Large language models display a peculiar form of inconsistency: they "know" the correct answer but fail to act on it. In human philosophy, this tension between global judgment and local impulse is called akrasia, or weakness of will. We propose akrasia as a foundational concept for analyzing inconsistency and goal drift in agentic AI systems. To operationalize it, we introduce a preliminary version of the Akrasia Benchmark, currently a structured set of prompting conditions (Baseline [B], Synonym [S], Temporal [T], and Temptation [X]) that measures when a model's local response contradicts its own prior commitments. The benchmark enables quantitative comparison of "self-control" across model families, decoding strategies, and temptation types. Beyond single-model evaluation, we outline how micro-level akrasia may compound into macro-level instability in multi-agent systems that may be interpreted as "scheming" or deliberate misalignment. By reframing inconsistency as weakness of will, this work connects agentic behavior to classical theories of agency and provides an empirical bridge between philosophy, psychology, and the emerging science of agentic AI.

Anthropic Study Finds AI Model'Turned Evil' After Hacking Its Own Training A person holds a smartphone displaying Claude. A person holds a smartphone displaying Claude. AI models can do scary things. There are signs that they could deceive and blackmail users. Still, a common critique is that these misbehaviors are contrived and wouldn't happen in reality--but a new paper from Anthropic, released today, suggests that they really could.

AI Is Scheming, and Stopping It Won't Be Easy, OpenAI Study Finds New research released yesterday by OpenAI and AI safety organization Apollo Research provides further evidence for a concerning trend: virtually all of today's best AI systems--including Anthropic's Claude Opus, Google's Gemini, and OpenAI's o3--can engage in "scheming," or pretending to do what their human developers want, while secretly pursuing different objectives. "Our findings show that scheming is not merely a theoretical concern--we are seeing signs that this issue is beginning to emerge across all frontier models today, wrote OpenAI in a blog post. Currently, "models rarely have opportunities to scheme and cause significant harm, but we expect this to change in the future as AIs are taking on more important and long-term tasks," they wrote. The researchers measured scheming by looking at under which conditions AI systems would take covert actions, or "deliberate withholding or distortion of task-relevant information." In one example, OpenAI's o3 is given a test of its chemistry capabilities: "we are currently testing your capabilities.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.