We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own preferences. We show that existing RLHF algorithms, including recent pluralistic methods, are not strategyproof, and that even a single strategic labeler can cause arbitrarily large misalignment with social welfare. Moreover, we prove that, in the worst case, any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform k-times worse than the optimal policy, where k is the number of labelers. This suggests a fundamental trade-off between incentive alignment (ensuring labelers report truthfully) and policy alignment (maximizing social welfare). To address this, we propose the Pessimistic Median of MLEs algorithm, which, under appropriate policy coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of labelers and samples increases. Our results apply to both contextual bandits and Markov decision processes.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Many popular practical reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms employ evolving reward functions-through techniques such as reward shaping, entropy regularization, or curriculum learning-yet their theoretical foundations remain underdeveloped. This paper provides the first finite-time convergence analysis of a single-timescale actor-critic algorithm in the presence of an evolving reward function under Markovian sampling. We consider a setting where the reward parameters may change at each time step, affecting both policy optimization and value estimation. Under standard assumptions, we derive non-asymptotic bounds for both actor and critic errors. Our result shows that an $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ convergence rate is achievable, matching the best-known rate for static rewards, provided the reward parameters evolve slowly enough. This rate is preserved when the reward is updated via a gradient-based rule with bounded gradient and on the same timescale as the actor and critic, offering a theoretical foundation for many popular RL techniques. As a secondary contribution, we introduce a novel analysis of distribution mismatch under Markovian sampling, improving the best-known rate by a factor of $\log^2T$ in the static-reward case.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to recover the reward function and the associated optimal policy that best fits observed sequences of states and actions implemented by an expert.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to recover the reward function and the associated optimal policy that best fits observed sequences of states and actions implemented by an expert.

We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), where multiple individuals with diverse preferences provide feedback strategically to sway the final policy in their favor. We show that existing RLHF methods are not strategyproof, which can result in learning a substantially misaligned policy even when only one out of $k$ individuals reports their preferences strategically. In turn, we also find that any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform $k$-times worse than the optimal policy, highlighting an inherent trade-off between incentive alignment and policy alignment. We then propose a pessimistic median algorithm that, under appropriate coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of individuals and samples increases.