A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans can be studied, as well as several basic results about the representation, verification and synthesis of stable joint plans.

The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We consider the following problem: within the family of Groves mechanisms, we want to identify mechanisms that give the agents the highest utilities, under the constraint that these mechanisms must never incur deficits. We adopt a prior-free approach. We introduce two general measures for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M individually dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M' if for every type profile, every agent's utility under M is no less than that under M', and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M' if for every type profile, the agents' total utility under M is no less than that under M', and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above definitions induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We study the maximal elements corresponding to these two partial orders, which we call the individually undominated mechanisms and the collectively undominated mechanisms, respectively.

Distributed knowledge based applications in open domain rely on common sense information which is bound to be uncertain and incomplete. To draw the useful conclusions from ambiguous data, one must address uncertainties and conflicts incurred in a holistic view. No integrated frameworks are viable without an in-depth analysis of conflicts incurred by uncertainties. In this paper, we give such an analysis and based on the result, propose an integrated framework. Our framework extends definite argumentation theory to model uncertainty. It supports three views over conflicting and uncertain knowledge. Thus, knowledge engineers can draw different conclusions depending on the application context (i.e. view). We also give an illustrative example on strategical decision support to show the practical usefulness of our framework.

Our hypothesis is that by equipping certain agents in a multi-agent system controlling an intelligent building with automated decision support, two important factors will be increased. The first is energy saving in the building. The second is customer value---how the people in the building experience the effects of the actions of the agents. We give evidence for the truth of this hypothesis through experimental findings related to tools for artificial decision making. A number of assumptions related to agent control, through monitoring and delegation of tasks to other kinds of agents, of rooms at a test site are relaxed. Each assumption controls at least one uncertainty that complicates considerably the procedures for selecting actions part of each such agent. We show that in realistic decision situations, room-controlling agents can make bounded rational decisions even under dynamic real-time constraints. This result can be, and has been, generalized to other domains with even harsher time constraints.

Artifact systems are a novel paradigm for specifying and implementing business processes described in terms of interacting modules called artifacts. Artifacts consist of data and lifecycles, accounting respectively for the relational structure of the artifacts' states and their possible evolutions over time. In this paper we put forward artifact-centric multi-agent systems, a novel formalisation of artifact systems in the context of multi-agent systems operating on them. Differently from the usual process-based models of services, the semantics we give explicitly accounts for the data structures on which artifact systems are defined. We study the model checking problem for artifact-centric multi-agent systems against specifications written in a quantified version of temporal-epistemic logic expressing the knowledge of the agents in the exchange. We begin by noting that the problem is undecidable in general. We then identify two noteworthy restrictions, one syntactical and one semantical, that enable us to find bisimilar finite abstractions and therefore reduce the model checking problem to the instance on finite models. Under these assumptions we show that the model checking problem for these systems is EXPSPACE-complete. We then introduce artifact-centric programs, compact and declarative representations of the programs governing both the artifact system and the agents. We show that, while these in principle generate infinite-state systems, under natural conditions their verification problem can be solved on finite abstractions that can be effectively computed from the programs. Finally we exemplify the theoretical results of the paper through a mainstream procurement scenario from the artifact systems literature.

The modeling of cascade processes in multi-agent systems in the form of complex networks has in recent years become an important topic of study due to its many applications: the adoption of commercial products, spread of disease, the diffusion of an idea, etc. In this paper, we begin by identifying a desiderata of seven properties that a framework for modeling such processes should satisfy: the ability to represent attributes of both nodes and edges, an explicit representation of time, the ability to represent non-Markovian temporal relationships, representation of uncertain information, the ability to represent competing cascades, allowance of non-monotonic diffusion, and computational tractability. We then present the MANCaLog language, a formalism based on logic programming that satisfies all these desiderata, and focus on algorithms for finding minimal models (from which the outcome of cascades can be obtained) as well as how this formalism can be applied in real world scenarios. We are not aware of any other formalism in the literature that meets all of the above requirements.

We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more fundamentally, G nets constitute a computationally advantageous framework for strategic inference, as both probability and utility independencies are captured in the structure of the network and can be exploited in order to simplify the inference process. An important aspect of multi-agent reasoning is the identification of some or all of the strategic equilibria in a game; we present original convergence methods for strategic equilibrium which can take advantage of strategic separabilities in the G net structure in order to simplify the computations. Specifically, we describe a method which identifies a unique equilibrium as a function of the game payoffs, and one which identifies all equilibria.

Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation tasks. Fictitious play is the canonical example of these algorithms. Nevertheless fictitious play implicitly assumes that players have stationary strategies. We present a novel variant of fictitious play where players predict their opponents' strategies using Extended Kalman filters and use their predictions to update their strategies. We show that in 2 by 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium and in potential games where players have two available actions, the proposed algorithm converges to the pure Nash equilibrium. The performance of the proposed algorithm was empirically tested, in two strategic form games and an ad-hoc sensor network surveillance problem. The proposed algorithm performs better than the classic fictitious play algorithm in these games and therefore improves the performance of game-theoretical learning in decentralised optimisation.

In the modern healthcare system, rapidly expanding costs/complexity, the growing myriad of treatment options, and exploding information streams that often do not effectively reach the front lines hinder the ability to choose optimal treatment decisions over time. The goal in this paper is to develop a general purpose (non-disease-specific) computational/artificial intelligence (AI) framework to address these challenges. This serves two potential functions: 1) a simulation environment for exploring various healthcare policies, payment methodologies, etc., and 2) the basis for clinical artificial intelligence - an AI that can think like a doctor. This approach combines Markov decision processes and dynamic decision networks to learn from clinical data and develop complex plans via simulation of alternative sequential decision paths while capturing the sometimes conflicting, sometimes synergistic interactions of various components in the healthcare system. It can operate in partially observable environments (in the case of missing observations or data) by maintaining belief states about patient health status and functions as an online agent that plans and re-plans. This framework was evaluated using real patient data from an electronic health record. Such an AI framework easily outperforms the current treatment-as-usual (TAU) case-rate/fee-for-service models of healthcare (Cost per Unit Change: $189 vs. $497) while obtaining a 30-35% increase in patient outcomes. Tweaking certain model parameters further enhances this advantage, obtaining roughly 50% more improvement for roughly half the costs. Given careful design and problem formulation, an AI simulation framework can approximate optimal decisions even in complex and uncertain environments. Future work is described that outlines potential lines of research and integration of machine learning algorithms for personalized medicine.

Dribbling an opponent player in digital soccer environment is an important practical problem in motion planning. It has special complexities which can be generalized to most important problems in other similar Multi Agent Systems. In this paper, we propose a hybrid computational geometry and evolutionary computation approach for generating motion trajectories to avoid a mobile obstacle. In this case an opponent agent is not only an obstacle but also one who tries to harden dribbling procedure. One characteristic of this approach is reducing process cost of online stage by transferring it to offline stage which causes increment in agents' performance. This approach breaks the problem into two offline and online stages. During offline stage the goal is to find desired trajectory using evolutionary computation and saving it as a trajectory plan. A trajectory plan consists of nodes which approximate information of each trajectory plan. In online stage, a linear interpolation along with Delaunay triangulation in xy-plan is applied to trajectory plan to retrieve desired action.