Predictions often influence the reality which they aim to predict, an effect known as performativity. Existing work focuses on accuracy maximization under this effect, but model deployment may have important unintended impacts, especially in multiagent scenarios. In this work, we investigate performative prediction in a concrete game-theoretic setting where social welfare is an alternative objective to accuracy maximization. We explore a collective risk dilemma scenario where maximising accuracy can negatively impact social welfare, when predicting collective behaviours. By assuming knowledge of a Bayesian agent behavior model, we then show how to achieve better trade-offs and use them for mechanism design.

Prediction models are popular in medical research and practice. By predicting an outcome of interest for specific patients, these models may help inform difficult treatment decisions, and are often hailed as the poster children for personalized, data-driven healthcare. We show however, that using prediction models for decision making can lead to harmful decisions, even when the predictions exhibit good discrimination after deployment. These models are harmful self-fulfilling prophecies: their deployment harms a group of patients but the worse outcome of these patients does not invalidate the predictive power of the model. Our main result is a formal characterization of a set of such prediction models. Next we show that models that are well calibrated before and after deployment are useless for decision making as they made no change in the data distribution. These results point to the need to revise standard practices for validation, deployment and evaluation of prediction models that are used in medical decisions.

Group fairness definitions such as Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity make assumptions about the underlying decision-problem that restrict them to classification problems. Prior work has translated these definitions to other machine learning environments, such as unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning, by implementing their closest mathematical equivalent. As a result, there are numerous bespoke interpretations of these definitions. This work aims to unify the shared aspects of each of these bespoke definitions, and to this end we provide a group fairness framework that generalizes beyond just classification problems. We leverage two fairness principles that enable this generalization. First, our framework measures outcomes in terms of utilities, rather than predictions, and does so for both the decision-maker and the individual. Second, our framework can consider counterfactual outcomes, rather than just observed outcomes, thus preventing loopholes where fairness criteria are satisfied through self-fulfilling prophecies. We provide concrete examples of how our utility fairness framework avoids these assumptions and thus naturally integrates with classification, clustering, and reinforcement learning fairness problems. We also show that many of the bespoke interpretations of Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity fit nicely as special cases of our framework.

It is increasingly possible for real-world agents, such as software-based agents or human institutions, to view the internal programming of other such agents that they interact with. For instance, a company can read the bylaws of another company, or one software system can read the source code of another. Game-theoretic equilibria between the designers of such agents are called \emph{program equilibria}, and we call this area \emph{open-source game theory}. In this work we demonstrate a series of counterintuitive results on open-source games, which are independent of the programming language in which agents are written. We show that certain formal institution designs that one might expect to defect against each other will instead turn out to cooperate, or conversely, cooperate when one might expect them to defect. The results hold in a setting where each institution has full visibility into the other institution's true operating procedures. We also exhibit examples and ten open problems for better understanding these phenomena. We argue that contemporary game theory remains ill-equipped to study program equilibria, given that even the outcomes of single games in open-source settings remain counterintuitive and poorly understood. Nonetheless, some of these open-source agents exhibit desirable characteristics -- e.g., they can unexploitably create incentives for cooperation and legibility from other agents -- such that analyzing them could yield considerable benefits.

Group fairness definitions such as Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity make assumptions about the underlying decision-problem that restrict them to classification problems. Prior work has translated these definitions to other machine learning environments, such as unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning, by implementing their closest mathematical equivalent. As a result, there are numerous bespoke interpretations of these definitions. Instead, we provide a generalized set of group fairness definitions that unambiguously extend to all machine learning environments while still retaining their original fairness notions. We derive two fairness principles that enable such a generalized framework. First, our framework measures outcomes in terms of utilities, rather than predictions, and does so for both the decision-algorithm and the individual. Second, our framework considers counterfactual outcomes, rather than just observed outcomes, thus preventing loopholes where fairness criteria are satisfied through self-fulfilling prophecies. We provide concrete examples of how our counterfactual utility fairness framework resolves known fairness issues in classification, clustering, and reinforcement learning problems. We also show that many of the bespoke interpretations of Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity fit nicely as special cases of our framework.

Over the past decade or so, the digital revolution has given us a surplus of data. This is exciting for a number of reasons, but mostly in terms of how AI will be able to further revolutionize the enterprise. However, in the world of B2B -- the industry I'm deeply involved in -- we are still experiencing a shortage of data, largely because the number of transactions is vastly lower compared to B2C. So, in order for AI to deliver on its promise of revolutionizing the enterprise, it must be able to solve these small data problems as well. The problem is that many data scientists turn to bad practices, creating self-fulfilling prophecies, which reduces the effectiveness of AI in small data scenarios -- and ultimately hinders AI's influence in advancing the enterprise.

Machine learning means learning from data; AI is a buzzword. Machine learning lives up to the hype: there are an incredible number of problems that you can solve by providing the right training data to the right learning algorithms. Call it AI if that helps you sell it, but know that AI, at least as used outside of academia, is often a buzzword that can mean whatever people want it to mean. Machine learning is about data and algorithms, but mostly data. But data is the key ingredient that makes machine learning possible.

As someone who often finds himself explaining machine learning to non-experts, I offer the following list as a public service announcement. Machine learning means learning from data; AI is a buzzword: Machine learning lives up to the hype: there are an incredible number of problems that you can solve by providing the right training data to the right learning algorithms. Call it AI if that helps you sell it, but know that AI, at least as used outside of academia, is often a buzzword that can mean whatever people want it to mean. Machine learning is about data and algorithms, but mostly data: There's a lot of excitement about advances in machine learning algorithms, and particularly about deep learning . But data is the key ingredient that makes machine learning possible.

Machine learning means learning from data; AI is a buzzword. Machine learning lives up to the hype: there are an incredible number of problems that you can solve by providing the right training data to the right learning algorithms. Call it AI if that helps you sell it, but know that AI, at least as used outside of academia, is often a buzzword that can mean whatever people want it to mean. Machine learning is about data and algorithms, but mostly data. But data is the key ingredient that makes machine learning possible.

Machine learning means learning from data; AI is a buzzword. Machine learning lives up to the hype: there are an incredible number of problems that you can solve by providing the right training data to the right learning algorithms. Call it AI if that helps you sell it, but know that AI is a buzzword that can mean whatever people want it to mean. Machine learning is about data and algorithms, but mostly data. But data is the key ingredient that makes machine learning possible.