Generalisation and efficiency ofmodelrepairment In practice the numberoffailure casesmight be large or even infinite. Optimisation For all experiments, we employ the same training scheme unless otherwise stated.

Pandora's Box is a central problem in decision making under uncertainty that can model various real life scenarios. In this problem we are given n boxes, each with a fixed opening cost, and an unknown value drawn from a known distribution, only revealed if we pay the opening cost. Our goal is to find a strategy for opening boxes to minimize the sum of the value selected and the opening cost paid.In this work we revisit Pandora's Box when the value distributions are correlated, first studied in [CGT+20]. We show that the optimal algorithm for the independent case, given by Weitzman's rule, directly works for the correlated case. In fact, our algorithm results in significantly improved approximation guarantees compared to the previous work, while also being substantially simpler. We also show how to implement the rule given only sample access to the correlated distribution of values. Specifically, we find that a number of samples that is polynomial in the number of boxes is sufficient for the algorithm to work.

It used to be just a sci-fi nightmare scenario, but today, AI phishing is real, and it's costing companies millions. We've already touched upon this one, but the Hong Kong phishing scam that targeted an employee at Arup deserves a deeper dive. The employee was tricked by deepfake versions of her CFO and colleagues into transferring HK 200 million across 15 transactions. The case has been widely reported and confirmed by the Hong Kong police. Every face and voice was AI-generated.

We investigate reinforcement learning in the Game Of Hidden Rules (GOHR) environment, a complex puzzle in which an agent must infer and execute hidden rules to clear a 6$\times$6 board by placing game pieces into buckets. We explore two state representation strategies, namely Feature-Centric (FC) and Object-Centric (OC), and employ a Transformer-based Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm for training. The agent has access only to partial observations and must simultaneously infer the governing rule and learn the optimal policy through experience. We evaluate our models across multiple rule-based and trial-list-based experimental setups, analyzing transfer effects and the impact of representation on learning efficiency.

Reinforcement learning based fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) on human preferences has been shown to enhance both their capabilities and safety behavior. However, in cases related to safety, without precise instructions to human annotators, the data collected may cause the model to become overly cautious, or to respond in an undesirable style, such as being judgmental. Additionally, as model capabilities and usage patterns evolve, there may be a costly need to add or relabel data to modify safety behavior. We propose a novel preference modeling approach that utilizes AI feedback and only requires a small amount of human data. Our method, Rule Based Rewards (RBR), uses a collection of rules for desired or undesired behaviors (e.g.

SINGAPORE--China's top internet regulator proposed rules Tuesday to control artificial-intelligence tools similar to ChatGPT, putting it at the forefront of efforts by governments worldwide to tame the new technology amid concerns over the challenges it poses.

Failing 15 per cent of the time is the best recipe for success, even more so than not failing at all, finds research. A study led by researchers at the University of Arizona proposed a mathematically devised optimum level of failure. Educational experts have long agreed that there is a'sweet spot' when it comes to learning, reasoning that people learn best when they are challenged to grasp something just outside the bounds of our existing knowledge. When a challenge is too simple, we don't learn anything new. Likewise, our knowledge doesn't improve when a challenge is so hard that we give up entirely.

One of the biggest confusions about "Artificial Intelligence" is that it is a very vague term. That's because Artificial Intelligence or AI is a term that was coined way back in 1955 with extreme hubris: We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language, form abstractions, and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve themselves. AI is over half a century old and carries with it too much baggage.

Artificial Intelligence for Microcomputers If you would like to develop an expert system or knowledgebased system on a microcomputer, you might want to read Artijcial Intelligence for Microcomputers by Mickey Williamson, This nontechnical book is easy to understand, written for the unsophisticated microcomputer user. The first chapters provide a brief history of artificial intelligence (AI) and an introduction to natural language query systems. They explain what knowledge-based systems and expert systems are and how they work. Discussions are also provided of the two major AI programming languages, Lisp and Prolog, including their strengths and weaknesses. The remainder of the book is devoted to a review of some of the existing AI software products for microcomputers, such as natural language query systems, decision support systems, expert system development shells, and AI programming languages.

Many bidders in eBay use bidding strategies that involve late bids, incremental bids, or both. Based on field evidence, we discuss the manner in which late bids are caused both by sophisticated, strategic reasoning and by irrationality and inexperience; the interaction of late bidding with incremental bidding; and the relation between market design and artificial agent design. Participants in internet markets can be human bidders bidding in person or artificial agents used by human bidders. Thus, the performance of market rules depends on what behavior the rules elicit from human and artificial agents. At the same time, the performance of software agents, and the decisions of bidders whether to use them, depends on how they interact with humans and other software agents in the market.