In operations of multi-agent teams ranging from homogeneous robot swarms to heterogeneous human-autonomy teams, unexpected events might occur. While efficiency of operation for multi-agent task allocation problems is the primary objective, it is essential that the decision-making framework is intelligent enough to manage unexpected task load with limited resources. Otherwise, operation effectiveness would drastically plummet with overloaded agents facing unforeseen risks. In this work, we present a decision-making framework for multi-agent teams to learn task allocation with the consideration of load management through decentralized reinforcement learning, where idling is encouraged and unnecessary resource usage is avoided. We illustrate the effect of load management on team performance and explore agent behaviors in example scenarios. Furthermore, a measure of agent importance in collaboration is developed to infer team resilience when facing handling potential overload situations.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), due to its on-policy nature, policy gradient (PG) methods are typically believed to be less sample efficient than value decomposition (VD) methods, which are off-policy. However, some recent empirical studies demonstrate that with proper input representation and hyper-parameter tuning, multi-agent PG can achieve surprisingly strong performance compared to off-policy VD methods. Why could PG methods work so well? In this post, we will present concrete analysis to show that in certain scenarios, e.g., environments with a highly multi-modal reward landscape, VD can be problematic and lead to undesired outcomes. In addition, PG methods with auto-regressive (AR) policies can learn multi-modal policies.

We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked domain, it is known that unanimous and strategy-proof deterministic rules have to be min-max rules and those that also satisfy anonymity have to be median rules. Further, random social choice rules satisfying these properties have been shown to be convex combinations of respective deterministic rules. We non-trivially add to this body of results by including fairness considerations in social choice. Our study directly addresses fairness for groups of agents. To study group-fairness, we consider an existing partition of the agents into logical groups, based on natural attributes such as gender, race, and location. To capture fairness within each group, we introduce the notion of group-wise anonymity. To capture fairness across the groups, we propose a weak notion as well as a strong notion of fairness. The proposed fairness notions turn out to be natural generalizations of existing individual-fairness notions and moreover provide non-trivial outcomes for strict ordinal preferences, unlike the existing group-fairness notions. We provide two separate characterizations of random social choice rules that satisfy group-fairness: (i) direct characterization (ii) extreme point characterization (as convex combinations of fair deterministic social choice rules). We also explore the special case where there are no groups and provide sharper characterizations of rules that achieve individual-fairness.

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a utility function that maps a vector to a scalar utility. In the case of a mixed strategy, it is meaningful to apply such a scalarisation both before calculating the expectation of the payoff vector as well as after. This distinction leads to two optimisation criteria. With the first criterion, players aim to optimise the expected value of their utility function applied to the payoff vectors obtained in the game. With the second criterion, players aim to optimise the utility of expected payoff vectors given a joint strategy. Under this latter criterion, it was shown that Nash equilibria need not exist. Our first contribution is to provide a sufficient condition under which Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Secondly, we show that when Nash equilibria do exist under both criteria, no equilibrium needs to be shared between the two criteria, and even the number of equilibria can differ. Thirdly, we contribute a study of pure strategy Nash equilibria under both criteria. We show that when assuming quasiconvex utility functions for players, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria under both optimisation criteria are equivalent. This result is further extended to games in which players adhere to different optimisation criteria. Finally, given these theoretical results, we construct an algorithm to compute all pure strategy Nash equilibria in MONFGs where players have a quasiconvex utility function.

Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

The ability to accurately estimate the position of robotic agents relative to one another, in possibly GPS-denied environments, is crucial to execute collaborative tasks. Inter-agent range measurements are available at a low cost, due to technologies such as ultra-wideband radio. However, the task of three-dimensional relative position estimation using range measurements in multi-agent systems suffers from unobservabilities. This letter presents a sufficient condition for the observability of the relative positions, and satisfies the condition using a simple framework with only range measurements, an accelerometer, a rate gyro, and a magnetometer. The framework has been tested in simulation and in experiments, where 40-50 cm positioning accuracy is achieved using inexpensive off-the-shelf hardware.

