In [12], Nilsson proposed the probabilistic logic in which the truth values of logical propositions are probability values between 0 and 1. It is applicable to any logical system for which the consistency of a finite set of propositions can be established. The probabilistic inference scheme reduces to the ordinary logical inference when the probabilities of all propositions are either 0 or 1. This logic has the same limitations of other probabilistic reasoning systems of the Bayesian approach. For common sense reasoning, consistency is not a very natural assumption. We have some well known examples: {Dick is a Quaker, Quakers are pacifists, Republicans are not pacifists, Dick is a Republican}and {Tweety is a bird, birds can fly, Tweety is a penguin}. In this paper, we shall propose some extensions of the probabilistic logic. In the second section, we shall consider the space of all interpretations, consistent or not. In terms of frames of discernment, the basic probability assignment (bpa) and belief function can be defined. Dempster's combination rule is applicable. This extension of probabilistic logic is called the evidential logic in [ 1]. For each proposition s, its belief function is represented by an interval [Spt(s), Pls(s)]. When all such intervals collapse to single points, the evidential logic reduces to probabilistic logic (in the generalized version of not necessarily consistent interpretations). Certainly, we get Nilsson's probabilistic logic by further restricting to consistent interpretations. In the third section, we shall give a probabilistic interpretation of probabilistic logic in terms of multi-dimensional random variables. This interpretation brings the probabilistic logic into the framework of probability theory. Let us consider a finite set S = {sl, s2, ..., Sn) of logical propositions. Each proposition may have true or false values; and may be considered as a random variable. We have a probability distribution for each proposition. The e-dimensional random variable (sl,..., Sn) may take values in the space of all interpretations of 2n binary vectors. We may compute absolute (marginal), conditional and joint probability distributions. It turns out that the permissible probabilistic interpretation vector of Nilsson [12] consists of the joint probabilities of S. Inconsistent interpretations will not appear, by setting their joint probabilities to be zeros. By summing appropriate joint probabilities, we get probabilities of individual propositions or subsets of propositions. Since the Bayes formula and other techniques are valid for e-dimensional random variables, the probabilistic logic is actually very close to the Bayesian inference schemes. In the last section, we shall consider a relaxation scheme for probabilistic logic. In this system, not only new evidences will update the belief measures of a collection of propositions, but also constraint satisfaction among these propositions in the relational network will revise these measures. This mechanism is similar to human reasoning which is an evaluative process converging to the most satisfactory result. The main idea arises from the consistent labeling problem in computer vision. This method is originally applied to scene analysis of line drawings. Later, it is applied to matching, constraint satisfaction and multi sensor fusion by several authors [8], [16] (and see references cited there). Recently, this method is used in knowledge aggregation by Landy and Hummel [9].

One of the most important aspects of current expert systems technology is the ability to make causal inferences about the impact of new evidence. When the domain knowledge and problem knowledge are uncertain and incomplete Bayesian reasoning has proven to be an effective way of forming such inferences [3,4,8]. While several reasoning schemes have been developed based on Bayes Rule, there has been very little work examining the comparative effectiveness of these schemes in a real application. This paper describes a knowledge based system for ship classification [1], originally developed using the PROSPECTOR updating method [2], that has been reimplemented to use the inference procedure developed by Pearl and Kim [4,5]. We discuss our reasons for making this change, the implementation of the new inference engine, and the comparative performance of the two versions of the system.

The fundamental elements of evidential reasoning problems are described, followed by a discussion of the structure of various types of problems. Bayesian inference networks and state space formalism are used as the tool for problem representation. A human-oriented decision making cycle for solving evidential reasoning problems is described and illustrated for a military situation assessment problem. The implementation of this cycle may serve as the basis for an expert system shell for evidential reasoning; i.e. a situation assessment processor.

