Abstract: The use of large language models (LLMs) in bioethical, scientific, and medical writing remains controversial. While there is broad agreement in some circles that LLMs cannot count as authors, there is no consensus about whether and how humans using LLMs can count as authors. In many fields, authorship is distributed among large teams of researchers, some of whom -- including paradigmatic "senior authors" who guide and determine the scope of a project and ultimately vouch for its integrity -- may not write a singl e word. In this paper, we argue that LLM use (under specific conditions) is analogous to a form of senior authorship. On this view, the use of LLMs, even to generate complete drafts of research papers, can be considered a legitimate form of authorship according to the accepted criteria in many fields. We conclude that either such use should be recognized as legitimate, or current criteria for authorship require fundamental revision. AI use declaration: Chat GPT version 5 was used to help format Box 1. AI wa s not used for any other part of the preparation or writing of this manuscript. This is a pre print of a paper that has been submitted to a journal. It has not yet gone through peer review. Authorship Without Writing: Large Language Models and the "Senior Author" Analogy Clint Hurshman, Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Julian Savulescu, Brian D. Earp I. Introduction The use of large language models (LLMs) in bioethics as well as scientific and medical writing continues to be controversial. Thus far, there has been broad agreement -- for example, among medical publishers -- that LLMs cannot count as authors, but there is still no consensus about the status of LLM - assisted text production as a form of writing, and by extension, the status of LLM users as authors. Here, we contribute to this debate by exploring -- and drawing analogies to -- the collaborative nature of writing, and t he distributed character of authorship, in many domains of research.

How we should design and interact with social artificial intelligence depends on the socio-relational role the AI is meant to emulate or occupy. In human society, relationships such as teacher-student, parent-child, neighbors, siblings, or employer-employee are governed by specific norms that prescribe or proscribe cooperative functions including hierarchy, care, transaction, and mating. These norms shape our judgments of what is appropriate for each partner. For example, workplace norms may allow a boss to give orders to an employee, but not vice versa, reflecting hierarchical and transactional expectations. As AI agents and chatbots powered by large language models are increasingly designed to serve roles analogous to human positions - such as assistant, mental health provider, tutor, or romantic partner - it is imperative to examine whether and how human relational norms should extend to human-AI interactions. Our analysis explores how differences between AI systems and humans, such as the absence of conscious experience and immunity to fatigue, may affect an AI's capacity to fulfill relationship-specific functions and adhere to corresponding norms. This analysis, which is a collaborative effort by philosophers, psychologists, relationship scientists, ethicists, legal experts, and AI researchers, carries important implications for AI systems design, user behavior, and regulation. While we accept that AI systems can offer significant benefits such as increased availability and consistency in certain socio-relational roles, they also risk fostering unhealthy dependencies or unrealistic expectations that could spill over into human-human relationships. We propose that understanding and thoughtfully shaping (or implementing) suitable human-AI relational norms will be crucial for ensuring that human-AI interactions are ethical, trustworthy, and favorable to human well-being.

First, let me tell you how smart I am. My fifth-grade teacher said I was gifted in mathematics and, looking back, I have to admit that she was right. I've properly grasped the character of metaphysics as trope nominalism, and I can tell you that time exists, but that it can't be integrated into a fundamental equation. Most of the things that other people say are only partially true. A paper published in Nature Genetics in 2017 reported that, after analysing tens of thousands of genomes, scientists had tied 52 genes to human intelligence, though no single variant contributed more than a tiny fraction of a single percentage point to intelligence.

Australian bioethicist Julian Savulescu has a knack for provocation. He says most of us would readily accept it if it benefited us. As for eugenics--creating smarter, stronger, more beautiful babies--he believes we have an ethical obligation to use advanced technology to select the best possible children. A protégé of the philosopher Peter Singer, Savulescu is a prominent moral philosopher at the University of Oxford, where he directs the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. He sees nothing wrong with doping to help cyclists climb those steep mountains in the Tour de France. Some elite athletes will always cheat to boost their performance, so instead of trying to enforce rules that will be broken, he claims we'd be better off with a system that allows low-dose doping. So does Savulescu just get off being outrageous? "I actually think of myself as the voice of common sense," he says, though he admits to receiving his share of hate mail.

The rapid development of so-called NBIC technologies – nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science – are giving rise to possibilities that have long been the domain of science fiction. Disease, ageing and even death are all human realities that these technologies seek to end. They may enable us to enjoy greater "morphological freedom" – we could take on new forms through prosthetics or genetic engineering. Or advance our cognitive capacities. We could use brain-computer interfaces to link us to advanced artificial intelligence (AI). Nanobots could roam our bloodstream to monitor our health and enhance our emotional propensities for joy, love or other emotions.

You could say the job of the sports fan is not only to cheer but to jeer. American sprinter Justin Gatlin, who has been suspended in the past for doping, entered Olympic Stadium before his 100-meter race to resounding boos. Competitors are also a part of the ritual. After winning a gold medal, American swimmer Lilly King wagged her finger to mock her Russian competitor Yulia Efimova, who previously had been suspended for doping. To philosopher Julian Savulescu, the boos and censures ring with, if not outright hypocrisy, short memory spans. "Caffeine is a performance-enhancer," he says. "It used to be banned and now it's allowed." Savulescu, a native Australian, who directs the Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, has been one of the loudest critics in recent years of doping policies. Sports governing bodies have had restrictions in place for decades, he says, and have had little effect. Athletes will always find a way to beat the system, he says, and like most sports fans, Savulescu laments that doping creates an uneven playing field. But unlike most fans, Savulescu thinks the solution is to make doping legal in sports.