Our framework employs traditional regret minimizers as black-box components.

The generation of high-quality, diverse, and prompt-aligned images is a central goal in image-generating diffusion models. The popular classifier-free guidance (CFG) approach improves quality and alignment at the cost of reduced variation, creating an inherent entanglement of these effects. Recent work has successfully disentangled these properties by guiding a model with a separately trained, inferior counterpart; however, this solution introduces the considerable overhead of requiring an auxiliary model. We challenge this prerequisite by introducing In-situ Autoguidance, a method that elicits guidance from the model itself without any auxiliary components. Our approach dynamically generates an inferior prediction on the fly using a stochastic forward pass, reframing guidance as a form of inference-time self-correction. We demonstrate that this zero-cost approach is not only viable but also establishes a powerful new baseline for cost-efficient guidance, proving that the benefits of self-guidance can be achieved without external models.

Our framework employs traditional regret minimizers as black-box components.

Our framework employs traditional regret minimizers as black-box components.

We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the follower best-responds. We provide learning algorithms for the leader which achieve $O(T^{1/2})$ regret under bandit feedback, an improvement from the previously best-known rates of $O(T^{2/3})$. Our algorithms rely on a reduction to linear contextual bandits in the utility space: In each round, a linear contextual bandit algorithm recommends a utility vector, which our algorithm inverts to determine the leader's mixed strategy. We extend our algorithms to the setting in which the leader's utility function is unknown, and also apply it to the problems of bidding in second-price auctions with side information and online Bayesian persuasion with public and private states. Finally, we observe that our algorithms empirically outperform previous results on numerical simulations.