Nowadays, multiagent planning under uncertainty scales to tens or even hundreds of agents. However, current methods either are restricted to problems with factored value functions, or provide solutions without any guarantees on quality. Methods in the former category typically build on heuristic search using upper bounds on the value function. Unfortunately, no techniques exist to compute such upper bounds for problems with non-factored value functions, which would additionally allow for meaningful benchmarking of methods of the latter category. To mitigate this problem, this paper introduces a family of influence-optimistic upper bounds for factored Dec-POMDPs without factored value functions. We demonstrate how we can achieve firm quality guarantees for problems with hundreds of agents.

Agents can be thought of as following a social behaviour, depending on the context in which they are interacting. We devise a computationally grounded  mechanism to represent and reason about others in social terms, reflecting the local perspective of an agent (first-person view), to support both stereotypical and empathetic reasoning. We use a hierarchy of agent models to discriminate which behaviours of others are plausible, and decide which behaviour for ourselves is socially acceptable, i.e. conforms to the social context. To this aim, we investigate the implications of considering agents capable of various degrees of theory of mind, and discuss a scenario showing how this affects behaviour.

Unfair rating attacks happen in existing trust and reputation systems, lowering the quality of the systems. There exists a formal model that measures the maximum impact of independent attackers [Wang et al., 2015] — based on information theory. We improve on these results in multiple ways: (1) we alter the methodology to be able to reason about colluding attackers as well, and (2) we extend the method to be able to measure the strength of any attacks (rather than just the strongest attack). Using (1), we identify the strongest collusion attacks, helping construct robust trust system. Using (2), we identify the strength of (classes of) attacks that we found in the literature. Based on this, we help to overcome a shortcoming of current research into collusion-resistance — specific (types of) attacks are used in simulations, disallowing direct comparisons between analyses of systems.

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another’s voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the pre-vote phase.

We study a setting of non-atomic routing in a network of m parallel links with asymmetry of information. While a central entity (such as a GPS navigation system) — a mediator hereafter — knows the cost functions associated with the links, they are unknown to the individual agents controlling the flow. The mediator gives incentive compatible recommendations to agents, trying to minimize the total travel time. Can the mediator do better than when agents minimize their travel time selfishly without coercing agents to follow his recommendations? We study the mediation ratio: the ratio between the mediated equilibrium obtained from an incentive compatible mediation protocol and the social optimum. We find that mediation protocols can reduce the efficiency loss compared to the full revelation alternative, and compared to the non mediated Nash equilibrium. In particular, in the case of two links with affine cost functions, the mediation ratio is at most 8/7, and remains strictly smaller than the price of anarchy of 4/3 for any fixed m. Yet, it approaches the price of anarchy as m grows. For general (monotone) cost functions, the mediation ratio is at most m, a significant improvement over the unbounded price of anarchy

We develop a methodology to model and verify Regarding the second limitation, proposals have been put open multi-agent systems (OMAS), where agents forward to consider a set of objects that vary at design time; may join in or leave at run time. Further, we specify the set of agents is normally considered to be finite in each properties of interest on OMAS in a variant of firstorder system run. This is a sensible assumption in many scenarios, temporal-epistemic logic, whose characterising but there are applications of MAS (e.g., e-commerce, smart features include epistemic modalities indexed grids) where an unbounded number of agents may freely enter to individual terms, interpreted on agents appearing and leave the system at run time. There is, therefore, at a given state. This formalism notably allows a need to account for the unbounded and possibly infinite to express group knowledge dynamically. We study agents joining in or leaving an open MAS. In this setting it the verification problem of these systems and show is still of interest to reason about their evolution and what that, under specific conditions, finite bisimilar abstractions they know individually and collectively. For example, in an can be obtained.

Interactive dynamic influence diagrams(I-DIDs) are a well recognized decision model that explicitly considers how multiagent interaction affects individual decision making. To predict behavior of other agents, I-DIDs require models of the other agents to be known ahead of time and manually encoded. This becomes a barrier to I-DID applications in a human-agent interaction setting, such as development of intelligent non-player characters(NPCs) in real-time strategy(RTS) games, where models of other agents or human players are often inaccessible to domain experts. In this paper, we use automatic techniques for learning behavior of other agents from replay data in RTS games. We propose a learning algorithm with improvement over existing work by building a full profile of agent behavior. This is the first time that data-driven learning techniques are embedded into the I-DID decision making framework. We evaluate the performance of our approach on two test cases.

We explore the mechanism design problem for lung exchange and its implementation in practice. We prove that determining whether there exists a non-trivial solution of the lung exchange problem is NP-complete. We propose a mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof and maximizes exchange size. To implement this mechanism in practice, we propose an algorithm based on Integer Linear Program and another based on search. Both of our algorithms for this mechanism yield excellent performances in simulated data sets.

One prominent way to deal with conflicting view-points among agents is to conduct an argumentative debate: by exchanging arguments, agents can seek to persuade each other. In this paper we investigate the problem, for an agent, of optimizing a sequence of moves to be put forward in a debate, against an opponent assumed to behave stochastically, and equipped with an unknown initial belief state. Despite the prohibitive number of states induced by a naive mapping to Markov models, we show that exploiting several features of such interaction settings allows for optimal resolution in practice, in particular: (1) as debates take place in a public space (or common ground), they can readily be modelled as Mixed Observability Markov Decision Processes, (2) as argumentation problems are highly structured, one can design optimization techniques to prune the initial instance. We report on the experimental evaluation of these techniques.

We investigate the problem of revenue optimal mechanism design [Myerson, 1981] under the context of the partial rationality model, where buyers randomize between two modes: rational and irrational. When a buyer is irrational (can be thought of as lazy), he acts according to certain fixed strategies, such as bidding his true valuation. The seller cannot observe the buyer’s valuation, or his rationality mode, but treat them as random variables from known distributions. The seller’s goal is to design a single-shot auction that maximizes her expected revenue. A minor generalization as it may seem, our findings are in sharp contrast to Myerson’s theory on the standard rational bidder case. In particular, we show that, even for the simplest setting with one buyer, direct value revelation loses generality. However, we do show that, in terms of revenue, the optimal value-revelation and type-revelation mechanisms are equivalent. In addition, the posted-price mechanism is no longer optimal. In fact, the more complicated the mechanism, the higher the revenue. For the case where there are multiple bidders with IID uniform valuations, we show that when the irrational buyers are truthful, first price auction yields more revenue than second price auction.