We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally, we extend our results to general stochastic games.

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.

We have implemented a real time front end for detecting voiced speech and estimating its fundamental frequency. The front end performs the signal processing for voice-driven agents that attend to the pitch contours of human speech and provide continuous audiovisual feedback. The algorithm we use for pitch tracking has several distinguishing features: it makes no use of FFTs or autocorrelation at the pitch period; it updates the pitch incrementally on a sample-by-sample basis; it avoids peak picking and does not require interpolation in time or frequency to obtain high resolution estimates; and it works reliably over a four octave range, in real time, without the need for postprocessing to produce smooth contours. The algorithm is based on two simple ideas in neural computation: the introduction of a purposeful nonlinearity, and the error signal of a least squares fit.

We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally, we extend our results to general stochastic games.

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.

We present a new method for learning good strategies in zero-sum Markov games in which each side is composed of multiple agents collaborating againstan opposing team of agents. Our method requires full observability and communication during learning, but the learned policies canbe executed in a distributed manner. The value function is represented asa factored linear architecture and its structure determines the necessary computational resources and communication bandwidth. This approach permits a tradeoff between simple representations with little or no communication between agents and complex, computationally intensive representationswith extensive coordination between agents. Thus, we provide a principled means of using approximation to combat the exponential blowup in the joint action space of the participants. The approach isdemonstrated with an example that shows the efficiency gains over naive enumeration.

We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach tolearning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational afterpolynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case.

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nashequilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated ifthe agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems:identifying the game and learning to play.

We have implemented a real time front end for detecting voiced speech and estimating its fundamental frequency. The front end performs the signal processing for voice-driven agents that attend to the pitch contours of human speech and provide continuous audiovisual feedback. The algorithm weuse for pitch tracking has several distinguishing features: it makes no use of FFTs or autocorrelation at the pitch period; it updates the pitch incrementally on a sample-by-sample basis; it avoids peak picking and does not require interpolation in time or frequency to obtain high resolution estimates;and it works reliably over a four octave range, in real time, without the need for postprocessing to produce smooth contours. The algorithm is based on two simple ideas in neural computation: the introduction of a purposeful nonlinearity, and the error signal of a least squares fit. The pitch tracker is used in two real time multimedia applications: avoice-to-MIDI player that synthesizes electronic music from vocalized melodies,and an audiovisual Karaoke machine with multimodal feedback. Both applications run on a laptop and display the user's pitch scrolling across the screen as he or she sings into the computer.

Program (July 28) is currently accepting nominations accessible to the general public or Tenth AAAI/SIGART Doctoral Consortium for AAAI Fellow. The AAAI Fellows to a broad AI audience (not just a subarea), (July 25-26) program is designed to written within the last two AAAI Intelligent Systems Demonstrations recognize people who have made significant, years.