However, as pointed out by [Moran et al., 2013], such We consider a setting where an agent-based planner assumptions simply do not hold in reality. The environment instructs teams of human emergency responders to is typically prone to significant uncertainties and humans may perform tasks in the real world. Due to uncertainty reject plans suggested by a software agent if they are tired or in the environment and the inability of the planner prefer to work with specific partners. Now, a naïve solution to consider all human preferences and all attributes to this would involve re-planning every time a rejection is of the real-world, humans may reject plans received. However, this may instead result in a high computational computed by the agent. A naïve solution that replans cost (as a whole new plan needs to be computed for given a rejection is inefficient and does not the whole team), may generate a plan that is still not acceptable, guarantee the new plan will be acceptable. Hence, and, following multiple rejection/replanning cycles (as we propose a new model re-planning problem using all individual team members need to accept the new plan), a Multi-agent Markov Decision Process that may lead the teams to suboptimal solutions.

Despite some success of Perfect Information Monte Carlo Sampling (PIMC) in imperfect information games in the past, it has been eclipsed by other approaches in recent years. Standard PIMC has well-known shortcomings in the accuracy of its decisions, but has the advantage of being simple, fast, robust and scalable, making it well-suited for imperfect information games with large state-spaces. We propose Presumed Value PIMC resolving the problem of overestimation of opponent's knowledge of hidden information in future game states. The resulting AI agent was tested against human experts in Schnapsen, a Central European 2-player trick-taking card game, and performs above human expert-level.

We investigate the problem of revenue optimal mechanism design [Myerson, 1981] under the context of the partial rationality model, where buyers randomize between two modes: rational and irrational. When a buyer is irrational (can be thought of as lazy), he acts according to certain fixed strategies, such as bidding his true valuation. The seller cannot observe the buyer’s valuation, or his rationality mode, but treat them as random variables from known distributions. The seller’s goal is to design a single-shot auction that maximizes her expected revenue. A minor generalization as it may seem, our findings are in sharp contrast to Myerson’s theory on the standard rational bidder case. In particular, we show that, even for the simplest setting with one buyer, direct value revelation loses generality. However, we do show that, in terms of revenue, the optimal value-revelation and type-revelation mechanisms are equivalent. In addition, the posted-price mechanism is no longer optimal. In fact, the more complicated the mechanism, the higher the revenue. For the case where there are multiple bidders with IID uniform valuations, we show that when the irrational buyers are truthful, first price auction yields more revenue than second price auction.

Unfair rating attacks happen in existing trust and reputation systems, lowering the quality of the systems. There exists a formal model that measures the maximum impact of independent attackers [Wang et al., 2015] — based on information theory. We improve on these results in multiple ways: (1) we alter the methodology to be able to reason about colluding attackers as well, and (2) we extend the method to be able to measure the strength of any attacks (rather than just the strongest attack). Using (1), we identify the strongest collusion attacks, helping construct robust trust system. Using (2), we identify the strength of (classes of) attacks that we found in the literature. Based on this, we help to overcome a shortcoming of current research into collusion-resistance — specific (types of) attacks are used in simulations, disallowing direct comparisons between analyses of systems.

In this paper we study the exchange of indivisible objects where agents’ possible preferences over the objects are strict and share a common structure among all of them, which represents a certain level of asymmetry among objects. A typical example of such an exchange model is a re-scheduling of tasks over several processors, since all task owners are naturally assumed to prefer that their tasks are assigned to fast processors rather than slow ones. We focus on designing exchange rules (a.k.a.mechanisms) that simultaneously satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. We first provide a general impossibility result for agents’ preferences that are determined in an additive manner, and then show an existence of such an exchange rule for further restricted lexicographic preferences. We finally find that for the restricted case, a previously known equivalence between the single-valuedness of the strict core and the existence of such an exchange rule does not carry over.

Pricing-based mechanisms have been widely studied and developed for resource allocation in multi-agent systems. One of the main goals in such studies is to avoid envy between the agents, i.e., guarantee fair allocation. However, even the simplest combinatorial cases of this problem is not well understood. Here, we try to fill these gaps and design polynomial revenue maximizing pricing mechanisms to allocate homogeneous resources among buyers in envy-free manner. In particular, we consider envy-free outcomes in which all buyers' utilities are maximized. We also consider pair envy-free outcomes in which all buyers prefer their allocations to the allocations obtained by other agents. For both notions of envy-freeness, we consider item and bundle pricing schemes. Our results clearly demonstrate the limitations and advantages in terms of revenue between these two different notions of envy-freeness.

We consider three important, non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms: Probabilistic Serial and two variants of the Boston mechanism. Under each of these mechanisms, we study the agent’s manipulation problem of determining a best response, i.e., a report that maximizes the agent’s expected utility. In particular, we consider local manipulation strategies, which are simple heuristics based on local, greedy search. We make three main contributions. First, we present results from a behavioral experiment (conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk) which demonstrate that human manipulation strategies can largely be explained by local manipulation strategies. Second, we prove that local manipulation strategies may fail to solve the manipulation problem optimally. Third, we show via large-scale simulations that despite this non-optimality, these strategies are very effective on average. Our results demonstrate that while the manipulation problem may be hard in general, even cognitively or computationally bounded (human) agents can find near-optimal solutions almost all the time via simple local search strategies.

Animals in social foraging not only present the ordered and aggregated group movement but also the individual movement patterns of Lévy walks that are characterized as the power-law frequency distribution of flight lengths. The environment and the conspecific effects between group members are two fundamental inducements to the collective behavior. However, most previous models emphasize one of the two inducements probably because of the great difficulty to solve the behavior conflict caused by two inducements. Here, we propose an environment-driven social force model to simulate overall foraging process of an agent group. The social force concept is adopted to quantify the conspecific effects and the interactions between individuals and the environment. The cohesion-first rule is implemented to solve the conflict, which means that individuals preferentially guarantee the collective cohesion under the environmental effect. The obtained results efficiently comply with the empirical reports that mean the Lévy walk pattern of individual movement paths and the high consistency and cohesion of the entity group. By extensive simulations, we also validate the impact of two inducements for individual behaviors in comparison with several classic models

Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.

While a variety of persuasion agents have been created and applied in different domains such as marketing, military training and health industry, there is a lack of a model which can provide a unified framework for different persuasion strategies. Specifically, persuasion is not adaptable to the individuals' personal states in different situations. Grounded in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), this paper presents a computational model called Model for Adaptive Persuasion (MAP) for virtual agents. MAP is a semi-connected network model which enables an agent to adapt its persuasion strategies through feedback. We have implemented and evaluated a MAP-based virtual nurse agent who takes care and recommends healthy lifestyle habits to the elderly. Our experimental results show that the MAP-based agent is able to change the others' attitudes and behaviors intentionally, interpret individual differences between users, and adapt to user's behavior for effective persuasion.