Automated negotiation is a well-known mechanism for autonomous agents to reach agreements. To realize beneficial agreements quickly, it is key to employ a good bidding strategy. When a negotiating agent has a good back-up plan, i.e., a high reservation value, failing to reach an agreement is not necessarily disadvantageous. Thus, the agent can adopt a risk-seeking strategy, aiming for outcomes with a higher utilities. Accordingly, this paper develops an optimal bidding strategy called MIA-RVelous for bilateral negotiations with private reservation values. The proposed greedy algorithm finds the optimal bid sequence given the agent's beliefs about the opponent in $O(n^2D)$ time, with $D$ the maximum number of rounds and $n$ the number of outcomes. The results obtained here can pave the way to realizing effective concurrent negotiations, given that concurrent negotiations can serve as a (probabilistic) backup plan.

Evaluating deep multiagent reinforcement learning In purely adversarial (i.e., two-player zero-sum) environments, (MARL) algorithms is complicated by stochasticity distance to Nash equilibrium may be a sufficient metric in training and sensitivity of agent performance [Brown et al., 2020; Schmid et al., 2023], as all equilibria to the behavior of other agents. We propose a metagame are interchangeably optimal. More generally, where there evaluation framework for deep MARL, by are multiple equilibria or where we do not necessarily expect framing each MARL algorithm as a meta-strategy, equilibrium behavior, the metrics for MARL performance and repeatedly sampling normal-form empirical may be less clear. In collaborative domains, global team return games over combinations of meta-strategies resulting is the common objective [Foerster et al., 2018; Rashid from different random seeds. Each empirical et al., 2020], however complex learning dynamics may lead game captures both self-play and cross-play factors agents using the same MARL algorithm to equilibria of distinct across seeds. These empirical games provide machine conventions in different runs [Hu et al., 2020].

We investigate the algorithmic problem of uniformly dispersing a swarm of robots in an unknown, gridlike environment. In this setting, our goal is to comprehensively study the relationships between performance metrics and robot capabilities. We introduce a formal model comparing dispersion algorithms based on makespan, traveled distance, energy consumption, sensing, communication, and memory. Using this framework, we classify several uniform dispersion algorithms according to their capability requirements and performance. We prove that while makespan and travel can be minimized in all environments, energy cannot, as long as the swarm's sensing range is bounded. In contrast, we show that energy can be minimized even by simple, ``ant-like" robots in synchronous settings and asymptotically minimized in asynchronous settings, provided the environment is topologically simply connected. Our findings offer insights into fundamental limitations that arise when designing swarm robotics systems for exploring unknown environments, highlighting the impact of environment's topology on the feasibility of energy-efficient dispersion.

There is a gap in risk assessment of trajectories between the trajectory information coming from a traffic motion prediction module and what is actually needed. Closing this gap necessitates advancements in prediction beyond current practices. Existing prediction models yield joint predictions of agents' future trajectories with uncertainty weights or marginal Gaussian probability density functions (PDFs) for single agents. Although, these methods achieve high accurate trajectory predictions, they only provide little or no information about the dependencies of interacting agents. Since traffic is a process of highly interdependent agents, whose actions directly influence their mutual behavior, the existing methods are not sufficient to reliably assess the risk of future trajectories. This paper addresses that gap by introducing a novel approach to motion prediction, focusing on predicting agent-pair covariance matrices in a ``scene-centric'' manner, which can then be used to model Gaussian joint PDFs for all agent-pairs in a scene. We propose a model capable of predicting those agent-pair covariance matrices, leveraging an enhanced awareness of interactions. Utilizing the prediction results of our model, this work forms the foundation for comprehensive risk assessment with statistically based methods for analyzing agents' relations by their joint PDFs.

Music composition represents the creative side of humanity, and itself is a complex task that requires abilities to understand and generate information with long dependency and harmony constraints. While demonstrating impressive capabilities in STEM subjects, current LLMs easily fail in this task, generating ill-written music even when equipped with modern techniques like In-Context-Learning and Chain-of-Thoughts. To further explore and enhance LLMs' potential in music composition by leveraging their reasoning ability and the large knowledge base in music history and theory, we propose ComposerX, an agent-based symbolic music generation framework. We find that applying a multi-agent approach significantly improves the music composition quality of GPT-4. The results demonstrate that ComposerX is capable of producing coherent polyphonic music compositions with captivating melodies, while adhering to user instructions.

