Is Q-learningprovablyefficient? InAdvancesin Neural Information Processing Systems, 2018.

The Lipschitz bandit is a key variant of stochastic bandit problems where the expected reward function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to an arm metric space. With its wide-ranging practical applications, various Lipschitz bandit algorithms have been developed, achieving the cumulative regret lower bound of order $\tilde O(T^{(d_z+1)/(d_z+2)})$ over time horizon $T$. Motivated by recent advancements in quantum computing and the demonstrated success of quantum Monte Carlo in simpler bandit settings, we introduce the first quantum Lipschitz bandit algorithms to address the challenges of continuous action spaces and non-linear reward functions. Specifically, we first leverage the elimination-based framework to propose an efficient quantum Lipschitz bandit algorithm named Q-LAE. Next, we present novel modifications to the classical Zooming algorithm, which results in a simple quantum Lipschitz bandit method, Q-Zooming. Both algorithms exploit the computational power of quantum methods to achieve an improved regret bound of $\tilde O(T^{d_z/(d_z+1)})$. Comprehensive experiments further validate our improved theoretical findings, demonstrating superior empirical performance compared to existing Lipschitz bandit methods.

Consider a bandit algorithm that recommends actions to self-interested users in a recommendation system. The users are free to choose other actions and need to be incentivized to follow the algorithm's recommendations.

We study the greedy (exploitation-only) algorithm in bandit problems with a known reward structure. We allow arbitrary finite reward structures, while prior work focused on a few specific ones. We fully characterize when the greedy algorithm asymptotically succeeds or fails, in the sense of sublinear vs. linear regret as a function of time. Our characterization identifies a partial identifiability property of the problem instance as the necessary and sufficient condition for the asymptotic success. Notably, once this property holds, the problem becomes easy--any algorithm will succeed (in the same sense as above), provided it satisfies a mild non-degeneracy condition. We further extend our characterization to contextual bandits and interactive decision-making with arbitrary feedback, and demonstrate its broad applicability across various examples. Keywords: Multi-armed bandits, contextual bandits, structured bandits, greedy algorithm, regret.

How to incentivize self-interested agents to explore when they prefer to exploit? Consider a population of self-interested agents that make decisions under uncertainty. They "explore" to acquire new information and "exploit" this information to make good decisions. Collectively they need to balance these two objectives, but their incentives are skewed toward exploitation. This is because exploration is costly, but its benefits are spread over many agents in the future. "Incentivized Exploration" addresses this issue via strategic communication. Consider a benign ``principal" which can communicate with the agents and make recommendations, but cannot force the agents to comply. Moreover, suppose the principal can observe the agents' decisions and the outcomes of these decisions. The goal is to design a communication and recommendation policy which (i) achieves a desirable balance between exploration and exploitation, and (ii) incentivizes the agents to follow recommendations. What makes it feasible is "information asymmetry": the principal knows more than any one agent, as it collects information from many. It is essential that the principal does not fully reveal all its knowledge to the agents. Incentivized exploration combines two important problems in, resp., machine learning and theoretical economics. First, if agents always follow recommendations, the principal faces a multi-armed bandit problem: essentially, design an algorithm that balances exploration and exploitation. Second, interaction with a single agent corresponds to "Bayesian persuasion", where a principal leverages information asymmetry to convince an agent to take a particular action. We provide a brief but self-contained introduction to each problem through the lens of incentivized exploration, solving a key special case of the former as a sub-problem of the latter.

Reviews and ratings are pervasive in many online platforms. A customer consults reviews/ratings, then chooses a product and then (often) leaves feedback, which is aggregated by the platform and served to future customers. Collectively, customers face a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, i.e., between acquiring new information while making potentially suboptimal decisions and making optimal decisions using available information. However, individual customers tend to act myopically and favor exploitation, without regards to exploration for the sake of the others. On a high level, we ask whether/how the myopic behavior interferes with efficient exploration. We are particularly interested in learning failures when only a few agents choose an optimal action.

We propose and design recommendation systems that incentivize efficient exploration. Agents arrive sequentially, choose actions and receive rewards, drawn from fixed but unknown action-specific distributions. The recommendation system presents each agent with actions and rewards from a subsequence of past agents, chosen ex ante. Thus, the agents engage in sequential social learning, moderated by these subsequences. We asymptotically attain optimal regret rate for exploration, using a flexible frequentist behavioral model and mitigating rationality and commitment assumptions inherent in prior work. We suggest three components of effective recommendation systems: independent focus groups, group aggregators, and interlaced information structures.