We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over T rounds) that depend on the observable d-dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size K . We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret eO(K dT), which we prove to be tight in dand T up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on K .

We begin by characterizing the space of elements that test an agent's ability to optimally allocate1031 their limited resources to goods and services they desire. In economics and decision theory, the1032 most primitive approach to describing the preferences of decision-makers is to use a function that1033 maps a set of possible choices to the agent's optimal choice within that set. Under a set of intuitive1034 assumptions, such as transitivity (i.e., if bundle X is preferred to bundle Y, and Y is preferred to1035 bundle Z, then X must be preferred to Z), it becomes possible to "rationalize" preferences by instead1036 describing a utility function. This function assigns a real number to each bundle, and the agent selects1037 the bundle with the highest utility.1038 In this paper, we focus on these "rationalizable" preferences, where agent choice can be implemented1039 as utility maximization constrained by prices and income. The solution to these consumer choice1040 problems provides ...

Regulatory frameworks, such as the EUAIAct, encourage openness of generalpurpose AI models by offering legal exemptions for "open-source" models. Despite this legislative attention on openness, the definition of open-source foundation models remains ambiguous.

Differentiable economics--the use of deep learning for auction design--has driven progress in multi-item auction design with additive and unit-demand valuations. However, there has been little progress for combinatorial auctions (CAs), even in the simplest and yet important single bidder case, due to exponential growth of the bundle space with the number of items. We address this challenge by introducing a deep network architecture for a menu-based CA, which supports the first dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC), revenue-optimizing single-bidder CA. Our idea is to generate a bundle distribution through an ordinary differential equation (ODE) applied to a tractable initial distribution. Our method, BUNDLEFLOW, learns suitable ODE-based transforms, one for each menu element, to optimize expected revenue. BUNDLEFLOW achieves up to 2.23 higher revenue than baselines on standard CA testbeds and scales up to 500 items.

In this work, we consider the data-driven assortment optimization problem under the linear multinomial logit (MNL) choice model. We first establish an improved confidence region for the maximum-likelihood-estimator (MLE) of the d-dimensional linear MNL likelihood function that removes the explicit dependency on a problem-dependent parameter κ 1 in previous result [42], which scales exponentially with the radius of the parameter set. Building on the confidence region result, we investigate the data-driven assortment optimization problem in both offline and online settings.

Differentiable economics--the use of deep learning for auction design--has driven progress in multi-item auction design with additive and unit-demand valuations. However, there has been little progress for combinatorial auctions (CAs), even in the simplest and yet important single bidder case, due to exponential growth of the bundle space with the number of items. We address this challenge by introducing a deep network architecture for a menu-based CA, which supports the first dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), revenue-optimizing single-bidder CA. Our idea is to generate a bundle distribution through an ordinary differential equation (ODE) applied to a tractable initial distribution. The BundleFlow method learns suitable ODE-based transforms, one for each menu element, to optimize expected revenue. BundleFlow achieves up to 2.23$\times$ higher revenue than baselines on standard CA testbeds and scales up to 500 items. Compared with other menu-learning baselines, BundleFlow also reduces training iterations by 3.6-9.5$\times$

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Learning curves are a fundamental primitive in supervised learning, describing how an algorithm's performance improves with more data and providing a quantitative measure of its generalization ability. Formally, a learning curve plots the decay of an algorithm's error for a fixed underlying distribution as a function of the number of training samples. Prior work on revenue-maximizing learning algorithms, starting with the seminal work of Cole and Roughgarden [STOC, 2014], adopts a distribution-free perspective, which parallels the PAC learning framework in learning theory. This approach evaluates performance against the hardest possible sequence of valuation distributions, one for each sample size, effectively defining the upper envelope of learning curves over all possible distributions, thus leading to error bounds that do not capture the shape of the learning curves. In this work we initiate the study of learning curves for revenue maximization and provide a near-complete characterization of their rate of decay in the basic setting of a single item and a single buyer. In the absence of any restriction on the valuation distribution, we show that there exists a Bayes-consistent algorithm, meaning that its learning curve converges to zero for any arbitrary valuation distribution as the number of samples $n \to \infty$. However, this convergence must be arbitrarily slow, even if the optimal revenue is finite. In contrast, if the optimal revenue is achieved by a finite price, then the optimal rate of decay is roughly $1/\sqrt{n}$. Finally, for distributions supported on discrete sets of values, we show that learning curves decay almost exponentially fast, a rate unattainable under the PAC framework.

Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for the items for sale and that the learning algorithm's input is a training set sampled from this distribution. This setup makes the strong assumption that no noise is introduced during data collection. In order to help place mechanism design via machine learning on firm foundations, we investigate the extent to which this learning process is robust to noise. Optimizing revenue using noisy data is challenging because revenue functions are extremely volatile: an infinitesimal change in the buyers' values can cause a steep drop in revenue. Nonetheless, we provide guarantees when arbitrarily correlated noise is added to the training set; we only require that the noise has bounded magnitude or is sub-Gaussian. We conclude with an application of our guarantees to multi-task mechanism design, where there are multiple distributions over buyers' values and the goal is to learn a high-revenue mechanism per distribution. To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design via machine learning with noisy data as well as multi-task mechanism design.

Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for the items for sale and that the learning algorithm's input is a training set sampled from this distribution. This setup makes the strong assumption that no noise is introduced during data collection. In order to help place mechanism design via machine learning on firm foundations, we investigate the extent to which this learning process is robust to noise. Optimizing revenue using noisy data is challenging because revenue functions are extremely volatile: an infinitesimal change in the buyers' values can cause a steep drop in revenue. Nonetheless, we provide guarantees when arbitrarily correlated noise is added to the training set; we only require that the noise has bounded magnitude or is sub-Gaussian. We conclude with an application of our guarantees to multi-task mechanism design, where there are multiple distributions over buyers' values and the goal is to learn a high-revenue mechanism per distribution. To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design via machine learning with noisy data as well as multi-task mechanism design.