Reinforcement Learning
Different Cortico-Basal Ganglia Loops Specialize in Reward Prediction at Different Time Scales
Tanaka, Saori C., Doya, Kenji, Okada, Go, Ueda, Kazutaka, Okamoto, Yasumasa, Yamawaki, Shigeto
To understand the brain mechanisms involved in reward prediction on different time scales, we developed a Markov decision task that requires prediction of both immediate and future rewards, and analyzed subjects'brain activities using functional MRI. We estimated the time course of reward prediction and reward prediction error on different time scales from subjects' performance data, and used them as the explanatory variables for SPM analysis. We found topographic mapsof different time scales in medial frontal cortex and striatum. The result suggests that different cortico-basal ganglia loops are specialized for reward prediction on different time scales.
Extending Q-Learning to General Adaptive Multi-Agent Systems
Recent multi-agent extensions of Q-Learning require knowledge of other agents' payoffs and Q-functions, and assume game-theoretic play at all times by all other agents. This paper proposes a fundamentally different approach, dubbed "Hyper-Q" Learning, in which values of mixed strategies rather than base actions are learned, and in which other agents' strategies are estimated from observed actions via Bayesian inference. Hyper-Qmay be effective against many different types of adaptive agents, even if they are persistently dynamic. Against certain broad categories of adaptation, it is argued that Hyper-Q may converge to exact optimaltime-varying policies. In tests using Rock-Paper-Scissors, Hyper-Q learns to significantly exploit an Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (IGA) player, as well as a Policy Hill Climber (PHC) player. Preliminary analysis of Hyper-Q against itself is also presented.
Eye Movements for Reward Maximization
Sprague, Nathan, Ballard, Dana
Recent eye tracking studies in natural tasks suggest that there is a tight link between eye movements and goal directed motor actions. However, most existing models of human eye movements provide a bottom up account thatrelates visual attention to attributes of the visual scene. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new model of human eye movements thatdirectly ties eye movements to the ongoing demands of behavior. Thebasic idea is that eye movements serve to reduce uncertainty about environmental variables that are task relevant. A value is assigned to an eye movement by estimating the expected cost of the uncertainty that will result if the movement is not made. If there are several candidate eye movements, the one with the highest expected value is chosen. The model is illustrated using a humanoid graphic figure that navigates on a sidewalk in a virtual urban environment. Simulations show our protocol is superior to a simple round robin scheduling mechanism.
Gaussian Processes in Reinforcement Learning
Kuss, Malte, Rasmussen, Carl E.
We exploit some useful properties of Gaussian process (GP) regression models for reinforcement learning in continuous state spaces and discrete time.We demonstrate how the GP model allows evaluation of the value function in closed form. The resulting policy iteration algorithm is demonstrated on a simple problem with a two dimensional state space. Further, we speculate that the intrinsic ability of GP models to characterise distributionsof functions would allow the method to capture entire distributions over future values instead of merely their expectation, which has traditionally been the focus of much of reinforcement learning.
Estimating Internal Variables and Paramters of a Learning Agent by a Particle Filter
Samejima, Kazuyuki, Doya, Kenji, Ueda, Yasumasa, Kimura, Minoru
When we model a higher order functions, such as learning and memory, we face a difficulty of comparing neural activities with hidden variables that depend on the history of sensory and motor signals and the dynamics ofthe network. Here, we propose novel method for estimating hidden variables of a learning agent, such as connection weights from sequences of observable variables. Bayesian estimation is a method to estimate the posterior probability of hidden variables from observable data sequence using a dynamic model of hidden and observable variables.
Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games
Wang, Xiaofeng, Sandholm, Tuomas
Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.
Optimality of Reinforcement Learning Algorithms with Linear Function Approximation
There are several reinforcement learning algorithms that yield approximate solutions for the problem of policy evaluation when the value function is represented with a linear function approximator. In this paper we show that each of the solutions is optimal with respect to a specific objective function.
Convergent Combinations of Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation
Schoknecht, Ralf, Merke, Artur
Convergence for iterative reinforcement learning algorithms like TD(O) depends on the sampling strategy for the transitions. However, in practical applications it is convenient to take transition data from arbitrary sources without losing convergence. In this paper we investigate the problem of repeated synchronous updates based on a fixed set of transitions. Our main theorem yields sufficient conditions of convergence for combinations of reinforcement learning algorithms and linear function approximation. This allows to analyse if a certain reinforcement learning algorithm and a certain function approximator are compatible.
Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games
Wang, Xiaofeng, Sandholm, Tuomas
Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.
A Convergent Form of Approximate Policy Iteration
Perkins, Theodore J., Precup, Doina
We study a new, model-free form of approximate policy iteration which uses Sarsa updates with linear state-action value function approximation for policy evaluation, and a "policy improvement operator" to generate a new policy based on the learned state-action values. We prove that if the policy improvement operator produces -soft policies and is Lipschitz continuous in the action values, with a constant that is not too large, then the approximate policy iteration algorithm converges to a unique solution from any initial policy. To our knowledge, this is the first convergence result for any form of approximate policy iteration under similar computational-resource assumptions.