Driving safely requires multiple capabilities from human and intelligent agents, such as the generalizability to unseen environments, the safety awareness of the surrounding traffic, and the decision-making in complex multi-agent settings. Despite the great success of Reinforcement Learning (RL), most of the RL research works investigate each capability separately due to the lack of integrated environments. In this work, we develop a new driving simulation platform called MetaDrive to support the research of generalizable reinforcement learning algorithms for machine autonomy. MetaDrive is highly compositional, which can generate an infinite number of diverse driving scenarios from both the procedural generation and the real data importing. Based on MetaDrive, we construct a variety of RL tasks and baselines in both single-agent and multi-agent settings, including benchmarking generalizability across unseen scenes, safe exploration, and learning multi-agent traffic. The generalization experiments conducted on both procedurally generated scenarios and real-world scenarios show that increasing the diversity and the size of the training set leads to the improvement of the RL agent's generalizability. We further evaluate various safe reinforcement learning and multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms in MetaDrive environments and provide the benchmarks. Source code, documentation, and demo video are available at \url{ https://metadriverse.github.io/metadrive}.

Learning and equilibrium computation in games are fundamental problems across computer science and economics, with applications ranging from politics to machine learning. Much of the work in this area revolves around a simple algorithm termed \emph{randomized weighted majority} (RWM), also known as "Hedge" or "Multiplicative Weights Update," which is well known to achieve statistically optimal rates in adversarial settings (Littlestone and Warmuth '94, Freund and Schapire '99). Unfortunately, RWM comes with an inherent computational barrier: it requires maintaining and sampling from a distribution over all possible actions. In typical settings of interest the action space is exponentially large, seemingly rendering RWM useless in practice. In this work, we refute this notion for a broad variety of \emph{structured} games, showing it is possible to efficiently (approximately) sample the action space in RWM in \emph{polylogarithmic} time. This gives the first efficient no-regret algorithms for problems such as the \emph{(discrete) Colonel Blotto game}, \emph{matroid congestion}, \emph{matroid security}, and basic \emph{dueling games}. As an immediate corollary, we give a polylogarithmic time meta-algorithm to compute approximate Nash Equilibria for these games that is exponentially faster than prior methods in several important settings. Further, our algorithm is the first to efficiently compute equilibria for more involved variants of these games with general sums, more than two players, and, for Colonel Blotto, multiple resource types.

While research in ad hoc teamwork has great potential for solving real-world robotic applications, most developments so far have been focusing on environments with simple dynamics. In this article, we discuss how the problem of ad hoc teamwork can be of special interest for marine robotics and how it can aid marine operations. Particularly, we present a set of challenges that need to be addressed for achieving ad hoc teamwork in underwater environments and we discuss possible solutions based on current state-of-the-art developments in the ad hoc teamwork literature.

We present an Equation/Variable free machine learning (EVFML) framework for the control of the collective dynamics of complex/multiscale systems modelled via microscopic/agent-based simulators. The approach obviates the need for construction of surrogate, reduced-order models.~The proposed implementation consists of three steps: (A) from high-dimensional agent-based simulations, machine learning (in particular, non-linear manifold learning (Diffusion Maps (DMs)) helps identify a set of coarse-grained variables that parametrize the low-dimensional manifold on which the emergent/collective dynamics evolve. The out-of-sample extension and pre-image problems, i.e. the construction of non-linear mappings from the high-dimensional input space to the low-dimensional manifold and back, are solved by coupling DMs with the Nystrom extension and Geometric Harmonics, respectively; (B) having identified the manifold and its coordinates, we exploit the Equation-free approach to perform numerical bifurcation analysis of the emergent dynamics; then (C) based on the previous steps, we design data-driven embedded wash-out controllers that drive the agent-based simulators to their intrinsic, imprecisely known, emergent open-loop unstable steady-states, thus demonstrating that the scheme is robust against numerical approximation errors and modelling uncertainty.~The efficiency of the framework is illustrated by controlling emergent unstable (i) traveling waves of a deterministic agent-based model of traffic dynamics, and (ii) equilibria of a stochastic financial market agent model with mimesis.