Distributed constraint optimization (DCOP) problems are a popular way of formulating and solving agent-coordination problems. A DCOP problem is a problem where several agents coordinate their values such that the sum of the resulting constraint costs is minimal. It is often desirable to solve DCOP problems with memory-bounded and asynchronous algorithms. We introduce Branch-and-Bound ADOPT (BnB-ADOPT), a memory-bounded asynchronous DCOP search algorithm that uses the message-passing and communication framework of ADOPT (Modi, Shen, Tambe, and Yokoo, 2005), a well known memory-bounded asynchronous DCOP search algorithm, but changes the search strategy of ADOPT from best-first search to depth-first branch-and-bound search. Our experimental results show that BnB-ADOPT finds cost-minimal solutions up to one order of magnitude faster than ADOPT for a variety of large DCOP problems and is as fast as NCBB, a memory-bounded synchronous DCOP search algorithm, for most of these DCOP problems. Additionally, it is often desirable to find bounded-error solutions for DCOP problems within a reasonable amount of time since finding cost-minimal solutions is NP-hard. The existing bounded-error approximation mechanism allows users only to specify an absolute error bound on the solution cost but a relative error bound is often more intuitive. Thus, we present two new bounded-error approximation mechanisms that allow for relative error bounds and implement them on top of BnB-ADOPT.

Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in the field of multi-agent systems. Central to this endeavour is the problem of determining which of the many possible coalitions to form in order to achieve some goal. This usually requires calculating a value for every possible coalition, known as the coalition value, which indicates how beneficial that coalition would be if it was formed. Once these values are calculated, the agents usually need to find a combination of coalitions, in which every agent belongs to exactly one coalition, and by which the overall outcome of the system is maximized. However, this coalition structure generation problem is extremely challenging due to the number of possible solutions that need to be examined, which grows exponentially with the number of agents involved. To date, therefore, many algorithms have been proposed to solve this problem using different techniques ranging from dynamic programming, to integer programming, to stochastic search all of which suffer from major limitations relating to execution time, solution quality, and memory requirements. With this in mind, we develop an anytime algorithm to solve the coalition structure generation problem. Specifically, the algorithm uses a novel representation of the search space, which partitions the space of possible solutions into sub-spaces such that it is possible to compute upper and lower bounds on the values of the best coalition structures in them. These bounds are then used to identify the sub-spaces that have no potential of containing the optimal solution so that they can be pruned. The algorithm, then, searches through the remaining sub-spaces very efficiently using a branch-and-bound technique to avoid examining all the solutions within the searched subspace(s). In this setting, we prove that our algorithm enumerates all coalition structures efficiently by avoiding redundant and invalid solutions automatically. Moreover, in order to effectively test our algorithm we develop a new type of input distribution which allows us to generate more reliable benchmarks compared to the input distributions previously used in the field. Given this new distribution, we show that for 27 agents our algorithm is able to find solutions that are optimal in 0.175% of the time required by the fastest available algorithm in the literature. The algorithm is anytime, and if interrupted before it would have normally terminated, it can still provide a solution that is guaranteed to be within a bound from the optimal one. Moreover, the guarantees we provide on the quality of the solution are significantly better than those provided by the previous state of the art algorithms designed for this purpose. For example, for the worst case distribution given 25 agents, our algorithm is able to find a 90% efficient solution in around 10% of time it takes to find the optimal solution.

We discuss the problems of modeling, control, and decision support in complex dynamic systems from a general system theoretic point of view. The main characteristics of complex systems and of system approach to complex system study are considered. We provide an overview and analysis of known existing paradigms and methods of mathematical modeling and simulation of complex systems, which support the processes of control and decision making. Then we continue with the general dynamic modeling and simulation technique for complex hierarchical systems functioning in control loop. Architectural and structural models of computer information system intended for simulation and decision support in complex systems are presented.

Many multi-agent coordination problems can be represented as DCOPs. Motivated by task allocation in disaster response, we extend standard DCOP models to consider uncertain task rewards where the outcome of completing a task depends on its current state, which is randomly drawn from unknown distributions. The goal of solving this problem is to find a solution for all agents that minimizes the overall worst-case loss. This is a challenging problem for centralized algorithms because the search space grows exponentially with the number of agents and is nontrivial for standard DCOP algorithms we have. To address this, we propose a novel decentralized algorithm that incorporates Max-Sum with iterative constraint generation to solve the problem by passing messages among agents. By so doing, our approach scales well and can solve instances of the task allocation problem with hundreds of agents and tasks.

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior is an approximately optimal solution to an unknown decision problem. These techniques learn a utility function that explains the example behavior and can then be used to accurately predict or imitate future behavior in similar observed or unobserved situations. In this work, we consider similar tasks in competitive and cooperative multi-agent domains. Here, unlike single-agent settings, a player cannot myopically maximize its reward; it must speculate on how the other agents may act to influence the game's outcome. Employing the game-theoretic notion of regret and the principle of maximum entropy, we introduce a technique for predicting and generalizing behavior.

