Approximate Bayesian inference for neural networks is considered a robust alternative to standard training, often providing good performance on out-of-distribution data. However, Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) with high-fidelity approximate inference via full-batch Hamiltonian Monte Carlo achieve poor generalization under covariate shift, even underperforming classical estimation. We explain this surprising result, showing how a Bayesian model average can in fact be problematic under covariate shift, particularly in cases where linear dependencies in the input features cause a lack of posterior contraction. We additionally show why the same issue does not affect many approximate inference procedures, or classical maximum a-posteriori (MAP) training. Finally, we propose novel priors that improve the robustness of BNNs to many sources of covariate shift.

We present a framework to statistically audit the privacy guarantee conferred by a differentially private machine learner in practice. While previous works have taken steps toward evaluating privacy loss through poisoning attacks or membership inference, they have been tailored to specific models or have demonstrated low statistical power. Our work develops a general methodology to empirically evaluate the privacy of differentially private machine learning implementations, combining improved privacy search and verification methods with a toolkit of influence-based poisoning attacks. We demonstrate significantly improved auditing power over previous approaches on a variety of models including logistic regression, Naive Bayes, and random forest. Our method can be used to detect privacy violations due to implementation errors or misuse. When violations are not present, it can aid in understanding the amount of information that can be leaked from a given dataset, algorithm, and privacy specification.

We derive the first finite-time logarithmic Bayes regret upper bounds for Bayesian bandits. In a multi-armed bandit, we obtain O(c logn)and O(ch log2 n)upper bounds for an upper confidence bound algorithm, where ch and c are constants depending on the prior distribution and the gaps of bandit instances sampled from it, respectively. The latter bound asymptotically matches the lower bound of Lai (1987). Our proofs are a major technical departure from prior works, while being simple and general. To show the generality of our techniques, we apply them to linear bandits. Our results provide insights on the value of prior in the Bayesian setting, both in the objective and as a side information given to the learner. They significantly improve upon existing O( n)bounds, which have become standard in the literature despite the logarithmic lower bound of Lai (1987).

We propose a novel reduction-to-binary (R2B) approach that enforces demographic parity for multiclass classification with non-binary sensitive attributes via a reduction to a sequence of binary debiasing tasks. We prove that R2B satisfies optimality and bias guarantees and demonstrate empirically that it can lead to an improvement over two baselines: (1) treating multiclass problems as multi-label by debiasing labels independently and (2) transforming the features instead of the labels. Surprisingly, we also demonstrate that independent label debiasing yields competitive results in most (but not all) settings.