Evidence that visual communication preceded written language and provided a basis for it goes back to prehistory, in forms such as cave and rock paintings depicting traces of our distant ancestors. Emergent communication research has sought to explore how agents can learn to communicate in order to collaboratively solve tasks. Existing research has focused on language, with a learned communication channel transmitting sequences of discrete tokens between the agents. In this work, we explore a visual communication channel between agents that are allowed to draw with simple strokes. Our agents are parameterised by deep neural networks, and the drawing procedure is differentiable, allowing for end-to-end training. In the framework of a referential communication game, we demonstrate that agents can not only successfully learn to communicate by drawing, but with appropriate inductive biases, can do so in a fashion that humans can interpret. We hope to encourage future research to consider visual communication as a more flexible and directly interpretable alternative of training collaborative agents.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has knowledge about either the prior distribution over states of nature or receiver's utilities, or both. We relax such unrealistic assumptions by considering settings in which the sender does not know anything about the prior and the receiver. We design an algorithm that achieves sublinear---in the number of rounds T---regret with respect to an optimal signaling scheme, and we also provide a collection of lower bounds showing that the guarantees of such an algorithm are tight. Our algorithm works by searching a suitable space of signaling schemes in order to learn receiver's best responses. To do this, we leverage a non-standard representation of signaling schemes that allows to cleverly overcome the challenge of not knowing anything about the prior over states of nature and receiver's utilities. Finally, our results also allow to derive lower/upper bounds on the sample complexity of learning signaling schemes in a related Bayesian persuasion PAC-learning problem.

Effective communication requires the ability to refer to specific parts of an observation in relation to others.

Ironically, previous works neglect multi-round interaction, which is indispensable in human communication.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.