We consider three hypotheses concerning the primate neocortex which have influenced computational neuroscience in recent years. Is the mind modular in terms of its being profitably described as a collection of relatively independent functional units? Does the regular structure of the cortex imply a single algorithm at work, operating on many different inputs in parallel? Can the cognitive differences between humans and our closest primate relatives be explained in terms of a scalable cortical architecture? We bring to bear diverse sources of evidence to argue that the answers to each of these questions — with some judicious qualifications — are in the affirmative. In particular, we argue that while our higher cognitive functions may interact in a complicated fashion, many of the component functions operate through well-defined interfaces and, perhaps more important, are built on a neural substrate that scales easily under the control of a modular genetic architecture. Processing in the primary sensory cortices seem amenable to similar algorithmic principles, and, even for those cases where alternative principles are at play, the regular structure of cortex allows the same or greater advantages as the architecture scales. Similar genetic machinery to that used by nature to scale body plans has apparently been applied to scale cortical computations. The resulting replicated computing units can be used to build larger working memory and support deeper recursions needed to qualitatively improve our abilities to handle language, abstraction and social interaction.

A helpful teacher can significantly improve the learning rate of a learning agent. Teaching algorithms have been formally studied within the field of Algorithmic Teaching. These give important insights into how a teacher can select the most informative examples while teachinga new concept. However the field has so far focused purely on classification tasks. In this paper we introducea novel method for optimally teaching sequential decision tasks. We present an algorithm that automatically selects the set of most informative demonstrations andevaluate it on several navigation tasks. Next, we explore the idea of using this algorithm to produce instructions for humans on how to choose examples when teaching sequential decision tasks. We present a user study that demonstrates the utility of such instructions.

We introduce a new task-independent framework to model top-down overt visual attention based on graph-ical models for probabilistic inference and reasoning. We describe a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) that infers probability distributions over attended objects and spatial locations directly from observed data. Probabilistic inference in our model is performed over object-related functions which are fed from manual annotations of objects in video scenes or by state-of-the-art object detection models. Evaluating over ∼3 hours (appx. 315,000 eye fixations and 12,600 saccades) of observers playing 3 video games (time-scheduling, driving, and flight combat), we show that our approach is significantly more predictive of eye fixations compared to: 1) simpler classifier-based models also developed here that map a signature of a scene (multi-modal information from gist, bottom-up saliency, physical actions, and events) to eye positions, 2) 14 state-of-the-art bottom-up saliency models, and 3) brute-force algorithms such as mean eye position. Our results show that the proposed model is more effective in employing and reasoning over spatio-temporal visual data.

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, and therefore it is important to know under what conditions the core of a game is guaranteed to be non-empty. Two notions that prove to be very useful in this context are Linear Programming (LP) duality and convexity. In this work, we apply these tools to identify games with overlapping coalitions (OCF games) that admit stable outcomes. We focus on three notions of the core defined in (Chalkiadakis et al. 2010) for such games, namely, the conservative core, the refined core and the optimistic core. First, we show that the conservative core of an OCF game is non-empty if and only if the core of a related classic coalitional game is non-empty. This enables us to improve the result of (Chalkiadakis et al. 2010) by giving a strictly weaker sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the conservative core. We then use LP duality to characterize OCF games with non-empty refined core; as a corollary, we show that the refined core of a game is non-empty as long as the superadditive cover of its characteristic function is convex. Finally, we identify a large class of OCF games that can be shown to have a non-empty optimistic core using an LP based argument.

We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but in the case where it is uncertain either which candidates exactly register for the election or which voters cast their votes. Under reasonable assumptions our problems reduce to counting variants of election control problems. We either give polynomial-time algorithms or prove #P-completeness results for counting variants of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters for Plurality, k -Approval, Approval, Condorcet, and Maximin voting rules.

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.

Stackelberg games increasingly influence security policies deployed in real-world settings. Much of the work to date focuses on devising a fixed randomized strategy for the defender, accounting for an attacker who optimally responds to it. In practice, defense policies are often subject to constraints and vary over time, allowing an attacker to infer characteristics of future policies based on current observations. A defender must therefore account for an attacker's observation capabilities in devising a security policy. We show that this general modeling framework can be captured using stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where a defender commits to a dynamic policy to which the attacker devises an optimal dynamic response. We then offer the following contributions. 1) We show that Markov stationary policies suffice in SSGs, 2) present a finite-time mixed-integer non-linear program for computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in SSGs, and 3) present a mixed-integer linear program to approximate it. 4) We illustrate our algorithms on a simple SSG representing an adversarial patrolling scenario, where we study the impact of attacker patience and risk aversion on optimal defense policies.

This research is motivated by large scale problems in urban transportation and labor mobility where there is congestion for resources and uncertainty in movement. In such domains, even though the individual agents do not have an identity of their own and do not explicitly interact with other agents, they effect other agents. While there has been much research in handling such implicit effects, it has primarily assumed de- terministic movements of agents. We address the issue of decision support for individual agents that are identical and have involuntary movements in dynamic environments. For instance, in a taxi fleet serving a city, when a taxi is hired by a customer, its movements are uncontrolled and depend on (a) the customers requirement; and (b) the location of other taxis in the fleet. Towards addressing decision support in such problems, we make two key contributions: (a) A framework to represent the decision problem for selfish individuals in a dynamic population, where there is transitional uncertainty (involuntary movements); and (b) Two techniques (Fictitious Play for Symmetric Agent Populations, FP-SAP and Soft- max based Flow Update, SMFU) that converge to equilibrium solutions. We show that our techniques (apart from providing equilibrium strategies) outperform “driver” strategies with re- spect to overall availability of taxis and the revenue obtained by the taxi drivers. We demonstrate this on a real world data set with 8,000 taxis and 83 zones (representing the entire area of Singapore).

Many strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus onthe opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, we combine recent research in influence blocking maximization with a double oracle approach and create novel heuristic oracles to generate mixed strategies for a real-world leadership network from Afghanistan, synthetic leadership networks, and a real social network. We find that leadership networks that exhibit highly interconnected clusters can be solved equally well by our heuristic methods, but our more sophisticated heuristics outperform simpler ones in less interconnected social networks.

Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomial-time rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications.