Automatic text summarization tools have a great impact on many fields, such as medicine, law, and scientific research in general. As information overload increases, automatic summaries allow handling the growing volume of documents, usually by assigning weights to the extracted phrases based on their significance in the expected summary. Obtaining the main contents of any given document in less time than it would take to do that manually is still an issue of interest. In~this~ article, a new method is presented that allows automatically generating extractive summaries from documents by adequately weighting sentence scoring features using \textit{Particle Swarm Optimization}. The key feature of the proposed method is the identification of those features that are closest to the criterion used by the individual when summarizing. The proposed method combines a binary representation and a continuous one, using an original variation of the technique developed by the authors of this paper. Our paper shows that using user labeled information in the training set helps to find better metrics and weights. The empirical results yield an improved accuracy compared to previous methods used in this field

Multiagent decision-making problems in partially observable environments are usually modeled as either extensive-form games (EFGs) within the game theory community or partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) within the reinforcement learning community. While most practical problems can be modeled in both formalisms, the communities using these models are mostly distinct with little sharing of ideas or advances. The last decade has seen dramatic progress in algorithms for EFGs, mainly driven by the challenge problem of poker. We have seen computational techniques achieving super-human performance, some variants of poker are essentially solved, and there are now sound local search algorithms which were previously thought impossible. While the advances have garnered attention, the fundamental advances are not yet understood outside the EFG community. This can be largely explained by the starkly different formalisms between the game theory and reinforcement learning communities and, further, by the unsuitability of the original EFG formalism to make the ideas simple and clear. This paper aims to address these hindrances, by advocating a new unifying formalism, a variant of POSGs, which we call Factored-Observation Games (FOGs). We prove that any timeable perfect-recall EFG can be efficiently modeled as a FOG as well as relating FOGs to other existing formalisms. Additionally, a FOG explicitly identifies the public and private components of observations, which is fundamental to the recent EFG breakthroughs. We conclude by presenting the two building-blocks of these breakthroughs --- counterfactual regret minimization and public state decomposition --- in the new formalism, illustrating our goal of a simpler path for sharing recent advances between game theory and reinforcement learning community.

This paper aims to question the suitability of the Turing Test, for testing machine intelligence, in the light of advances made in the last 60 years in science, medicine, and philosophy of mind. While the main concept of the test may seem sound and valid, a detailed analysis of what is required to pass the test highlights a significant flow. Once the analysis of the test is presented, a systematic approach is followed in analysing what is needed to devise a test or tests for intelligent machines. The paper presents a plausible generic framework based on categories of factors implied by subjective perception of intelligence. An evaluative discussion concludes the paper highlighting some of the unaddressed issues within this generic framework.

Reinforcement Learning, a machine learning framework for training an autonomous agent based on rewards, has shown outstanding results in various domains. However, it is known that learning a good policy is difficult in a domain where rewards are rare. We propose a method, optimistic proximal policy optimization (OPPO) to alleviate this difficulty. OPPO considers the uncertainty of the estimated total return and optimistically evaluates the policy based on that amount. We show that OPPO outperforms the existing methods in a tabular task.

In recent years, reinforcement learning has been successful in solving video games from Atari to Star Craft II. However, the end-to-end model-free reinforcement learning (RL) is not sample efficient and requires a significant amount of computational resources to achieve superhuman level performance. Model-free RL is also unlikely to produce human-like agents for playtesting and gameplaying AI in the development cycle of complex video games. In this paper, we present a hierarchical approach to training agents with the goal of achieving human-like style and high skill level in team sports games. While this is still work in progress, our preliminary results show that the presented approach holds promise for solving the posed multi-agent learning problem.

Liquidation is the process of selling a large number of shares of one stock sequentially within a given time frame, taking into consideration the costs arising from market impact and a trader's risk aversion. The main challenge in optimizing liquidation is to find an appropriate modeling system that can incorporate the complexities of the stock market and generate practical trading strategies. In this paper, we propose to use multi-agent deep reinforcement learning model, which better captures high-level complexities comparing to various machine learning methods, such that agents can learn how to make the best selling decisions. First, we theoretically analyze the Almgren and Chriss model and extend its fundamental mechanism so it can be used as the multi-agent trading environment. Our work builds the foundation for future multi-agent environment trading analysis. Secondly, we analyze the cooperative and competitive behaviours between agents by adjusting the reward functions for each agent, which overcomes the limitation of single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. Finally, we simulate trading and develop an optimal trading strategy with practical constraints by using a reinforcement learning method, which shows the capabilities of reinforcement learning methods in solving realistic liquidation problems.

