Social intelligence in natural and artificial systems is usually measured by the evaluation of associated traits or tasks that are deemed to represent some facets of social behaviour. The amalgamation of these traits is then used to configure the intuitive notion of social intelligence. Instead, in this paper we start from a parametrised definition of social intelligence as the expected performance in a set of environments with several agents, and we assess and derive tests from it. This definition makes several dependencies explicit: (1) the definition depends on the choice (and weight) of environments and agents, (2) the definition may include both competitive and cooperative behaviours depending on how agents and rewards are arranged into teams, (3) the definition mostly depends on the abilities of other agents, and (4) the actual difference between social intelligence and general intelligence (or other abilities) depends on these choices. As a result, we address the problem of converting this definition into a more precise one where some fundamental properties ensuring social behaviour (such as action and reward dependency and anticipation on competitive/cooperative behaviours) are met as well as some other more instrumental properties (such as secernment, boundedness, symmetry, validity, reliability, efficiency), which are convenient to convert the definition into a practical test. From the definition and the formalised properties, we take a look at several representative multi-agent environments, tests and games to see whether they meet these properties.

We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences (valuation functions) over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for decision making by autonomous agents and has been shown to present severe computational hardness, in the design of truthful approximation mechanisms. We study a non-truthful mechanism that is, however, practically relevant to multi-agent environments, by virtue of its natural simplicity. It employs an Item Bidding interface, wherein every agent issues a separate bid for the inclusion of each distinct item in the outcome; the k items with the highest sums of bids are chosen and agents are charged according to a VCG-based payment rule. For fairly expressive classes of the agents' valuation functions, we establish existence of socially optimal pure Nash and strong equilibria, that are resilient to coordinated deviations of subsets of agents. Subsequently we derive tight worst-case bounds on the approximation of the optimum social welfare achieved in equilibrium. We show that the mechanism's performance improves with the number of agents that can coordinate, and reaches half of the optimum welfare at strong equilibrium.

In this paper, we solve cooperative decentralized stochastic planning problems, where the interactions between agents (specified using transition and reward functions) are dependent on the number of agents (and not on the identity of the individual agents) involved in the interaction. A collision of robots in a narrow corridor, defender teams coordinating patrol activities to secure a target, etc. are examples of such anonymous interactions. Formally, we consider problems that are a subset of the well known Decentralized MDP (DEC-MDP) model, where the anonymity in interactions is specified within the joint reward and transition functions. In this paper, not only do we introduce a general model model called D-SPAIT to capture anonymity in interactions, but also provide optimization based optimal and local-optimal solutions for generalizable sub-categories of D-SPAIT.

Many multi-agent coordination problems can be represented as DCOPs. Motivated by task allocation in disaster response, we extend standard DCOP models to consider uncertain task rewards where the outcome of completing a task depends on its current state, which is randomly drawn from unknown distributions. The goal of solving this problem is to find a solution for all agents that minimizes the overall worst-case loss. This is a challenging problem for centralized algorithms because the search space grows exponentially with the number of agents and is nontrivial for existing algorithms for standard DCOPs. To address this, we propose a novel decentralized algorithm that incorporates Max-Sum with iterative constraint generation to solve the problem by passing messages among agents. By so doing, our approach scales well and can solve instances of the task allocation problem with hundreds of agents and tasks.

Recent work has shown that diverse teams can outperform a uniform team made of copies of the best agent. However, there are fundamental questions that were not asked before. When should we use diverse or uniform teams? How does the performance change as the action space or the teams get larger? Hence, we present a new model of diversity for teams, that is more general than previous models. We prove that the performance of a diverse team improves as the size of the action space gets larger. Concerning the size of the diverse team, we show that the performance converges exponentially fast to the optimal one as we increase the number of agents. We present synthetic experiments that allow us to gain further insights: even though a diverse team outperforms a uniform team when the size of the action space increases, the uniform team will eventually again play better than the diverse team for a large enough action space. We verify our predictions in a system of Go playing agents, where we show a diverse team that improves in performance as the board size increases, and eventually overcomes a uniform team.

