As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) - what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task - becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only 700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls. Our code is available at: https://github.com/EricGLan/CI-RL

We study the ability of language models to reason about appropriate information disclosure--a central aspect of the evolving field of agentic privacy. Whereas previous works have focused on evaluating a model's ability to align with human decisions, we examine the role of ambiguity and missing context on model performance when making information-sharing decisions. We identify context ambiguity as a crucial barrier for high performance in privacy assessments. By designing Camber, a framework for context disambiguation, we show that model-generated decision rationales can reveal ambiguities and that systematically disambiguating context based on these rationales leads to significant accuracy improvements (up to 13.3% in precision and up to 22.3% in recall) as well as reductions in prompt sensitivity. Overall, our results indicate that approaches for context disambiguation are a promising way forward to enhance agentic privacy reasoning.

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, Markov persuasion processes (MPPs) have been introduced to capture sequential scenarios where a sender faces a stream of myopic receivers in a Markovian environment. The MPPs studied so far in the literature suffer from issues that prevent them from being fully operational in practice, e.g., they assume that the sender knows receivers' rewards. We fix such issues by addressing MPPs where the sender has no knowledge about the environment.

Evidence that visual communication preceded written language and provided a basis for it goes back to prehistory, in forms such as cave and rock paintings depicting traces of our distant ancestors. Emergent communication research has sought to explore how agents can learn to communicate in order to collaboratively solve tasks. Existing research has focused on language, with a learned communication channel transmitting sequences of discrete tokens between the agents. In this work, we explore a visual communication channel between agents that are allowed to draw with simple strokes. Our agents are parameterised by deep neural networks, and the drawing procedure is differentiable, allowing for end-to-end training. In the framework of a referential communication game, we demonstrate that agents can not only successfully learn to communicate by drawing, but with appropriate inductive biases, can do so in a fashion that humans can interpret. We hope to encourage future research to consider visual communication as a more flexible and directly interpretable alternative of training collaborative agents.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has knowledge about either the prior distribution over states of nature or receiver's utilities, or both. We relax such unrealistic assumptions by considering settings in which the sender does not know anything about the prior and the receiver. We design an algorithm that achieves sublinear---in the number of rounds T---regret with respect to an optimal signaling scheme, and we also provide a collection of lower bounds showing that the guarantees of such an algorithm are tight. Our algorithm works by searching a suitable space of signaling schemes in order to learn receiver's best responses. To do this, we leverage a non-standard representation of signaling schemes that allows to cleverly overcome the challenge of not knowing anything about the prior over states of nature and receiver's utilities. Finally, our results also allow to derive lower/upper bounds on the sample complexity of learning signaling schemes in a related Bayesian persuasion PAC-learning problem.

Effective communication requires the ability to refer to specific parts of an observation in relation to others.