We introduce the novel EAI framework for integrating emotion modeling into LLMs to examine the emotional impact on ethics and LLM-based decision-making in various strategic games, including bargaining and repeated games. Our experimental study with various LLMs demonstrated that emotions can significantly alter the ethical decision-making landscape of LLMs, highlighting the need for robust mechanisms to ensure consistent ethical standards. Our game-theoretic analysis revealed that LLMs are susceptible to emotional biases influenced by model size, alignment strategies, and primary pretraining language. Notably, these biases often diverge from typical human emotional responses, occasionally leading to unexpected drops in cooperation rates, even under positive emotional influence.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human decision-making, but their intrinsic biases often diverge from real human behavior--limiting their ability to reflect population-level diversity. We address this challenge with a persona-based approach that leverages individual-level behavioral data from behavioral economics to adjust model biases. Applying this method to the ultimatum game--a standard but difficult benchmark for LLMs--we observe improved alignment between simulated and empirical behavior, particularly on the responder side. While further refinement of trait representations is needed, our results demonstrate the promise of persona-conditioned LLMs for simulating human-like decision patterns at scale.

Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when no-regret learning algorithms converge to Nash equilibria in bargaining games. Recent results have shown that online algorithms related to Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) converge to Nash equilibria (NE) in the last iterate in a wide variety of games, including zero-sum games. However, bargaining games do not have the properties used previously to established convergence guarantees, even in the simplest case of the ultimatum game, which features a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. Nonetheless, we establish that FTRL (without the modifications necessary for zero-sum games) achieves last-iterate convergence to an approximate NE in the ultimatum game along with a bound on convergence time under mild assumptions. Further, we provide experimental results to demonstrate that convergence to NE, including NE with asymmetric payoffs, occurs under a broad range of initial conditions, both in the ultimatum game and in bargaining games with multiple rounds. This work demonstrates how complex economic behavior (e.g. learning to use threats and the existence of many possible equilibrium outcomes) can result from using a simple learning algorithm, and that FTRL can converge to equilibria in a more diverse set of games than previously known.

Large language models demonstrate advanced problem-solving capabilities by incorporating reasoning techniques such as chain of thought and reflection. However, how these reasoning capabilities extend to social intelligence remains unclear. In this study, we investigate this question using economic games that model social dilemmas, where social intelligence plays a crucial role. First, we examine the effects of chain-of-thought and reflection techniques in a public goods game. We then extend our analysis to six economic games on cooperation and punishment, comparing off-the-shelf non-reasoning and reasoning models. We find that reasoning models significantly reduce cooperation and norm enforcement, prioritizing individual rationality. Consequently, groups with more reasoning models exhibit less cooperation and lower gains through repeated interactions. These behaviors parallel human tendencies of "spontaneous giving and calculated greed." Our results suggest the need for AI architectures that incorporate social intelligence alongside reasoning capabilities to ensure that AI supports, rather than disrupts, human cooperative intuition. Recent innovations in reasoning techniques, such as chain of thought [1] and reflection [2], are advancing the intellectual capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to the next level. Models such as OpenAI o1 leverage these techniques to solve complex problems, generate coherent arguments, and improve decision-making in multi-step reasoning scenarios [3-5]. Indeed, these reasoning models have demonstrated excellence in mathematical proofs, logical deduction, and strategic planning [6, 7]. The necessity of social intelligence is highlighted in social dilemmas, where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality [12].

Despite its importance, studying economic behavior across diverse, non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations presents significant challenges. We address this issue by introducing a novel methodology that uses Large Language Models (LLMs) to create synthetic cultural agents (SCAs) representing these populations. We subject these SCAs to classic behavioral experiments, including the dictator and ultimatum games. Our results demonstrate substantial cross-cultural variability in experimental behavior. Notably, for populations with available data, SCAs' behaviors qualitatively resemble those of real human subjects. For unstudied populations, our method can generate novel, testable hypotheses about economic behavior. By integrating AI into experimental economics, this approach offers an effective and ethical method to pilot experiments and refine protocols for hard-to-reach populations. Our study provides a new tool for cross-cultural economic studies and demonstrates how LLMs can help experimental behavioral research.

