Students routinely use ChatGPT and the like now to help them with their homework, such as writing an essay. It takes less effort to complete and is easier to do than by hand. It can even produce as good if not better output than the student's own work. However, there is a growing concern that over-reliance on using GenAI in this way will stifle the development of learning writing and critical thinking skills. How might this trend be reversed? What if students were required to make more effort when using GenAI to do their homework? It might be more challenging, but the additional effort involved could result in them learning more and having a greater sense of achievement. This tension can be viewed as a form of effort paradox; where effort is both viewed as something to be avoided but at the same time is valued. Is it possible to let students learn sometimes with less and other times more effort? Students are already adept at the former but what about the latter? Could we design new kinds of AI tools that deliberately require more effort to use to deepen the learning experience? In this paper, I begin to outline what form these might take, for example, asking students to use a combination of GenAI tools with traditional learning approaches (e.g. note-taking while reading). I also discuss how else to design tools to think with that augments human cognition; where students learn more the skills of metacognition and reflection.

Cognitive Science has profoundly shaped disciplines such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Linguistics, and Culture. Many breakthroughs in AI trace their roots to cognitive theories, while AI itself has become an indispensable tool for advancing cognitive research. This reciprocal relationship motivates a comprehensive review of the intersections between AI and Cognitive Science. By synthesizing key contributions from both perspectives, we observe that AI progress has largely emphasized practical task performance, whereas its cognitive foundations remain conceptually fragmented. We argue that the future of AI within Cognitive Science lies not only in improving performance but also in constructing systems that deepen our understanding of the human mind. Promising directions include aligning AI behaviors with cognitive frameworks, situating AI in embodiment and culture, developing personalized cognitive models, and rethinking AI ethics through cognitive co-evaluation.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

The generation of connectional brain templates (CBTs) has recently garnered significant attention for its potential to identify unique connectivity patterns shared across individuals. However, existing methods for CBT learning such as conventional machine learning and graph neural networks (GNNs) are hindered by several limitations. These include: (i) poor interpretability due to their black-box nature, (ii) high computational cost, and (iii) an exclusive focus on structure and topology, overlooking the cognitive capacity of the generated CBT. To address these challenges, we introduce mCOCO (multi-sensory COgnitive COmputing), a novel framework that leverages Reservoir Computing (RC) to learn population-level functional CBT from BOLD (Blood-Oxygen-level-Dependent) signals. RC's dynamic system properties allow for tracking state changes over time, enhancing interpretability and enabling the modeling of brain-like dynamics, as demonstrated in prior literature. By integrating multi-sensory inputs (e.g., text, audio, and visual data), mCOCO captures not only structure and topology but also how brain regions process information and adapt to cognitive tasks such as sensory processing, all in a computationally efficient manner. Our mCOCO framework consists of two phases: (1) mapping BOLD signals into the reservoir to derive individual functional connectomes, which are then aggregated into a group-level CBT - an approach, to the best of our knowledge, not previously explored in functional connectivity studies - and (2) incorporating multi-sensory inputs through a cognitive reservoir, endowing the CBT with cognitive traits. Extensive evaluations show that our mCOCO-based template significantly outperforms GNN-based CBT in terms of centeredness, discriminativeness, topological soundness, and multi-sensory memory retention. Our source code is available at https://github.com/basiralab/mCOCO.

Simulators have revolutionized scientific practice across the natural sciences. By generating data that reliably approximate real-world phenomena, they enable scientists to accelerate hypothesis testing and optimize experimental designs [1, 2]. This is perhaps best illustrated by AlphaFold, a Nobel-prize winning simulator in chemistry that predicts protein structures from amino acid sequences, enabling rapid prototyping of molecular interactions, drug targets, and protein functions [1]. In the behavioral sciences, a reliable participant simulator--a system capable of producing human-like behavior across cognitive tasks--would represent a similarly transformative advance [3]. Recently, Binz et al. introduced Centaur, a large language model (LLM) fine-tuned on human data from 160 experiments, proposing its use not only as a model of cognition but also as a participant simulator for "in silico prototyping of experimental studies" [4], e.g., to advance automated cognitive science [3, 5]. Although Centaur demonstrates strong predictive accuracy, its generative behavior-- a critical criterion for a participant simulator--systematically diverges from human data. This suggests that, while Centaur is a significant step toward predicting human behavior, it does not yet meet the standards of a reliable participant simulator or an accurate model of cognition. A core criterion for any behavioral simulator is its ability to generate behavioral patterns observed in experiments.

Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor's arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points - related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession - at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.

Human intelligence has generally been studied by focusing on two primary levels: cognitive science, which examines the mind, and neuroscience, which focuses on the brain. Both approaches have influenced artificial intelligence (AI) research, leading to the development of various cognitive architectures with emergent behaviors.23 In this article, we propose an approach inspired by human cognition, specifically drawing on cognitive theories about human reasoning and decision making. We are inspired by the book Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman,20 which categorizes human thought processes into two systems: System 1 (fast thinking) and System 2 (slow thinking).37 System 1, or "thinking fast," is responsible for intuitive, quick, and often unconscious decisions.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

--The time allocation problem in multi-function cognitive radar systems focuses on the trade-off between scanning for newly emerging targets and tracking the previously detected targets. We formulate this as a multi-objective optimization problem and employ deep reinforcement learning to find Pareto-optimal solutions and compare deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) and soft actor-critic (SAC) algorithms. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of both algorithms in adapting to various scenarios, with SAC showing improved stability and sample efficiency compared to DDPG. We further employ the NSGA-II algorithm to estimate an upper bound on the Pareto front of the considered problem. This work contributes to the development of more efficient and adaptive cognitive radar systems capable of balancing multiple competing objectives in dynamic environments.

A beginning is made at mapping four neural theories of consciousness onto the Common Model of Cognition. This highlights how the four jointly depend on recurrent local modules plus a cognitive cycle operating on a global working memory with complex states, and reveals how an existing integrative view of consciousness from a neural perspective aligns with the Com-mon Model.