Anthropic has usurped OpenAI as the world's most valuable artificial intelligence startup, soaring to a $965bn valuation ahead of expected public listings by the rival firms. Anthropic, the maker of the Claude family of chatbots, said on Thursday that it had raised $65bn from private investors after a fundraising round led by Altimeter Capital, Greenoaks, Dragoneer and Sequoia Capital. "This funding will help us serve the historic demand we are experiencing, stay at the research frontier, and bring Claude to more of the places where work happens," Anthropic's Chief Financial Officer Krishna Rao said in a statement. Altimeter Capital CEO Brad Gerstner hailed the adoption of Claude among the "world's most demanding organisations" as evidence of Anthropic's command in the field. "This momentum positions Anthropic to lead the next phase of AI innovation and capture the enormous opportunity ahead," Gerstner said.

Musk v. Altman week 3: Elon Musk and Sam Altman traded blows over each other's credibility. Now the jury will pick a side. The trial spilled plenty of dirt--and raised more questions than answers about how the AI giant should be governed. In the final week of the trial, lawyers traded blows over Elon Musk's and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman's credibility. Altman was grilled on his alleged history of lying and self-dealing involving companies that do business with OpenAI. But he fired back, painting Musk as a power-seeker who wanted to control the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI)--powerful AI that can compete with humans on most cognitive tasks.

We study contextual dynamic pricing with linear valuations and bounded-support agnostic noise, whose induced demand curve may be non-Lipschitz with arbitrary jumps and atoms. Such discontinuities break the cross-context interpolation arguments used by smooth-demand pricing algorithms, while the best previous method achieved only $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret. We propose Conservative-Markdown Redirect-UCB Pricing, a polynomial-time algorithm that combines randomized parameter estimation, conservative residual-grid probing, and confidence-based one-step redirection. Our algorithm achieves $\tilde O(T^{2/3})$ optimal regret, matching the known lower bounds of Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) up to logarithmic factors and improving over the previous upper bound of Xu and Wang (2022). Under stochastic well-conditioned contexts, this closes the long-existing open regret gap in linear-valuation contextual pricing under agnostic non-Lipschitz noise distribution.

We revisit the classical problem of designing Budget-Feasible Mechanisms (BFMs) for submodular valuation functions, which has been extensively studied since the seminal paper of Singer [FOCS'10] due to its wide applications in crowdsourcing and social marketing. We propose TripleEagle, a novel algorithmic framework for designing BFMs, based on which we present several simple yet effective BFMs that achieve better approximation ratios than the state-of-the-art work for both monotone and non-monotone submodular valuation functions. Moreover, our BFMs are the first in the literature to achieve linear complexities while ensuring obvious strategyproofness, making them more practical than the previous BFMs. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the empirical performance of our BFMs, and the experimental results strongly demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach.

Double Auction enables decentralized transfer of goods between multiple buyers and sellers, thus underpinning functioning of many online marketplaces. Buyers and sellers compete in these markets through bidding, but do not often know their own valuation a-priori. As the allocation and pricing happens through bids, the profitability of participants, hence sustainability of such markets, depends crucially on learning respective valuations through repeated interactions. We initiate the study of Double Auction markets under bandit feedback on both buyers' and sellers' side. We show with confidence bound based bidding, and'Average Pricing' there is an efficient price discovery among the participants.