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We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis testing rule, aiming to pick a p-value threshold that balances false positives and false negatives while anticipating the agent's incentive to maximize expected profitability. Building on prior work, we develop a game-theoretic model that captures how the agent's participation and reporting behavior respond to the principal's statistical decision rule. Despite the complexity of the interaction, we show that the principal's errors exhibit clear monotonic behavior when segmented by an efficiently computable critical p-value threshold, leading to an interpretable characterization of their optimal p-value threshold.

The next frontier of online advertising is revenue generation from LLM-generated content. We consider a setting where advertisers aim to influence the responses of an LLM, while platforms seek to maximize advertiser value and ensure user satisfaction. The challenge is that advertisers' preferences generally conflict with those of the user, and advertisers may misreport their preferences. To address this, we introduce MOSAIC, an auction mechanism that ensures that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for advertisers and that aligns the utility of each advertiser with their contribution to social welfare. Importantly, the mechanism operates without LLM fine-tuning or access to model weights and provably converges to the output of the optimally fine-tuned LLM as computational resources increase. Additionally, it can incorporate contextual information about advertisers, which significantly improves social welfare. Via experiments with publicly available LLMs, we show that MOSAIC leads to high advertiser value and platform revenue with low computational costs. While our motivating application is online advertising, our mechanism can be applied in any setting with monetary transfers, making it a general-purpose solution for truthfully aggregating the preferences of selfinterested agents over LLM-generated replies.

We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei [Ala14] introduced a powerful multi-to-single agent reduction based on an ex-ante relaxation of the multi-agent problem. This reduction employs a rounding procedure which is an online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) in disguise, a now widely-used method for rounding fractional solutions in online Bayesian and stochastic optimization problems. In this paper, we leverage our vantage point, 10 years after the work of Alaei, with a rich OCRS toolkit and modern approaches to analyzing multi-agent mechanisms; we introduce a general framework for designing non-sequential and sequential multi-agent, revenue-maximizing mechanisms, capturing a wide variety of problems Alaei's framework could not address. Our framework uses an interim relaxation, that is rounded to a feasible mechanism using what we call a two-level OCRS, which allows for some structured dependence between the activation of its input elements. For a wide family of constraints, we can construct such schemes using existing OCRSs as a black box; for other constraints, such as knapsack, we construct such schemes from scratch. We demonstrate numerous applications of our framework, including a sequential mechanism that guarantees a 2ee 1 3.16 approximation to the optimal revenue for the case of additive agents subject to matroid feasibility constraints. The simplicity of our developed two-level CRSs and OCRSs highlights the strength of our framework: even with a simple analysis, it yields state-of-the-art approximation guarantees across a wide range of settings. Finally, we show how it naturally extends to multi-parameter procurement auctions.

We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over T rounds) that depend on the observable d-dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size K . We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret eO(K dT), which we prove to be tight in dand T up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on K .

We begin by characterizing the space of elements that test an agent's ability to optimally allocate1031 their limited resources to goods and services they desire. In economics and decision theory, the1032 most primitive approach to describing the preferences of decision-makers is to use a function that1033 maps a set of possible choices to the agent's optimal choice within that set. Under a set of intuitive1034 assumptions, such as transitivity (i.e., if bundle X is preferred to bundle Y, and Y is preferred to1035 bundle Z, then X must be preferred to Z), it becomes possible to "rationalize" preferences by instead1036 describing a utility function. This function assigns a real number to each bundle, and the agent selects1037 the bundle with the highest utility.1038 In this paper, we focus on these "rationalizable" preferences, where agent choice can be implemented1039 as utility maximization constrained by prices and income. The solution to these consumer choice1040 problems provides ...

Regulatory frameworks, such as the EUAIAct, encourage openness of generalpurpose AI models by offering legal exemptions for "open-source" models. Despite this legislative attention on openness, the definition of open-source foundation models remains ambiguous.

Differentiable economics--the use of deep learning for auction design--has driven progress in multi-item auction design with additive and unit-demand valuations. However, there has been little progress for combinatorial auctions (CAs), even in the simplest and yet important single bidder case, due to exponential growth of the bundle space with the number of items. We address this challenge by introducing a deep network architecture for a menu-based CA, which supports the first dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC), revenue-optimizing single-bidder CA. Our idea is to generate a bundle distribution through an ordinary differential equation (ODE) applied to a tractable initial distribution. Our method, BUNDLEFLOW, learns suitable ODE-based transforms, one for each menu element, to optimize expected revenue. BUNDLEFLOW achieves up to 2.23 higher revenue than baselines on standard CA testbeds and scales up to 500 items.

In this work, we consider the data-driven assortment optimization problem under the linear multinomial logit (MNL) choice model. We first establish an improved confidence region for the maximum-likelihood-estimator (MLE) of the d-dimensional linear MNL likelihood function that removes the explicit dependency on a problem-dependent parameter κ 1 in previous result [42], which scales exponentially with the radius of the parameter set. Building on the confidence region result, we investigate the data-driven assortment optimization problem in both offline and online settings.