This paper presents the view that artificial intelligence (AI) is primarily concerned with propositional languages for representing knowledge and with techniques for manipulating these representations. In this respect, AI is analogous to applied in a variety of other subject areas. Typically, AI research (or should be) more concerned with the general form and properties of representational languages and methods than it is with the context being described by these languages. Notable exceptions involve "commonsense" knowledge about the everyday would ( no other specialty claims this subject area as its own ), and metaknowledge (or knowledge about the properties itself). In these areas AI is concerned with content as well as form. We also observe that the technology that seems to underly peripheral sensory and motor activities (analogous to low-level animal or human vision and muscle control) seems to be quite different from the technology that seems to underly cognitive reasoning and problem solving. Some definitions of AI would include peripheral as well as cognitive processes; here we argue against including the peripheral processes.

When I returned to Stanford last summer after a two-year leave of absence, serving as a program manager at the Defense Advanced Projects Agency, I was frequently asked about that experience. It was superb experience, for many reasons. As a program manager I had near-perfect vantage point from which to view the entire field of Artificial Intelligence. Not only did I become better acquainted with the most creative and active people in the field, I was also personally kept up to date on their latest research. ARPA is not just a place to go to provide a public service, but is really a central node in the research network for collecting and integrating results and disseminating them to the broader community: government, industry and the public at large. Moreover, it was my responsibility to identify new avenues of research and/or applications of research, coupled with the resources (limited, but real) to make these new activities happen -- a unique opportunity.

Our program in AI is part of the larger departmental focal area of cybernetics which integrates both AI and brain theory (BT). Our research also draws upon a new and expanding interdepartmental program in cognitive science that brings together researchers in cybernetics, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. This interdisciplinary approach to AI has already led to a number of fruitful collaborations in the areas of cooperative computation, learning, natural language parsing, and vision.

The Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Herbert Simon in 1978. At Carnegie-Mellon University he holds the title of Professor of Computer Science and Psychology. These two facts together delineate the range and uniqueness of his contributions in creating meaningful interactions among fields that developed in isolation but that are all concerned with human decision-making and problem-solving processes. In particular, Simon has brought the insights of decision theory, organization theory (especially as it applies to the business firm), behavior modeling, cognitive psychology, and the study of artificial intelligence to bear on economic questions. This has led not only to new conceptual dimensions for theoretical constructions, but also to a new humanizing realism in economics, a way of taking into account and dealing with human behavior and interactions that lie at the root of all economic activity.

Othello is a recent addition to the collection of games that have been examined within artificial intelligence. Advances have been rapid, yielding programs that have reached the level of world-championship play. This article describes the current champion Othello program, iago. The work described here includes: (1) a task analysis of Othello; (2) the implementation of a program based on this analysis and state-of-the-art AI game-playing techniques; and (3) an evaluation of the program's performance through games played against other programs and comparisons with expert human play.

A piece-of-advice suggests what goal should be achievednext while preserving some other condition. If this goal can be achieved in agiven problem-situation (e.g. a given chess position) then we say that the piece-ofadviceis 'satisfiable' in that position. In this way ALI makes it possible to breakthe whole problem of achieving an ultimate goal into a sequence of subproblems,each of them consisting of achievement of a subgoal prescribed by some pieceof-advice. The control structure which chooses what piece-of-advice to applynext consists of a set of 'advice-tables', each of them being specialized in acertain problem-subdomain.In Hayes, J. E., Michie, D., and Pao, Y.-H. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 10. Ellis Horwood.

We briefly describe the logic programming language PROLOG concentrating on those aspects of the language that make it suitable for implementing expert systems. We show how features of expert systems such as: (1) inference generated requests for data, (2) probabilistic reasoning, (3) explanation of behaviour can be easily programmed in PROLOG. We illustrate each of these features by showing how a fault finder expert could be programmed in PROLOG.In Hayes, J. E., Michie, D., and Pao, Y.-H. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 10. Ellis Horwood.

A knowledge-based programming system can utilize a very-high-level self description to rewrite and improve itself. This paper presents a specification, in the very-high-level language V, of the rule compiler component of the CIII knowledgebased programming system. From this specification of part of itself, CIII produces an efficient program satisfying the specification. This represents a modest application of a machine intelligence system to a real programming problem, namely improving one of the programming environment's tools — the rule compiler. The high-level description and the use of a programming knowledge base provide potential for system performance to improve with added knowledge.In Hayes, J. E., Michie, D., and Pao, Y.-H. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 10. Ellis Horwood.

The notion of an ethical machine can be interpreted in more than one way. Perhaps the most important interpretation is a machine that can generalize from existing literature to infer one or more consistent ethical systems and can work out their consequences. An ultra-intelligent machine should be able to do this, and that is one reason for not fearing it.In Hayes, J. E., Michie, D., and Pao, Y.-H. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 10. Ellis Horwood.

Discourse Processes, vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1-32.