Autonomous vehicles (AV) are expected to navigate in complex traffic scenarios with multiple surrounding vehicles. The correlations between road users vary over time, the degree of which, in theory, could be infinitely large, and thus posing a great challenge in modeling and predicting the driving environment. In this research, we propose a method to reproduce such high-dimensional scenarios in a finitely tractable form by defining a stochastic vector field model in multi-vehicle interactions. We then apply non-parametric Bayesian learning to extract the underlying motion patterns from a large quantity of naturalistic traffic data. We use Gaussian process to model multi-vehicle motion, and Dirichlet process to assign each observation to a specific scenario. We implement the proposed method on NGSim highway and intersection data sets, in which complex multi-vehicle interactions are prevalent. The results show that the proposed method is capable of capturing motion patterns from both settings, without imposing heroic prior, hence can be applied for a wide array of traffic situations. The proposed modeling can enable simulation platforms and other testing methods designed for AV evaluation, to easily model and generate traffic scenarios emulating large scale driving data.

Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (\emph{house markets}) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the general domain Top Trading Cycle is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness, the situation differs in single-peaked domains. Bade (2019) presented the Crawler, an alternative procedure enjoying the same properties (with the additional advantage of being implementable in obviously dominant strategies); while Damamme et al. (2015) showed that allowing mutually beneficial swap-deals among the agents was already enough to guarantee Pareto-optimality. In this paper we significantly deepen our understanding of this decentralized procedures: we show in particular that the single-peaked domains happen to be ``maximal'' if one wishes to guarantee this convergence property. Interestingly, we also observe that the set of allocations reachable by swap-deals always contains the outcome of the Crawler. To further investigate how these different mechanisms compare, we pay special attention to the average and minimum rank of the resource obtained by the agents in the outcome allocation. We provide theoretical bounds on the loss potentially induced by these procedures with respect to these criteria, and complement these results with an extensive experimental study which shows how different variants of swap dynamics behave. In fact, even the simplest dynamics exhibit very good results, and it is possible to further guide the process towards our objectives, if one is ready to sacrifice a bit in terms of decentralization. On our way, we also show that a simple variant of the Crawler allows to check efficiently that an allocation is Pareto-optimal in single-peaked domains.

This paper extends the notion of equilibrium in game theory to learning algorithms in repeated stochastic games. We define a learning equilibrium as an algorithm used by a population of players, such that no player can individually use an alternative algorithm and increase its asymptotic score. We introduce Foolproof Cooperative Learning (FCL), an algorithm that converges to a Tit-for-Tat behavior. It allows cooperative strategies when played against itself while being not exploitable by selfish players. We prove that in repeated symmetric games, this algorithm is a learning equilibrium. We illustrate the behavior of FCL on symmetric matrix and grid games, and its robustness to selfish learners.

Teams of UGVs patrolling harsh and complex 3D environments can experience interference and spatial conflicts with one another. Neglecting the occurrence of these events crucially hinders both soundness and reliability of a patrolling process. This work presents a distributed multi-robot patrolling technique, which uses a two-level coordination strategy to minimize and explicitly manage the occurrence of conflicts and interference. The first level guides the agents to single out exclusive target nodes on a topological map. This target selection relies on a shared idleness representation and a coordination mechanism preventing topological conflicts. The second level hosts coordination strategies based on a metric representation of space and is supported by a 3D SLAM system. Here, each robot path planner negotiates spatial conflicts by applying a multi-robot traversability function. Continuous interactions between these two levels ensure coordination and conflicts resolution. Both simulations and real-world experiments are presented to validate the performances of the proposed patrolling strategy in 3D environments. Results show this is a promising solution for managing spatial conflicts and preventing deadlocks.