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Asynchronous Forward Bounding for Distributed COPs

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

A new search algorithm for solving distributed constraint optimization problems (DisCOPs) is presented. Agents assign variables sequentially and compute bounds on partial assignments asynchronously. The asynchronous bounds computation is based on the propagation of partial assignments. The asynchronous forward-bounding algorithm (AFB) is a distributed optimization search algorithm that keeps one consistent partial assignment at all times. The algorithm is described in detail and its correctness proven. Experimental evaluation shows that AFB outperforms synchronous branch and bound by many orders of magnitude, and produces a phase transition as the tightness of the problem increases. This is an analogous effect to the phase transition that has been observed when local consistency maintenance is applied to MaxCSPs. The AFB algorithm is further enhanced by the addition of a backjumping mechanism, resulting in the AFB-BJ algorithm. Distributed backjumping is based on accumulated information on bounds of all values and on processing concurrently a queue of candidate goals for the next move back. The AFB-BJ algorithm is compared experimentally to other DisCOP algorithms (ADOPT, DPOP, OptAPO) and is shown to be a very efficient algorithm for DisCOPs.


Alleviating Media Bias Through Intelligent Agent Blogging

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Consumers of mass media must have a comprehensive, balanced and plural selection of news to get an unbiased perspective; but achieving this goal can be very challenging, laborious and time consuming. News stories development over time, its (in)consistency, and different level of coverage across the media outlets are challenges that a conscientious reader has to overcome in order to alleviate bias. In this paper we present an intelligent agent framework currently facilitating analysis of the main sources of on-line news in El Salvador. We show how prior tools of text analysis and Web 2.0 technologies can be combined with minimal manual intervention to help individuals on their rational decision process, while holding media outlets accountable for their work.


Preferences in Interactive Systems: Technical Challenges and Case Studies

AI Magazine

Interactive artificial intelligence systems employ preferences in both their reasoning and their interaction with the user. This survey considers preference handling in applications such as recommender systems, personal assistant agents, and personalized user interfaces. We survey the major questions and approaches, present illustrative examples, and give an outlook on potential benefits and challenges.


Calendar of Events

AI Magazine

This page includes all the AAAI sponsored conferences presented by AAAI Affiliates, and conferences held in cooperation with AAAI to be held during the next 9 months.


Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice

AI Magazine

In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.


How Emotional Mechanism Helps Episodic Learning in a Cognitive Agent

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In this paper we propose the CTS (Concious Tutoring System) technology, a biologically plausible cognitive agent based on human brain functions.This agent is capable of learning and remembering events and any related information such as corresponding procedures, stimuli and their emotional valences. Our proposed episodic memory and episodic learning mechanism are closer to the current multiple-trace theory in neuroscience, because they are inspired by it [5] contrary to other mechanisms that are incorporated in cognitive agents. This is because in our model emotions play a role in the encoding and remembering of events. This allows the agent to improve its behavior by remembering previously selected behaviors which are influenced by its emotional mechanism. Moreover, the architecture incorporates a realistic memory consolidation process based on a data mining algorithm.


Resource Adaptive Agents in Interactive Theorem Proving

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We introduce a resource adaptive agent mechanism which supports the user in interactive theorem proving. The mechanism uses a two layered architecture of agent societies to suggest appropriate commands together with possible command argument instantiations. Experiments with this approach show that its effectiveness can be further improved by introducing a resource concept. In this paper we provide an abstract view on the overall mechanism, motivate the necessity of an appropriate resource concept and discuss its realization within the agent architecture.


Interactive Policy Learning through Confidence-Based Autonomy

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

The CBA algorithm consists of two components which take advantage of the complimentary abilities of humans and computer agents. The first component, Confident Execution, enables the agent to identify states in which demonstration is required, to request a demonstration from the human teacher and to learn a policy based on the acquired data. The algorithm selects demonstrations based on a measure of action selection confidence, and our results show that using Confident Execution the agent requires fewer demonstrations to learn the policy than when demonstrations are selected by a human teacher. The second algorithmic component, Corrective Demonstration, enables the teacher to correct any mistakes made by the agent through additional demonstrations in order to improve the policy and future task performance. CBA and its individual components are compared and evaluated in a complex simulated driving domain.


Computing Robust Counter-Strategies

Neural Information Processing Systems

Adaptation to other initially unknown agents often requires computing an effective counter-strategy. In the Bayesian paradigm, one must find a good counter-strategy to the inferred posterior of the other agents' behavior. In the experts paradigm, one may want to choose experts that are good counter-strategies to the other agents' expected behavior. In this paper we introduce a technique for computing robust counter-strategies for adaptation in multiagent scenarios under a variety of paradigms. The strategies can take advantage of a suspected tendency in the decisions of the other agents, while bounding the worst-case performance when the tendency is not observed. The technique involves solving a modified game, and therefore can make use of recently developed algorithms for solving very large extensive games. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique in two-player Texas Hold'em. We show that the computed poker strategies are substantially more robust than best response counter-strategies, while still exploiting a suspected tendency. We also compose the generated strategies in an experts algorithm showing a dramatic improvement in performance over using simple best responses.


Computational Equivalence of Fixed Points and No Regret Algorithms, and Convergence to Equilibria

Neural Information Processing Systems

We study the relation between notions of game-theoretic equilibria which are based on stability under a set of deviations, and empirical equilibria which are reached by rational players. Rational players are modelled by players using no regret algorithms, which guarantee that their payoff in the long run is almost as much as the most they could hope to achieve by consistently deviating from the algorithm's suggested action. We show that for a given set of deviations over the strategy set of a player, it is possible to efficiently approximate fixed points of a given deviation if and only if there exist efficient no regret algorithms resistant to the deviations. Further, we show that if all players use a no regret algorithm, then the empirical distribution of their plays converges to an equilibrium.