Reinforcement learning for multi-agent games has attracted lots of attention recently. However, given the challenge of solving Nash equilibria for large population games, existing works with guaranteed polynomial complexities either focus on variants of zero-sum and potential games, or aim at solving (coarse) correlated equilibria, or require access to simulators, or rely on certain assumptions that are hard to verify. This work proposes MF-OML (Mean-Field Occupation-Measure Learning), an online mean-field reinforcement learning algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of large population sequential symmetric games. MF-OML is the first fully polynomial multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm for provably solving Nash equilibria (up to mean-field approximation gaps that vanish as the number of players $N$ goes to infinity) beyond variants of zero-sum and potential games. When evaluated by the cumulative deviation from Nash equilibria, the algorithm is shown to achieve a high probability regret bound of $\tilde{O}(M^{3/4}+N^{-1/2}M)$ for games with the strong Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition, and a regret bound of $\tilde{O}(M^{11/12}+N^{- 1/6}M)$ for games with only the Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition, where $M$ is the total number of episodes and $N$ is the number of agents of the game. As a byproduct, we also obtain the first tractable globally convergent computational algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of monotone mean-field games.

Predicting future trajectories of traffic agents accurately holds substantial importance in various applications such as autonomous driving. Previous methods commonly infer all future steps of an agent either recursively or simultaneously. However, the recursive strategy suffers from the accumulated error, while the simultaneous strategy overlooks the constraints among future steps, resulting in kinematically infeasible predictions. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose G2LTraj, a plug-and-play global-to-local generation approach for trajectory prediction. Specifically, we generate a series of global key steps that uniformly cover the entire future time range. Subsequently, the local intermediate steps between the adjacent key steps are recursively filled in. In this way, we prevent the accumulated error from propagating beyond the adjacent key steps. Moreover, to boost the kinematical feasibility, we not only introduce the spatial constraints among key steps but also strengthen the temporal constraints among the intermediate steps. Finally, to ensure the optimal granularity of key steps, we design a selectable granularity strategy that caters to each predicted trajectory. Our G2LTraj significantly improves the performance of seven existing trajectory predictors across the ETH, UCY and nuScenes datasets. Experimental results demonstrate its effectiveness. Code will be available at https://github.com/Zhanwei-Z/G2LTraj.

As AI increasingly integrates with human decision-making, we must carefully consider interactions between the two. In particular, current approaches focus on optimizing individual agent actions but often overlook the nuances of collective intelligence. Group dynamics might require that one agent (e.g., the AI system) compensate for biases and errors in another agent (e.g., the human), but this compensation should be carefully developed. We provide a theoretical framework for algorithmic compensation that synthesizes game theory and reinforcement learning principles to demonstrate the natural emergence of deceptive outcomes from the continuous learning dynamics of agents. We provide simulation results involving Markov Decision Processes (MDP) learning to interact. This work then underpins our ethical analysis of the conditions in which AI agents should adapt to biases and behaviors of other agents in dynamic and complex decision-making environments. Overall, our approach addresses the nuanced role of strategic deception of humans, challenging previous assumptions about its detrimental effects. We assert that compensation for others' biases can enhance coordination and ethical alignment: strategic deception, when ethically managed, can positively shape human-AI interactions.

In this paper, we propose standard statistical tools as a solution to commonly highlighted problems in the explainability literature. Indeed, leveraging statistical estimators allows for a proper definition of explanations, enabling theoretical guarantees and the formulation of evaluation metrics to quantitatively assess the quality of explanations. This approach circumvents, among other things, the subjective human assessment currently prevalent in the literature. Moreover, we argue that uncertainty quantification is essential for providing robust and trustworthy explanations, and it can be achieved in this framework through classical statistical procedures such as the bootstrap. However, it is crucial to note that while Statistics offers valuable contributions, it is not a panacea for resolving all the challenges. Future research avenues could focus on open problems, such as defining a purpose for the explanations or establishing a statistical framework for counterfactual or adversarial scenarios.

Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit auctions are limited. This paper utilizes artificial intelligence, specifically reinforcement learning, as a model free learning approach to simulate bidding in three prominent multi-unit auctions employed in practice. We introduce six algorithms that are suitable for learning and bidding in multi-unit auctions and compare them using an illustrative example. This paper underscores the significance of using artificial intelligence in auction design, particularly in enhancing the design of multi-unit auctions.