As robots become increasingly prevalent in work-oriented collaborations, trust has emerged as a critical factor in their acceptance and effectiveness. However, trust is dynamic and can erode when mistakes are made. Despite emerging research on trust repair in human-robot interaction, significant questions remain about identifying reliable approaches to restoring trust in robots after trust violations occur. To address this problem, my research aims to identify effective strategies for designing robots capable of trust repair in human-robot interaction (HRI) and to explore the underlying mechanisms that make these strategies successful. This paper provides an overview of the fundamental concepts and key components of the trust repair process in HRI, as well as a summary of my current published work in this area. Additionally, I discuss the research questions that will guide my future work and the potential contributions that this research could make to the field.

Efficient learning in multi-armed bandit mechanisms such as pay-per-click (PPC) auctions typically involves three challenges: 1) inducing truthful bidding behavior (incentives), 2) using personalization in the users (context), and 3) circumventing manipulations in click patterns (corruptions). Each of these challenges has been studied orthogonally in the literature; incentives have been addressed by a line of work on truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms, context has been extensively tackled by contextual bandit algorithms, while corruptions have been discussed via a recent line of work on bandits with adversarial corruptions. Since these challenges co-exist, it is important to understand the robustness of each of these approaches in addressing the other challenges, provide algorithms that can handle all simultaneously, and highlight inherent limitations in this combination. In this work, we show that the most prominent contextual bandit algorithm, $\epsilon$-greedy can be extended to handle the challenges introduced by strategic arms in the contextual multi-arm bandit mechanism setting. We further show that $\epsilon$-greedy is inherently robust to adversarial data corruption attacks and achieves performance that degrades linearly with the amount of corruption.

Due to the broad range of applications of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), understanding the effects of adversarial attacks against MARL model is essential for the safe applications of this model. Motivated by this, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on MARL. In the considered setup, there is an exogenous attacker who is able to modify the rewards before the agents receive them or manipulate the actions before the environment receives them. The attacker aims to guide each agent into a target policy or maximize the cumulative rewards under some specific reward function chosen by the attacker, while minimizing the amount of manipulation on feedback and action. We first show the limitations of the action poisoning only attacks and the reward poisoning only attacks. We then introduce a mixed attack strategy with both the action poisoning and the reward poisoning. We show that the mixed attack strategy can efficiently attack MARL agents even if the attacker has no prior information about the underlying environment and the agents' algorithms.

Nudging is a behavioral strategy aimed at influencing people's thoughts and actions. Nudging techniques can be found in many situations in our daily lives, and these nudging techniques can targeted at human fast and unconscious thinking, e.g., by using images to generate fear or the more careful and effortful slow thinking, e.g., by releasing information that makes us reflect on our choices. In this paper, we propose and discuss a value-based AI-human collaborative framework where AI systems nudge humans by proposing decision recommendations. Three different nudging modalities, based on when recommendations are presented to the human, are intended to stimulate human fast thinking, slow thinking, or meta-cognition. Values that are relevant to a specific decision scenario are used to decide when and how to use each of these nudging modalities. Examples of values are decision quality, speed, human upskilling and learning, human agency, and privacy. Several values can be present at the same time, and their priorities can vary over time. The framework treats values as parameters to be instantiated in a specific decision environment.

This paper presents a novel planning method that achieves navigation of multi-robot formations in cluttered environments, while maintaining the formation throughout the robots motion. The method utilises a decentralised approach to find feasible formation parameters that guarantees formation constraints for rigid formations. The method proves to be computationally efficient, making it relevant for reactive planning and control of multi-robot systems formation. The method has been tested in a simulation environment to prove feasibility and run-time efficiency.

We consider a cooperative multi-agent system consisting of a team of agents with decentralized information. Our focus is on the design of symmetric (i.e. identical) strategies for the agents in order to optimize a finite horizon team objective. We start with a general information structure and then consider some special cases. The constraint of using symmetric strategies introduces new features and complications in the team problem. For example, we show in a simple example that randomized symmetric strategies may outperform deterministic symmetric strategies. We also discuss why some of the known approaches for reducing agents' private information in teams may not work under the constraint of symmetric strategies. We then adopt the common information approach for our problem and modify it to accommodate the use of symmetric strategies. This results in a common information based dynamic program where each step involves minimization over a single function from the space of an agent's private information to the space of probability distributions over actions. We present specialized models where private information can be reduced using simple dynamic program based arguments.

Despite numerous successes in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL), the learned policies are not interpretable. Moreover, since DRL does not exploit symbolic relational representations, it has difficulties in coping with structural changes in its environment (such as increasing the number of objects). Relational Reinforcement Learning, on the other hand, inherits the relational representations from symbolic planning to learn reusable policies. However, it has so far been unable to scale up and exploit the power of deep neural networks. We propose Deep Explainable Relational Reinforcement Learning (DERRL), a framework that exploits the best of both -- neural and symbolic worlds. By resorting to a neuro-symbolic approach, DERRL combines relational representations and constraints from symbolic planning with deep learning to extract interpretable policies. These policies are in the form of logical rules that explain how each decision (or action) is arrived at. Through several experiments, in setups like the Countdown Game, Blocks World, Gridworld, and Traffic, we show that the policies learned by DERRL can be applied to different configurations and contexts, hence generalizing to environmental modifications.

We present a method for the control of robot swarms using two subsets of robots: a larger group of simple, oblivious robots (which we call the workers) that is governed by simple local attraction forces, and a smaller group (the guides) with sufficient mission knowledge to create and displace a desired worker formation by operating on the local forces of the workers. The guides coordinate to shape the workers like smart particles by changing their interaction parameters. We study the approach with a large scale experiment in a physics based simulator with up to 5000 robots forming three different patterns. Our experiments reveal that the approach scales well with increasing robot numbers, and presents little pattern distortion. We evaluate the approach on a physical swarm of robots that use visual inertial odometry to compute their relative positions and obtain results that are comparable with simulation. This work lays the foundation for designing and coordinating configurable smart particles, with applications in smart materials and nanomedicine.

This paper investigates causal influences between agents linked by a social graph and interacting over time. In particular, the work examines the dynamics of social learning models and distributed decision-making protocols, and derives expressions that reveal the causal relations between pairs of agents and explain the flow of influence over the network. The results turn out to be dependent on the graph topology and the level of information that each agent has about the inference problem they are trying to solve. Using these conclusions, the paper proposes an algorithm to rank the overall influence between agents to discover highly influential agents. It also provides a method to learn the necessary model parameters from raw observational data. The results and the proposed algorithm are illustrated by considering both synthetic data and real Twitter data.

If much of the information is irrelevant, it's easy to To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative imagine how this could lead to significant increases in efficiency games, it is often crucial to have information for finding optimal policies. For example, this could about one's collaborators: successful driving requires allow a focused effort on few-shot or zero-shot adaptation to understanding which side of the road to co-players (Zand et al., 2022; Albrecht & Stone, 2017; Stone drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2020) or more efficient DecPOMDP is strategically relevant: the fine-grained planning algorithms (Szer & Charpillet, 2006; Seuken & acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining Zilberstein, 2007). In order to leverage these benefits, we optimal coordination. We show that there build the theory, data structures, and algorithms required to is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information.