Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables large language models (LLMs) to move beyond fast System-1 responses and engage in deliberative System-2 reasoning. However, this comes at the cost of significant inefficiency due to verbose intermediate output. Recent latent-space reasoning methods improve efficiency by operating on hidden states without decoding into language, yet they treat all steps uniformly, failing to distinguish critical deductions from auxiliary steps and resulting in suboptimal use of computational resources. In this paper, we propose System-1.5 Reasoning, an adaptive reasoning framework that dynamically allocates computation across reasoning steps through shortcut paths in latent space. Specifically, System-1.5 Reasoning introduces two types of dynamic shortcuts. The model depth shortcut (DS) adaptively reasons along the vertical depth by early exiting non-critical tokens through lightweight adapter branches, while allowing critical tokens to continue through deeper Transformer layers. The step shortcut (SS) reuses hidden states across the decoding steps to skip trivial steps and reason horizontally in latent space. Training System-1.5 Reasoning involves a two-stage self-distillation process: first distilling natural language CoT into latent-space continuous thought, and then distilling full-path System-2 latent reasoning into adaptive shortcut paths (System-1.5 Reasoning). Experiments on reasoning tasks demonstrate the superior performance of our method. For example, on GSM8K, System-1.5 Reasoning achieves reasoning performance comparable to traditional CoT fine-tuning methods while accelerating inference by over 20x and reducing token generation by 92.31% on average.

Language models can be used to solve long-horizon planning problems in two distinct modes: a fast 'System-1' mode, directly generating plans without any explicit search or backtracking, and a slow 'System-2' mode, planning step-by-step by explicitly searching over possible actions. While System-2 is typically more effective, it is also more computationally expensive, making it infeasible for long plans or large action spaces. Moreover, isolated System-1 or 2 ignores the user's end goals, failing to provide ways to control the model's behavior. To this end, we propose the System-1.x Planner, a controllable planning framework with LLMs that is capable of generating hybrid plans and balancing between the two planning modes based on the difficulty of the problem at hand. System-1.x consists of (i) a controller, (ii) a System-1 Planner, and (iii) a System-2 Planner. Based on a user-specified hybridization factor (x) governing the mixture between System-1 and 2, the controller decomposes a problem into sub-goals, and classifies them as easy or hard to be solved by either System-1 or 2, respectively. We fine-tune all three components on top of a single base LLM, requiring only search traces as supervision. Experiments with two diverse planning tasks -- Maze Navigation and Blocksworld -- show that our System-1.x Planner outperforms a System-1 Planner, a System-2 Planner trained to approximate A* search, and also a symbolic planner (A*). We demonstrate the following key properties of our planner: (1) controllability: increasing the hybridization factor (e.g., System-1.75 vs 1.5) performs more search, improving performance, (2) flexibility: by building a neuro-symbolic variant with a neural System-1 and a symbolic System-2, we can use existing symbolic methods, and (3) generalizability: by being able to learn from different search algorithms, our method is robust to the choice of search algorithm.

There have been increasing challenges to dual-system descriptions of System-1 and System-2, critiquing them as imprecise and fostering misconceptions. We address these issues here by way of Dennett's appeal to use computational thinking as an analytical tool, specifically we employ the Common Model of Cognition. Results show that the characteristics thought to be distinctive of System-1 and System-2 instead form a spectrum of cognitive properties. By grounding System-1 and System-2 in the Common Model we aim to clarify their underlying mechanisms, persisting misconceptions, and implications for metacognition.