Federated Learning (FL) holds great promise for digital health by enabling collaborative model training without compromising patient data privacy. However, heterogeneity across institutions, lack of sustained reputation, and unreliable contributions remain major challenges. In this paper, we propose a robust, peer-driven reputation mechanism for federated healthcare that employs a hybrid communication model to integrate decentralized peer feedback with clustering-based noise handling to enhance model aggregation. Crucially, our approach decouples the federated aggregation and reputation mechanisms by applying differential privacy to client-side model updates before sharing them for peer evaluation. This ensures sensitive information remains protected during reputation computation, while unaltered updates are sent to the server for global model training. Using the Cox Proportional Hazards model for survival analysis across multiple federated nodes, our framework addresses both data heterogeneity and reputation deficit by dynamically adjusting trust scores based on local performance improvements measured via the concordance index. Experimental evaluations on both synthetic datasets and the SEER dataset demonstrate that our method consistently achieves high and stable C-index values, effectively down-weighing noisy client updates and outperforming FL methods that lack a reputation system.

Understanding the emergence of cooperation in systems of computational agents is crucial for the development of effective cooperative AI. Interaction among individuals in real-world settings are often sparse and occur within a broad spectrum of incentives, which often are only partially known. In this work, we explore how cooperation can arise among reinforcement learning agents in scenarios characterised by infrequent encounters, and where agents face uncertainty about the alignment of their incentives with those of others. To do so, we train the agents under a wide spectrum of environments ranging from fully competitive, to fully cooperative, to mixed-motives. Under this type of uncertainty we study the effects of mechanisms, such as reputation and intrinsic rewards, that have been proposed in the literature to foster cooperation in mixed-motives environments. Our findings show that uncertainty substantially lowers the agents' ability to engage in cooperative behaviour, when that would be the best course of action. In this scenario, the use of effective reputation mechanisms and intrinsic rewards boosts the agents' capability to act nearly-optimally in cooperative environments, while greatly enhancing cooperation in mixed-motive environments as well.

Auction-based Federated Learning (AFL) enables open collaboration among self-interested data consumers and data owners. Existing AFL approaches are commonly under the assumption of sellers' market in that the service clients as sellers are treated as scarce resources so that the aggregation servers as buyers need to compete the bids. Yet, as the technology progresses, an increasing number of qualified clients are now capable of performing federated learning tasks, leading to shift from sellers' market to a buyers' market. In this paper, we shift the angle by adapting the procurement auction framework, aiming to explain the pricing behavior under buyers' market. Our modeling starts with basic setting under complete information, then move further to the scenario where sellers' information are not fully observable. In order to select clients with high reliability and data quality, and to prevent from external attacks, we utilize a blockchain-based reputation mechanism. The experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approach.

Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a significant advancement in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), enabling collaborative model training across distributed devices while maintaining data privacy. As the importance of FL increases, addressing trustworthiness issues in its various aspects becomes crucial. In this survey, we provide an extensive overview of the current state of Trustworthy FL, exploring existing solutions and well-defined pillars relevant to Trustworthy . Despite the growth in literature on trustworthy centralized Machine Learning (ML)/Deep Learning (DL), further efforts are necessary to identify trustworthiness pillars and evaluation metrics specific to FL models, as well as to develop solutions for computing trustworthiness levels. We propose a taxonomy that encompasses three main pillars: Interpretability, Fairness, and Security & Privacy. Each pillar represents a dimension of trust, further broken down into different notions. Our survey covers trustworthiness challenges at every level in FL settings. We present a comprehensive architecture of Trustworthy FL, addressing the fundamental principles underlying the concept, and offer an in-depth analysis of trust assessment mechanisms. In conclusion, we identify key research challenges related to every aspect of Trustworthy FL and suggest future research directions. This comprehensive survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners working on the development and implementation of Trustworthy FL systems, contributing to a more secure and reliable AI landscape.

Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game theoretical models have shown that specific social norms can make cooperation stable, but how agents can independently learn to establish effective reputation mechanisms on their own is less understood. We use a simple model of reinforcement learning to show that reputation mechanisms generate two coordination problems: agents need to learn how to coordinate on the meaning of existing reputations and collectively agree on a social norm to assign reputations to others based on their behavior. These coordination problems exhibit multiple equilibria, some of which effectively establish cooperation. When we train agents with a standard Q-learning algorithm in an environment with the presence of reputation mechanisms, convergence to undesirable equilibria is widespread. We propose two mechanisms to alleviate this: (i) seeding a proportion of the system with fixed agents that steer others towards good equilibria; and (ii), intrinsic rewards based on the idea of introspection, i.e., augmenting agents' rewards by an amount proportionate to the performance of their own strategy against themselves. A combination of these simple mechanisms is successful in stabilizing cooperation, even in a fully decentralized version of the problem where agents learn to use and assign reputations simultaneously. We show how our results relate to the literature in Evolutionary Game Theory, and discuss implications for artificial, human and hybrid systems, where reputations can be used as a way to establish trust and cooperation.

Artificial intelligence shows promise for solving many practical societal problems in areas such as healthcare and transportation. However, the current mechanisms for AI model diffusion such as Github code repositories, academic project webpages, and commercial AI marketplaces have some limitations; for example, a lack of monetization methods, model traceability, and model auditabilty. In this work, we sketch guidelines for a new AI diffusion method based on a decentralized online marketplace. We consider the technical, economic, and regulatory aspects of such a marketplace including a discussion of solutions for problems in these areas. Finally, we include a comparative analysis of several current AI marketplaces that are already available or in development. We find that most of these marketplaces are centralized commercial marketplaces with relatively few models.

Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust in electronic markets with moral hazard. Future clients guide their business decisions by considering the feedback from past transactions; if truthfully exposed, cheating behavior is sanctioned and thus becomes irrational. It therefore becomes important to ensure that rational clients have the right incentives to report honestly. As an alternative to side-payment schemes that explicitly reward truthful reports, we show that honesty can emerge as a rational behavior when clients have a repeated presence in the market. To this end we describe a mechanism that supports an equilibrium where truthful feedback is obtained. Then we characterize the set of pareto-optimal equilibria of the mechanism, and derive an upper bound on the percentage of false reports that can be recorded by the mechanism. An important role in the existence of this bound is played by the fact that rational clients can establish a reputation for reporting honestly.

The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms. Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the seller being long-lived and the susceptibility to whitewashing. In this paper, we introduce so-called escrow mechanisms that avoid these problems by installing a trusted intermediary which forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condition. We address the incentive issues that arise and design an escrow mechanism that is incentive-compatible, efficient, interim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced. In contrast to previous work on trust and reputation, our approach does not rely on knowing the sellers' cost functions or the distribution of buyer valuations.

The most prominent way to establish trust in online markets such as eBay are reputation systems that publish buyer feedback about a seller's past behavior. These systems, however, critically rely on assumptions that are rarely met in real-world marketplaces: first, it is assumed that there are no reporting costs and no benefits from lying so that buyers honestly report their private experiences. Second, it is assumed that every seller is long-lived, i.e. will continue to trade on the marketplace indefinitely and, third, it is assumed that sellers cannot whitewash, i.e. create new accounts once an old one is ran down. In my thesis, I address all of these assumptions and design incentive-compatible trust mechanisms that do not rely on any of the aforementioned assumptions. Moreover, I focus on designs that minimize common knowledge assumptions with respect to the players' valuations, costs and beliefs.

Maintaining a sound reputation mechanism requires a robust control and investigation. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of a reputation mechanism that objectively maintains accurate reputation evaluation of selfish agent-based web services. In this framework, web services are ranked using their reputation as a result of provided feedback reflecting consumers' satisfaction about the offered services. However, selfish web services may alter their public reputation level by managing to get fake feedback. In this paper, game-theoretic analysis investigates the payoffs of different situations and elaborates on the facts that discourage web services to act maliciously.