First provide a summary of the paper, and then address the following criteria: Quality, clarity, originality and significance. Thanks to your rebuttal, I think I now understand your algorithm, and I think it is correct. But why did you present in Figure 2 algorithm 2 with CB and not TCB? The algorithm with CB does not work, and it is misleading to put CB in Figure 2. I would recommend changing this and putting TCB in the presentation of your algorithm. Also, please comment on the necessity of knowing L(u_1,...,u_n) (or rather an upper bound on this, and rewrite the Thm with an upper bound since it is not realistic to have truly this quantity available).

Large visual-language models (LVLMs) integrate aligned large language models (LLMs) with visual modules to process multimodal inputs. However, the safety mechanisms developed for text-based LLMs do not naturally extend to visual modalities, leaving LVLMs vulnerable to harmful image inputs. To address this cross-modal safety gap, we introduce security tensors - trainable input vectors applied during inference through either the textual or visual modality. These tensors transfer textual safety alignment to visual processing without modifying the model's parameters. They are optimized using a curated dataset containing (i) malicious image-text pairs requiring rejection, (ii) contrastive benign pairs with text structurally similar to malicious queries, with the purpose of being contrastive examples to guide visual reliance, and (iii) general benign samples preserving model functionality. Experimental results demonstrate that both textual and visual security tensors significantly enhance LVLMs' ability to reject diverse harmful visual inputs while maintaining near-identical performance on benign tasks. Further internal analysis towards hidden-layer representations reveals that security tensors successfully activate the language module's textual "safety layers" in visual inputs, thereby effectively extending text-based safety to the visual modality.

Traditional recommendation systems (RecSys) suffer from two problems: the exploitation-exploration dilemma and the cold-start problem. One solution to solving the exploitation-exploration dilemma is the contextual bandit policy, which adaptively exploits and explores user interests. As a result, the contextual bandit policy achieves increased rewards in the long run. The contextual bandit policy, however, may cause the system to explore more than needed in the cold-start situations, which can lead to worse short-term rewards. Cross-domain RecSys methods adopt transfer learning to leverage prior knowledge in a source RecSys domain to jump start the cold-start target RecSys. To solve the two problems together, in this paper, we propose the first applicable transferable contextual bandit (TCB) policy for the cross-domain recommendation. TCB not only benefits the exploitation but also accelerates the exploration in the target RecSys. TCB's exploration, in turn, helps to learn how to transfer between different domains. TCB is a general algorithm for both homogeneous and heterogeneous domains. We perform both theoretical regret analysis and empirical experiments. The empirical results show that TCB outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms over time.