation of our approach considers general distributions and accounts for data association aspects. We demonstrate how iX-BSP could benefit existing approximations of the general problem, introducing iML-BSP, which re-uses calculations across planning sessions under the common Maximum Likelihood assumption. We evaluate both methods and demonstrate a substantial reduction in computation time while statistically preserving accuracy. The evaluation includes both simulation and real-world experiments considering autonomous vision-based navigation and SLAM. As a further contribution, we introduce to iX-BSP the non-integral wildfire approximation, allowing one to trade accuracy for computational performance by averting from updating re-used beliefs when they are "close enough". We evaluate iX-BSP under wildfire demonstrating a substantial reduction in computation time while controlling the accuracy sacrifice. We also provide analytical and empirical bounds of the effect wildfire holds over the objective value.

Bounded rationality is an important consideration stemming from the fact that agents often have limits on their processing abilities, making the assumption of perfect rationality inapplicable to many real tasks. We propose an information-theoretic approach to the inference of agent decisions under Smithian competition. The model explicitly captures the boundedness of agents (limited in their information-processing capacity) as the cost of information acquisition for expanding their prior beliefs. The expansion is measured as the Kullblack-Leibler divergence between posterior decisions and prior beliefs. When information acquisition is free, the \textit{homo economicus} agent is recovered, while in cases when information acquisition becomes costly, agents instead revert to their prior beliefs. The maximum entropy principle is used to infer least-biased decisions, based upon the notion of Smithian competition formalised within the Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium framework. The incorporation of prior beliefs into such a framework allowed us to systematically explore the effects of prior beliefs on decision-making, in the presence of market feedback. We verified the proposed model using Australian housing market data, showing how the incorporation of prior knowledge alters the resulting agent decisions. Specifically, it allowed for the separation (and analysis) of past beliefs and utility maximisation behaviour of the agent.

Since the seminal work of Hintikka on epistemic logic [28], of Von Wright on the logic of preference [55, 56] and of Cohen & Levesque on the logic of intention [19], many formal logics for reasoning about cognitive attitudes of agents such as knowledge and belief [24], preference [32, 48], desire [23], intention [44, 30] and their combination [38, 54] have been proposed. Generally speaking, these logics are nothing but formal models of rational agency relying on the idea that an agent endowed with cognitive attitudes makes decisions on the basis of what she believes and of what she desires or prefers. The idea of describing rational agents in terms of their epistemic and motivational attitudes is something that these logics share with classical decision theory and game theory. Classical decision theory and game theory provide a quantitative account of individual and strategic decision-making by assuming that agents' beliefs and desires can be respectively modeled by subjective probabilities and utilities. Qualitative approaches to individual and strategic decision-making have been proposed in AI [16, 22] to characterize criteria that a rational agent should adopt for making decisions when she cannot build a probability distribution over the set of possible events and her preference over the set of possible outcomes cannot be expressed by a utility function but only by a qualitative ordering over the outcomes.