revr
Theoretical Benefit and Limitation of Diffusion Language Model
Diffusion language models have emerged as a new approach for text generation. By enabling the parallel sampling of multiple tokens in each diffusion step, they appear to offer a more efficient alternative to auto-regressive models. However, our observations show that current open-sourced diffusion language models require more sampling steps to achieve comparable accuracy on representative tasks-resulting in even higher inference costs than their auto-regressive counterparts. To investigate whether this is an inherent limitation, we conduct a rigorous theoretical analysis of a widely adopted variant: the Masked Diffusion Model (MDM). Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that the conclusion is highly sensitive to the choice of evaluation metric. Under mild conditions, we prove that when the target is near-optimal perplexity, MDMs can achieve this goal in a constant number of sampling steps, independent of sequence length. This result demonstrates that efficiency can, in principle, be attained without compromising generation quality. However, when targeting low sequence error rate-which is important for assessing the "correctness" of a generated sequence, such as a reasoning chain-we show that in the worst case, the required sampling steps must scale linearly with sequence length, thereby eliminating the efficiency advantage. Our analysis establishes the first theoretical foundation for understanding the comparative strengths and limitations of MDMs, offering practical guidance on when to favor MDMs over auto-regressive models and vice versa.
Revenue maximization via machine learning with noisy data
Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for the items for sale and that the learning algorithm's input is a training set sampled from this distribution. This setup makes the strong assumption that no noise is introduced during data collection. In order to help place mechanism design via machine learning on firm foundations, we investigate the extent to which this learning process is robust to noise. Optimizing revenue using noisy data is challenging because revenue functions are extremely volatile: an infinitesimal change in the buyers' values can cause a steep drop in revenue. Nonetheless, we provide guarantees when arbitrarily correlated noise is added to the training set; we only require that the noise has bounded magnitude or is sub-Gaussian. We conclude with an application of our guarantees to multi-task mechanism design, where there are multiple distributions over buyers' values and the goal is to learn a high-revenue mechanism per distribution. To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design via machine learning with noisy data as well as multi-task mechanism design.
Revenue maximization via machine learning with noisy data
Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for the items for sale and that the learning algorithm's input is a training set sampled from this distribution. This setup makes the strong assumption that no noise is introduced during data collection. In order to help place mechanism design via machine learning on firm foundations, we investigate the extent to which this learning process is robust to noise. Optimizing revenue using noisy data is challenging because revenue functions are extremely volatile: an infinitesimal change in the buyers' values can cause a steep drop in revenue. Nonetheless, we provide guarantees when arbitrarily correlated noise is added to the training set; we only require that the noise has bounded magnitude or is sub-Gaussian. We conclude with an application of our guarantees to multi-task mechanism design, where there are multiple distributions over buyers' values and the goal is to learn a high-revenue mechanism per distribution. To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design via machine learning with noisy data as well as multi-task mechanism design.