During the ongoing debate over the representation of uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Cheeseman, Lemmer, Pearl, and others have argued that probability theory, and in particular the Bayesian theory, should be used as the basis for the inference mechanisms of Expert Systems dealing with uncertainty. In order to pursue the issue in a practical setting, sophisticated tools for knowledge engineering are needed that allow flexible and understandable interaction with the underlying knowledge representation schemes. This paper describes a Generalized Bayesian framework for building expert systems which function in uncertain domains, using algorithms proposed by Lemmer. It is neither rule-based nor frame-based, and requires a new system of knowledge engineering tools. The framework we describe provides a knowledge-based system architecture with an inference engine, explanation capability, and a unique aid for building consistent knowledge bases.

Ross D. Shachter and Leonard J. Bertrand Department of Engineering-Economic Systems, Stanford University (visiting the Center for Health Policy Research and Education, Duke University, PO Box GM, Durham, NC 27706) and Strategic Decisions Group, Menlo Park, CA for the Third Workshop on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence Seattle, Washington, July 10-12, 1987 The generalized fault diagram, a data structure for failure analysis based on the influence diagram, is defined. Unlike the fault tree, this structure allows for dependence among the basic events and replicated logical elements. A heuristic procedure is developed for efficient processing of these structures. Deterministic logic and conditional probabilities are both appealing frameworks in which to build a knowledge base. Each has a natural graphical representation, semantic network for logic and influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 1981) or bayes networks (Pearl, 1986) for probabilities.

This paper reports work in progress on an explanation facility for Bayesian conditioning aimed at improving user acceptance of probability-based decision support systems. Design of the facility, which appears to be reasonably domain-independent, is based on an information processing model that accounts both for biased and normative behavior in reasoning about conditional evidence. Preliminary results indicate that the facility is both acceptable to naive users and effective in improving understanding of Bayesian conditioning.

A method for computing probabilistic propositions is presented. It assumes the availability of a single external routine for computing the probability of one instantiated variable, given a conjunction of other instantiated variables. In particular, the method allows belief network algorithms to calculate general probabilistic propositions over nodes in the network. Although in the worst case the time complexity of the method is exponential in the size of a query, it is polynomial in the size of a number of common types of queries.

We describe a representation and a set of inference methods that combine logic programming techniques with probabilistic network representations for uncertainty (influence diagrams). The techniques emphasize the dynamic construction and solution of probabilistic and decision-theoretic models for complex and uncertain domains. Given a query, a logical proof is produced if possible; if not, an influence diagram based on the query and the knowledge of the decision domain is produced and subsequently solved. A uniform declarative, first-order, knowledge representation is combined with a set of integrated inference procedures for logical, probabilistic, and decision-theoretic reasoning.

Our previous work on classifying complex ship images [1,2] has evolved into an effort to develop software tools for building and solving generic classification problems. Managing the uncertainty associated with feature data and other evidence is an important issue in this endeavor. Bayesian techniques for managing uncertainty [7,12,13] have proven to be useful for managing several of the belief maintenance requirements of classification problem solving. One such requirement is the need to give qualitative explanations of what is believed. Pearl [11] addresses this need by computing what he calls a belief commitment-the most probable instantiation of all hypothesis variables given the evidence available. Before belief commitments can be computed, the straightforward implementation of Pearl's procedure involves finding an analytical solution to some often difficult optimization problems. We describe an efficient implementation of this procedure using tensor products that solves these problems enumeratively and avoids the need for case by case analysis. The procedure is thereby made more practical to use in the general case.

Much of the controversy about methods for automated decision making has focused on specific calculi for combining beliefs or propagating uncertainty. We broaden the debate by (1) exploring the constellation of secondary tasks surrounding any primary decision problem, and (2) identifying knowledge engineering concerns that present additional representational tradeoffs. We argue on pragmatic grounds that the attempt to support all of these tasks within a single calculus is misguided. In the process, we note several uncertain reasoning objectives that conflict with the Bayesian ideal of complete specification of probabilities and utilities. In response, we advocate treating the uncertainty calculus as an object language for reasoning mechanisms that support the secondary tasks. Arguments against Bayesian decision theory are weakened when the calculus is relegated to this role. Architectures for uncertainty handling that take statements in the calculus as objects to be reasoned about offer the prospect of retaining normative status with respect to decision making while supporting the other tasks in uncertain reasoning.