Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in complex tasks and interactive environments, yet their creativity remains underexplored. This paper introduces a simulation framework utilizing the game Balderdash to evaluate both the creativity and logical reasoning of LLMs. In Balderdash, players generate fictitious definitions for obscure terms to deceive others while identifying correct definitions. Our framework enables multiple LLM agents to participate in this game, assessing their ability to produce plausible definitions and strategize based on game rules and history. We implemented a centralized game engine featuring various LLMs as participants and a judge LLM to evaluate semantic equivalence. Through a series of experiments, we analyzed the performance of different LLMs, examining metrics such as True Definition Ratio, Deception Ratio, and Correct Guess Ratio. The results provide insights into the creative and deceptive capabilities of LLMs, highlighting their strengths and areas for improvement. Specifically, the study reveals that infrequent vocabulary in LLMs' input leads to poor reasoning on game rules and historical context (https://github.com/ParsaHejabi/Simulation-Framework-for-Multi-Agent-Balderdash).

Communication is a fundamental aspect of human society, facilitating the exchange of information and beliefs among people. Despite the advancements in large language models (LLMs), recent agents built with these often neglect the control over discussion tactics, which are essential in communication scenarios and games. As a variant of the famous communication game Werewolf, One Night Ultimate Werewolf (ONUW) requires players to develop strategic discussion policies due to the potential role changes that increase the uncertainty and complexity of the game. In this work, we first present the existence of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBEs) in two scenarios of the ONUW game: one with discussion and one without. The results showcase that the discussion greatly changes players' utilities by affecting their beliefs, emphasizing the significance of discussion tactics. Based on the insights obtained from the analyses, we propose an RL-instructed language agent framework, where a discussion policy trained by reinforcement learning (RL) is employed to determine appropriate discussion tactics to adopt. Our experimental results on several ONUW game settings demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of our proposed framework.

User-provided helpfulness votes can highlight the most useful responses, but voting is a social process that can gain momentum based on the popularity of responses and the polarity of existing votes. We propose the Chinese Voting Process (CVP) which models the evolution of helpfulness votes as a self-reinforcing process dependent on position and presentation biases. We evaluate this model on Amazon product reviews and more than 80 StackExchange forums, measuring the intrinsic quality of individual responses and behavioral coefficients of different communities.

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.

User-provided helpfulness votes can highlight the most useful responses, but voting is a social process that can gain momentum based on the popularity of responses and the polarity of existing votes. We propose the Chinese Voting Process (CVP) which models the evolution of helpfulness votes as a self-reinforcing process dependent on position and presentation biases. We evaluate this model on Amazon product reviews and more than 80 StackExchange forums, measuring the intrinsic quality of individual responses and behavioral coefficients of different communities.