As large-scale theft of data from corporate servers is becoming increasingly common, it becomes interesting to examine alternatives to the paradigm of centralizing sensitive data into large databases. Instead, one could use cryptography and distributed computation so that sensitive data can be supplied and processed in encrypted form, and only the final result is made known. In this paper, we examine how such a paradigm can be used to implement constraint satisfaction, a technique that can solve a broad class of AI problems such as resource allocation, planning, scheduling, and diagnosis. Most previous work on privacy in constraint satisfaction only attempted to protect specific types of information, in particular the feasibility of particular combinations of decisions. We formalize and extend these restricted notions of privacy by introducing four types of private information, including the feasibility of decisions and the final decisions made, but also the identities of the participants and the topology of the problem. We present distributed algorithms that allow computing solutions to constraint satisfaction problems while maintaining these four types of privacy. We formally prove the privacy properties of these algorithms, and show experiments that compare their respective performance on benchmark problems.

In reputation systems for multiagent-based e-marketplaces, buying agents model the reputation of selling agents based on ratings shared by other buyers (called advisors). With the existence of unfair rating attacks from dishonest advisors, the effectiveness of reputation systems thus heavily relies on whether buyers can accurately determine which advisors to include in trust networks and their trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose two approaches to deal with unfair rating attacks. The first method is to combine the advantages of different categorical trust models. Secondly, we propose a novel multiagent evolutionary trust model (MET) where each buyer constructs its trust network (information about which advisors should be include in the network and their trustworthiness) by the evolutionary model. Experimental results demonstrate the proposed algorithms are more robust than the state-of-the-art trust models against various unfair rating attacks.

Optimal decentralized decision making in a team of cooperative agents as formalized by decentralized POMDPs is a notoriously hard problem. A major obstacle is that the agents do not have access to a sufficient statistic during execution, which means that they need to base their actions on their histories of observations. A consequence is that even during off-line planning the choice of decision rules for different stages is tightly interwoven: decisions of earlier stages affect how to act optimally at later stages, and the optimal value function for a stage is known to have a dependence on the decisions made up to that point. This paper makes a contribution to the theory of decentralized POMDPs by showing how this dependence on the 'past joint policy' can be replaced by a sufficient statistic. These results are extended to the case of k-step delayed communication. The paper investigates the practical implications, as well as the effectiveness of a new pruning technique for MAA* methods, in a number of benchmark problems and discusses future avenues of research opened by these contributions.

Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP) is a powerful framework for representing and solving distributed combinatorial problems, where the variables of the problem are owned by different agents. Many multi-agent problems include constraints that produce different gains (or costs) for the participating agents. Asymmetric gains of constrained agents cannot be naturally represented by the standard DCOP model. The present paper proposes a general framework for Asymmetric DCOPs (ADCOPs). In ADCOPs different agents may have different valuations for constraints that they are involved in. The new framework bridges the gap between multi-agent problems which tend to have asymmetric structure and the standard symmetric DCOP model. The benefits of the proposed model over previous attempts to generalize the DCOP model are discussed and evaluated. Innovative algorithms that apply to the special properties of the proposed ADCOP model are presented in detail. These include complete algorithms that have a substantial advantage in terms of runtime and network load over existing algorithms (for standard DCOPs) which use alternative representations. Moreover, standard incomplete algorithms (i.e., local search algorithms) are inapplicable to the existing DCOP representations of asymmetric constraints and when they are applied to the new ADCOP framework they often fail to converge to a local optimum and yield poor results. The local search algorithms proposed in the present paper converge to high quality solutions. The experimental evidence that is presented reveals that the proposed local search algorithms for ADCOPs achieve high quality solutions while preserving a high level of privacy.

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer of a multi-agent system program its identical agents to behave each in a different way? From a game theoretic perspective, such situations lead to undesirable Nash equilibria. For example consider a resource allocation game in that two players compete for an exclusive access to a single resource. It has three Nash equilibria. The two pure-strategy NE are efficient, but not fair. The one mixed-strategy NE is fair, but not efficient. Aumann's notion of correlated equilibrium fixes this problem: It assumes a correlation device that suggests each agent an action to take. However, such a "smart" coordination device might not be available. We propose using a randomly chosen, "stupid" integer coordination signal. "Smart" agents learn which action they should use for each value of the coordination signal. We present a multi-agent learning algorithm that converges in polynomial number of steps to a correlated equilibrium of a channel allocation game, a variant of the resource allocation game. We show that the agents learn to play for each coordination signal value a randomly chosen pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, the outcome is an efficient correlated equilibrium. This CE becomes more fair as the number of the available coordination signal values increases.