The ongoing revolution in language modelling has led to various novel applications, some of which rely on the emerging "social abilities" of large language models (LLMs). Already, many turn to the new "cyber friends" for advice during pivotal moments of their lives and trust them with their deepest secrets, implying that accurate shaping of LLMs' "personalities" is paramount. Leveraging the vast diversity of data on which LLMs are pretrained, state-of-the-art approaches prompt them to adopt a particular personality. We ask (i) if personality-prompted models behave (i.e. "make" decisions when presented with a social situation) in line with the ascribed personality, and (ii) if their behavior can be finely controlled. We use classic psychological experiments - the Milgram Experiment and the Ultimatum Game - as social interaction testbeds and apply personality prompting to GPT-3.5/4/4o-mini/4o. Our experiments reveal failure modes of the prompt-based modulation of the models' "behavior", thus challenging the feasibility of personality prompting with today's LLMs.

Humans are not homo economicus (i.e., rational economic beings). As humans, we exhibit systematic behavioral biases such as loss aversion, anchoring, framing, etc., which lead us to make suboptimal economic decisions. Insofar as such biases may be embedded in text data on which large language models (LLMs) are trained, to what extent are LLMs prone to the same behavioral biases? Understanding these biases in LLMs is crucial for deploying LLMs to support human decision-making. We propose utility theory-a paradigm at the core of modern economic theory-as an approach to evaluate the economic biases of LLMs. Utility theory enables the quantification and comparison of economic behavior against benchmarks such as perfect rationality or human behavior. To demonstrate our approach, we quantify and compare the economic behavior of a variety of open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that the economic behavior of current LLMs is neither entirely human-like nor entirely economicus-like. We also find that most current LLMs struggle to maintain consistent economic behavior across settings. Finally, we illustrate how our approach can measure the effect of interventions such as prompting on economic biases.

Negotiation is the basis of social interactions; humans negotiate everything from the price of cars to how to share common resources. With rapidly growing interest in using large language models (LLMs) to act as agents on behalf of human users, such LLM agents would also need to be able to negotiate. In this paper, we study how well LLMs can negotiate with each other. We develop NegotiationArena: a flexible framework for evaluating and probing the negotiation abilities of LLM agents. We implemented three types of scenarios in NegotiationArena to assess LLM's behaviors in allocating shared resources (ultimatum games), aggregate resources (trading games) and buy/sell goods (price negotiations). Each scenario allows for multiple turns of flexible dialogues between LLM agents to allow for more complex negotiations. Interestingly, LLM agents can significantly boost their negotiation outcomes by employing certain behavioral tactics. For example, by pretending to be desolate and desperate, LLMs can improve their payoffs by 20\% when negotiating against the standard GPT-4. We also quantify irrational negotiation behaviors exhibited by the LLM agents, many of which also appear in humans. Together, \NegotiationArena offers a new environment to investigate LLM interactions, enabling new insights into LLM's theory of mind, irrationality, and reasoning abilities.

Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an elastic sense of subjective identity and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. An elastic sense of identity in agents is known to lead to responsible decision-making in non-cooperative, non-zero-sum games like Prisoners' Dilemma, and is a desirable feature to add into agent models. However, when it comes to allocation, an elastic sense of identity can be shown to exacerbate inequities in allocation, giving no rational incentive for agents to act fairly towards one another. This lead us to introduce a sense of fairness as an innate characteristic of autonomous agency. For this, we implement the well-known Ultimatum Game between two agents, where their elastic sense of self (controlled by a parameter called $\gamma$) and a sense of fairness (controlled by a parameter called $\tau$) are both varied. We study the points at which agents find it no longer rational to identify with the other agent, and uphold their sense of fairness, and vice versa. Such a study also helps us discern the subtle difference between responsibility and fairness when it comes to autonomous agency.