A panel satisfies descriptive representation when its composition reflects the population. We examine the role of descriptive representation in collective decision making through an optimization lens, asking whether representative panels make decisions that maximize social welfare for the underlying population. Our main results suggest that, in general, representation with respect to intersections of two or more features guarantees higher social welfare than that achieved by the status quo of proportionally representing individual features. Moreover, an analysis of real data suggests that representation with respect to pairs of features is feasible in practice. These results have significant implications for the design of citizens' assemblies, which are gaining prominence in AI governance.

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We initiate the study of multidimensional Bayesian utility maximization, focusing on the unit-demand setting where values are i.i.d.

Multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) aims to optimize policies in the presence of conflicting objectives, where linear scalarization is commonly used to reduce vector-valued returns into scalar signals. While effective for certain preferences, this approach cannot capture fairness-oriented goals such as Nash social welfare or max-min fairness, which require nonlinear and non-additive trade-offs. Although several online algorithms have been proposed for specific fairness objectives, a unified approach for optimizing nonlinear welfare criteria in the offline setting--where learning must proceed from a fixed dataset--remains unexplored.

Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy -- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) -- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Is it possible to understand or imitate a policy maker's rationale by looking at past decisions they made?