In the wake of a fabricated explosion image at the Pentagon, an ability to discern real images from fake counterparts has never been more critical. Our study introduces a novel multi-modal approach to detect AI-generated images amidst the proliferation of new generation methods such as Diffusion models. Our method, UGAD, encompasses three key detection steps: First, we transform the RGB images into YCbCr channels and apply an Integral Radial Operation to emphasize salient radial features. Secondly, the Spatial Fourier Extraction operation is used for a spatial shift, utilizing a pre-trained deep learning network for optimal feature extraction. Finally, the deep neural network classification stage processes the data through dense layers using softmax for classification. Our approach significantly enhances the accuracy of differentiating between real and AI-generated images, as evidenced by a 12.64% increase in accuracy and 28.43% increase in AUC compared to existing state-of-the-art methods.

Recent rapid advancements in deepfake technology have allowed the creation of highly realistic fake media, such as video, image, and audio. These materials pose significant challenges to human authentication, such as impersonation, misinformation, or even a threat to national security. To keep pace with these rapid advancements, several deepfake detection algorithms have been proposed, leading to an ongoing arms race between deepfake creators and deepfake detectors. Nevertheless, these detectors are often unreliable and frequently fail to detect deepfakes. This study highlights the challenges they face in detecting deepfakes, including (1) the pre-processing pipeline of artifacts and (2) the fact that generators of new, unseen deepfake samples have not been considered when building the defense models. Our work sheds light on the need for further research and development in this field to create more robust and reliable detectors. Figure 1: Illustration of the face detected from different engines.

The metaverse has gained significant attention from various industries due to its potential to create a fully immersive and interactive virtual world. However, the integration of deepfakes in the metaverse brings serious security implications, particularly with regard to impersonation. This paper examines the security implications of deepfakes in the metaverse, specifically in the context of gaming, online meetings, and virtual offices. The paper discusses how deepfakes can be used to impersonate in gaming scenarios, how online meetings in the metaverse open the door for impersonation, and how virtual offices in the metaverse lack physical authentication, making it easier for attackers to impersonate someone. The implications of these security concerns are discussed in relation to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad. The paper further explores related issues such as the darkverse, and digital cloning, as well as regulatory and privacy concerns associated with addressing security threats in the virtual world.

Time series anomaly detection is extensively studied in statistics, economics, and computer science. Over the years, numerous methods have been proposed for time series anomaly detection using deep learning-based methods. Many of these methods demonstrate state-of-the-art performance on benchmark datasets, giving the false impression that these systems are robust and deployable in many practical and industrial real-world scenarios. In this paper, we demonstrate that the performance of state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods is degraded substantially by adding only small adversarial perturbations to the sensor data. We use different scoring metrics such as prediction errors, anomaly, and classification scores over several public and private datasets ranging from aerospace applications, server machines, to cyber-physical systems in power plants. Under well-known adversarial attacks from Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) methods, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) and graph neural networks (GNNs) methods, which claim to be robust against anomalies and have been possibly integrated in real-life systems, have their performance drop to as low as 0%. To the best of our understanding, we demonstrate, for the first time, the vulnerabilities of anomaly detection systems against adversarial attacks. The overarching goal of this research is to raise awareness towards the adversarial vulnerabilities of time series anomaly detectors.

Recently, significant advancements have been made in face recognition technologies using Deep Neural Networks. As a result, companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Naver offer highly accurate commercial face recognition web services for diverse applications to meet the end-user needs. Naturally, however, such technologies are threatened persistently, as virtually any individual can quickly implement impersonation attacks. In particular, these attacks can be a significant threat for authentication and identification services, which heavily rely on their underlying face recognition technologies' accuracy and robustness. Despite its gravity, the issue regarding deepfake abuse using commercial web APIs and their robustness has not yet been thoroughly investigated. This work provides a measurement study on the robustness of black-box commercial face recognition APIs against Deepfake Impersonation (DI) attacks using celebrity recognition APIs as an example case study. We use five deepfake datasets, two of which are created by us and planned to be released. More specifically, we measure attack performance based on two scenarios (targeted and non-targeted) and further analyze the differing system behaviors using fidelity, confidence, and similarity metrics. Accordingly, we demonstrate how vulnerable face recognition technologies from popular companies are to DI attack, achieving maximum success rates of 78.0% and 99.9% for targeted (i.e., precise match) and non-targeted (i.e., match with any celebrity) attacks, respectively. Moreover, we propose practical defense strategies to mitigate DI attacks, reducing the attack success rates to as low as 0% and 0.02% for targeted and non-targeted attacks, respectively.