The fair division of indivisible goods has long been an important topic in economics and, more recently, computer science. We investigate the existence of envy-free allocations of indivisible goods, that is, allocations where each player values her own allocated set of goods at least as highly as any other player's allocated set of goods. Under additive valuations, we show that even when the number of goods is larger than the number of agents by a linear fraction, envy-free allocations are unlikely to exist. We then show that when the number of goods is larger by a logarithmic factor, such allocations exist with high probability. We support these results experimentally and show that the asymptotic behavior of the theory holds even when the number of goods and agents is quite small. We demonstrate that there is a sharp phase transition from nonexistence to existence of envy-free allocations, and that on average the computational problem is hardest at that transition.

As large-scale theft of data from corporate servers is becoming increasingly common, it becomes interesting to examine alternatives to the paradigm of centralizing sensitive data into large databases. Instead, one could use cryptography and distributed computation so that sensitive data can be supplied and processed in encrypted form, and only the final result is made known. In this paper, we examine how such a paradigm can be used to implement constraint satisfaction, a technique that can solve a broad class of AI problems such as resource allocation, planning, scheduling, and diagnosis. Most previous work on privacy in constraint satisfaction only attempted to protect specific types of information, in particular the feasibility of particular combinations of decisions. We formalize and extend these restricted notions of privacy by introducing four types of private information, including the feasibility of decisions and the final decisions made, but also the identities of the participants and the topology of the problem. We present distributed algorithms that allow computing solutions to constraint satisfaction problems while maintaining these four types of privacy. We formally prove the privacy properties of these algorithms, and show experiments that compare their respective performance on benchmark problems.

Collecting and maintaining accurate world knowledge in a dynamic, complex, adversarial, and stochastic environment such as the RoboCup 3D Soccer Simulation is a challenging task. Knowledge should be learned in real-time with time constraints. We use recently introduced Off-Policy Gradient Descent algorithms within Reinforcement Learning that illustrate learnable knowledge representations for dynamic role assignments. The results show that the agents have learned competitive policies against the top teams from the RoboCup 2012 competitions for three vs three, five vs five, and seven vs seven agents. We have explicitly used subsets of agents to identify the dynamics and the semantics for which the agents learn to maximize their performance measures, and to gather knowledge about different objectives, so that all agents participate effectively and efficiently within the group.

In this paper, we consider decentralized sequential decision making in distributed online recommender systems, where items are recommended to users based on their search query as well as their specific background including history of bought items, gender and age, all of which comprise the context information of the user. In contrast to centralized recommender systems, in which there is a single centralized seller who has access to the complete inventory of items as well as the complete record of sales and user information, in decentralized recommender systems each seller/learner only has access to the inventory of items and user information for its own products and not the products and user information of other sellers, but can get commission if it sells an item of another seller. Therefore the sellers must distributedly find out for an incoming user which items to recommend (from the set of own items or items of another seller), in order to maximize the revenue from own sales and commissions. We formulate this problem as a cooperative contextual bandit problem, analytically bound the performance of the sellers compared to the best recommendation strategy given the complete realization of user arrivals and the inventory of items, as well as the context-dependent purchase probabilities of each item, and verify our results via numerical examples on a distributed data set adapted based on Amazon data. We evaluate the dependence of the performance of a seller on the inventory of items the seller has, the number of connections it has with the other sellers, and the commissions which the seller gets by selling items of other sellers to its users.

Asynchronous Partial Overlay (APO) is a search algorithm that uses cooperative mediation to solve Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (DisCSPs). The algorithm partitions the search into different subproblems of the DisCSP. The original proof of completeness of the APO algorithm is based on the growth of the size of the subproblems. The present paper demonstrates that this expected growth of subproblems does not occur in some situations, leading to a termination problem of the algorithm. The problematic parts in the APO algorithm that interfere with its completeness are identified and necessary modifications to the algorithm that fix these problematic parts are given. The resulting version of the algorithm, Complete Asynchronous Partial Overlay (CompAPO), ensures its completeness. Formal proofs for the soundness and completeness of CompAPO are given. A detailed performance evaluation of CompAPO comparing it to other DisCSP algorithms is presented, along with an extensive experimental evaluation of the algorithm's unique behavior. Additionally, an optimization version of the algorithm, CompOptAPO, is presented, discussed, and evaluated.