In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in1 finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies2 of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated equilibria; however,3 our understanding of how the players' actual strategies evolve over time is much4 more limited - and, in many cases, non-existent. This issue is exacerbated by5 a series of recent results showing that only strict Nash equilibria are stable and6 attracting under regularized learning, thus making the relation between learning7 and pointwise solution concepts particularly elusive. In lieu of this, we take a more8 general approach and instead seek to characterize the setwise rationality properties9 of the players' day-to-day play. To that end, we focus on one of the most stringent10 criteria of setwise strategic stability, namely that any unilateral deviation from the11 set in question incurs a cost to the deviator - a property known as closedness under12 better replies (club).

As such, in games where the marginalization of CCE coincides with the game's Nash equilibria (like

In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain invariant to small -- but otherwise arbitrary -- perturbations to the game's payoff structure, and we provide a crisp geometric characterization thereof. Subsequently, we turn to the question of dynamic robustness, and we examine which equilibria may arise as stable limit points of the dynamics of "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) in the presence of randomness and uncertainty. Despite their very distinct origins, we establish a structural correspondence between these two notions of robustness: strategic robustness implies dynamic robustness, and, conversely, the requirement of strategic robustness cannot be relaxed if dynamic robustness is to be maintained. Finally, we examine the rate of convergence to robust equilibria as a function of the underlying regularizer, and we show that entropically regularized learning converges at a geometric rate in games with affinely constrained action spaces.

In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the aim of characterizing the long-run behavior of the induced sequence of play. In stark contrast to deterministic, full-information models of learning (or models with a vanishing learning rate), we show that the resulting dynamics do not converge in general. In lieu of this, we ask instead which actions are played more often in the long run, and by how much. We show that, in strongly monotone games, the dynamics of regularized learning may wander away from equilibrium infinitely often, but they always return to its vicinity in finite time (which we estimate), and their long-run distribution is sharply concentrated around a neighborhood thereof. We quantify the degree of this concentration, and we show that these favorable properties may all break down if the underlying game is not strongly monotone -- underscoring in this way the limits of regularized learning in the presence of persistent randomness and uncertainty.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance in natural language processing tasks, yet their massive size makes serving them inefficient and costly. Semi-structured pruning has emerged as an effective method for model acceleration, but existing approaches are suboptimal because they focus on local, layer-wise optimizations using heuristic rules, failing to leverage global feedback. We present ProxSparse, a learning-based framework for mask selection enabled by regularized optimization. ProxSparse transforms the rigid, non-differentiable mask selection process into a smoother optimization procedure, allowing gradual mask exploration with flexibility. ProxSparse does not involve additional weight updates once the mask is determined. Our extensive evaluations on 7 widely used models show that ProxSparse consistently outperforms previously proposed semi-structured mask selection methods with significant improvement, demonstrating the effectiveness of our learned approach towards semi-structured pruning.

Motivated by the success of Nesterov's accelerated gradient algorithm for convex minimization problems, we examine whether it is possible to achieve similar performance gains in the context of online learning in games. To that end, we introduce a family of accelerated learning methods, which we call "follow the accelerated leader" (FTXL), and which incorporates the use of momentum within the general framework of regularized learning - and, in particular, the exponential / multiplicative weights algorithm and its variants. Drawing inspiration and techniques from the continuous-time analysis of Nesterov's algorithm, we show that FTXL converges locally to strict Nash equilibria at a superlinear rate, achieving in this way an exponential speed-up over vanilla regularized learning methods (which, by comparison, converge to strict equilibria at a geometric, linear rate). Importantly, FTXL maintains its superlinear convergence rate in a broad range of feedback structures, from deterministic, full information models to stochastic, realization-based ones, and even when run with bandit, payoff-based information, where players are only able to observe their individual realized payoffs.

We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at O(T {-3/4}), while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at O(T {-1}) --an improvement upon the worst case O(T {-1/2}) rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve \tilde{O}(T {-1/2}) rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of Rakhlin and Shridharan \cite{Rakhlin2013} and Daskalakis et al. \cite{Daskalakis2014}, who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated equilibria; however, our understanding of how the players' actual strategies evolve over time is much more limited - and, in many cases, non-existent. This issue is exacerbated further by a series of recent results showing that only strict Nash equilibria are stable and attracting under regularized learning, thus making the relation between learning and pointwise solution concepts particularly elusive. In lieu of this, we take a more general approach and instead seek to characterize the \emph{setwise} rationality properties of the players' day-to-day play. To that end, we focus on one of the most stringent criteria of setwise strategic stability, namely that any unilateral deviation from the set in question incurs a cost to the deviator - a property known as closedness under better replies (club). In so doing, we obtain a far-reaching equivalence between strategic and dynamic stability: a product of pure strategies is closed under better replies if and only if its span is stable and attracting under regularized learning. In addition, we estimate the rate of convergence to such sets, and we show that methods based on entropic regularization (like the exponential weights algorithm) converge at a geometric rate, while projection-based methods converge within a finite number of iterations, even with bandit, payoff-based feedback.