The "right to be forgotten" and the data privacy laws that encode it have motivated machine unlearning since its earliest days. Now, some argue that an inbound wave of artificial intelligence regulations -- like the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) -- may offer important new use cases for machine unlearning. However, this position paper argues, this opportunity will only be realized if researchers proactively bridge the (sometimes sizable) gaps between machine unlearning's state of the art and its potential applications to AI regulation. To demonstrate this point, we use the AIA as our primary case study. Specifically, we deliver a "state of the union" as regards machine unlearning's current potential (or, in many cases, lack thereof) for aiding compliance with various provisions of the AIA. This starts with a precise cataloging of the potential applications of machine unlearning to AIA compliance. For each, we flag the technical gaps that exist between the potential application and the state of the art of machine unlearning. Finally, we end with a call to action: for machine learning researchers to solve the open technical questions that could unlock machine unlearning's potential to assist compliance with the AIA -- and other AI regulations like it.

Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks--including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight--all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle. Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AILAWS--systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI--as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS. Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.

Appendix A describes the Unity-based interface implemented in EVAAA, including an environment setup, prefab structures, and object instantiation. Appendix B provides a comprehensive introduction to Essential Variables (EVs), including their design, dynamics, and role in internal state regulation. Appendix C explains the implementation of the reward system and its connection to the balance of internal states. Appendix E outlines the modular configuration to generate EVAAA environments, along with the instructions for environment customization. Appendix F presents the structure and progression of naturalistic training environments. Appendix G describes the design of unseen experimental testbeds for evaluation. Appendix I provides analyses of agent behavior across training and test environments, including emergent behavioral patterns. All code and data are publicly available at: https://github.com/cocoanlab/evaaa A.1 Prefabs Environmental elements such as terrain, resources, obstacles, and predators are implemented as reusable and configurable Unity prefabs. Prefabs are grouped into Agents, Environment, and Materials. Each category includes reusable components for constructing and customizing interactive scenes: Agents (main agent and predators), Environment (terrain and containers), and Materials (varied textures and colors for visual distinction). This modular system enables rapid prototyping, task generation, condition randomization, and reproducible scene setup. Prefabs can be customized through the Unity Editor or programmatically at runtime, and reused across scenes without manual rebuilding.

'Musk profits where there are as few regulations as possible and he can dominate.' 'Musk profits where there are as few regulations as possible and he can dominate.' Ten years ago, after complaining that traffic was'driving him nuts', Musk's Boring Company began building underground tunnels to ease congestion on the roads. I t's another blindingly bright day in Las Vegas but I'm 30ft underground and strapped in for a rocket ride to the future. And it's pretty slow - my driver tells me the speed limit down here is 30mph. It's also pretty short: the journey is over in a matter of minutes.

'The CEOs are telling us, "We're on track to create superhuman intelligence, which has a good chance of causing human extinction."' 'The CEOs are telling us, "We're on track to create superhuman intelligence, which has a good chance of causing human extinction."' Will it take a'Chernobyl-scale disaster' for us to regulate cyber weapons of mass destruction? T he AI company Anthropic has been making major headlines recently. Its trillion-dollar IPO plan and its blood feud with secretary of defense Pete Hegseth have attracted much attention, but two other events may be even more consequential.

Recent proposals for regulating frontier AI models have sparked concerns about the cost of safety regulation, and most such regulations have been shelved due to the safety-innovation tradeoff. This paper argues for an alternative regulatory approach that ensures AI safety while actively promoting innovation: mandating that large AI laboratories release small, openly accessible "analog models"--scaled-down versions trained similarly to and distilled from their largest proprietary models. Analog models serve as public proxies, allowing broad participation in safety verification, interpretability research, and algorithmic transparency without forcing labs to disclose their full-scale models. Recent research demonstrates that safety and interpretability methods developed using these smaller models generalize effectively to frontier-scale systems. By enabling the wider research community to directly investigate and innovate upon accessible analogs, our policy substantially reduces the regulatory burden and accelerates safety advancements. This mandate promises minimal additional costs, leveraging reusable resources like data and infrastructure, while significantly contributing to the public good. Our hope is not only that this policy be adopted, but that it illustrates a broader principle supporting fundamental research in machine learning: deeper understanding of models relaxes the safety-innovation tradeoff and lets us have more of both.

Regulatory frameworks, such as the EUAIAct, encourage openness of generalpurpose AI models by offering legal exemptions for "open-source" models. Despite this legislative attention on openness, the definition of open-source foundation models remains ambiguous.

The federal government is planning to let a rule regulating federal data center operations sunset in September with no replacement. The US government is quietly planning to allow a rule outlining the standards for federal data center usage and operations, known as the Federal Data Center Enhancement Act (FDCEA), to expire, according to sources who spoke to WIRED. Neither Congress nor the Trump administration appears to be making significant moves to protect or extend the rule, or put alternate plans in place. Data centers have become a hot-button issue in recent months, as the tech industry goes all in on artificial intelligence and the infrastructure needed to power it. According to a Gallup poll from May, more than 70 percent of Americans oppose the construction of data centers, the energy-and water-intensive buildings that power the AI boom, in their communities.

Artificial intelligence (AI) now permeates critical infrastructures and decisionmaking systems where failures produce social, economic, and democratic harm. This position paper challenges the entrenched belief that regulation and innovation are opposites. As evidenced by analogies from aviation, pharmaceuticals, and welfare systems and recent cases of synthetic misinformation, bias and unaccountable decision-making, the absence of well-designed regulation has already created immeasurable damage. Regulation, when thoughtful and adaptive, is not a brake on innovation--it is its foundation. The present position paper examines the EU AIAct as a model of risk-based, responsibility-driven regulation that addresses the Collingridge Dilemma: acting early enough to prevent harm, yet flexibly enough to sustain innovation. Its adaptive mechanisms--regulatory sandboxes, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) support, real-world testing, fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA)--demonstrate how regulation can accelerate responsibly, rather than delay, technological progress. The position paper summarises how governance tools transform perceived burdens into tangible advantages: legal certainty, consumer trust, and ethical competitiveness.

The right to be forgotten and the data privacy laws that encode it have motivated machine unlearning since its earliest days. Now, some argue that an inbound wave of artificial intelligence regulations -- like the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) -- may offer important new use cases for machine unlearning. However, this position paper argues, this opportunity will only be realized if researchers proactively bridge the (sometimes sizable) gaps between machine unlearning's state of the art and its potential applications to AI regulation. To demonstrate this point, we use the AIA as our primary case study. Specifically, we deliver a state of the union as regards machine unlearning's current potential (or, in many cases, lack thereof) for aiding compliance with the AIA. This starts with a precise cataloging of the potential applications of machine unlearning to AIA compliance. For each, we flag the technical gaps that exist between the potential application and the state of the art of machine unlearning. Finally, we end with a call to action: for machine learning researchers to solve the open technical questions that could unlock machine unlearning's potential to assist compliance with the AIA -- and other AI regulation like it.