The rapid advance of large-scale AI systems is reshaping how work is divided between people and machines. We formalise this reallocation as an iterated task-delegation map and show that--under broad, empirically grounded assumptions--the process converges to a stable idempotent equilibrium in which every task is performed by the agent (human or machine) with enduring comparative advantage. Leveraging lattice-theoretic fixed-point tools (Tarski and Banach), we (i) prove existence of at least one such equilibrium and (ii) derive mild monotonicity conditions that guarantee uniqueness. In a stylised continuous model the long-run automated share takes the closed form $x^* = α/ (α+ β)$, where $α$ captures the pace of automation and $β$ the rate at which new, human-centric tasks appear; hence full automation is precluded whenever $β> 0$. We embed this analytic result in three complementary dynamical benchmarks--a discrete linear update, an evolutionary replicator dynamic, and a continuous Beta-distributed task spectrum--each of which converges to the same mixed equilibrium and is reproducible from the provided code-free formulas. A 2025-to-2045 simulation calibrated to current adoption rates projects automation rising from approximately 10% of work to approximately 65%, leaving a persistent one-third of tasks to humans. We interpret that residual as a new profession of workflow conductor: humans specialise in assigning, supervising and integrating AI modules rather than competing with them. Finally, we discuss implications for skill development, benchmark design and AI governance, arguing that policies which promote "centaur" human-AI teaming can steer the economy toward the welfare-maximising fixed point.

Task allocation in multi-human multi-robot (MH-MR) teams presents significant challenges due to the inherent heterogeneity of team members, the dynamics of task execution, and the information uncertainty of operational states. Existing approaches often fail to address these challenges simultaneously, resulting in suboptimal performance. To tackle this, we propose ATA-HRL, an adaptive task allocation framework using hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL), which incorporates initial task allocation (ITA) that leverages team heterogeneity and conditional task reallocation in response to dynamic operational states. Additionally, we introduce an auxiliary state representation learning task to manage information uncertainty and enhance task execution. Through an extensive case study in large-scale environmental monitoring tasks, we demonstrate the benefits of our approach.

Given a collaborative high-level task and a team of heterogeneous robots and behaviors to satisfy it, this work focuses on the challenge of automatically, at runtime, adjusting the individual robot behaviors such that the task is still satisfied, when robots encounter changes to their abilities--either failures or additional actions they can perform. We consider tasks encoded in LTL^\psi and minimize global teaming reassignments (and as a result, local resynthesis) when robots' capabilities change. We also increase the expressivity of LTL^\psi by including additional types of constraints on the overall teaming assignment that the user can specify, such as the minimum number of robots required for each assignment. We demonstrate the framework in a simulated warehouse scenario.

Will 2024 be a boom or a bust for big tech? By one estimate, there have been more than 7,500 layoffs in the sector since the start of the year – a dispersal of pink slips that many hoped would have ceased after the deep job cuts of 2023. However, as the US's big tech earnings season gets under way this week, some analysts are predicting strong numbers. This batch of quarterly financial results may show that the industry has cleared out its pandemic-era overhiring and reorganised itself around cloud computing and AI - necessitating cuts in sectors with less rosy prospects. Analysts keen on AI say we are at the start of a tech bull market.

In recent years, cooperative game theory and its solution methods have expanded beyond traditional realms like cost-sharing (Shubik, 1962; Littlechild and Owen, 1973; Tijs and Driessen, 1986; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2021) and property rights remuneration (Hart and Moore, 1990; Tauman and Watanabe, 2007). Their application in statistics for identifying important variables (Lipovetsky and Conklin; Shorrocks, 2012), in machine learning for interpreting prediction models (Lundberg and Lee, 2017; Lundberg et al., 2020), and in marketing for attributing online advertisers' impact on customer conversion (Dalessandro et al.; Berman; Singal et al., forthcoming) demonstrate that today, allocation rules for cooperative games are routinely computed and implemented (Grömping, 2015; Google; GitHub). The most prominent allocation rule for these applications is the Shapley value, which rewards (punishes) a player for a higher (lower) marginal contributions. In fact, this strong monotonicity property is characteristic of the Shapley value (Young, 1985), which is commonly cited as a compelling reason for the widespread adoption of the Shapley value (Shorrocks, 2012; Huettner and Sunder, 2012; Lundberg and Lee, 2017). While strong monotonicity ensures that individuals have an incentive to work towards a common goal, less is known about the incentives of groups of players. In this paper, we study coalitional manipulations, i.e., modifications of a game with the intention to increase the total payoff accruing to the members of a coalition even as the coalition does not create any additional surplus. We introduce axioms ensuring that allocation rules are immune to such manipulations.

Many cryptocurrency brokers nowadays offer a variety of derivative assets that allow traders to perform hedging or speculation. This paper proposes an effective algorithm based on neural networks to take advantage of these investment products. The proposed algorithm constructs a portfolio that contains a pair of negatively correlated assets. A deep neural network, which outputs the allocation weight of each asset at a time interval, is trained to maximize the Sharpe ratio. A novel loss term is proposed to regulate the network's bias towards a specific asset, thus enforcing the network to learn an allocation strategy that is close to a minimum variance strategy. Extensive experiments were conducted using data collected from Binance spanning 19 months to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. The backtest results show that the proposed algorithm can produce neural networks that are able to make profits in different market situations.

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance (DeFi), allowing users to trade cryptocurrencies without the need for third-party authorization. Investors are incentivized to deposit assets into liquidity pools, against which users can trade directly, while paying fees to liquidity providers (LPs). However, a number of unresolved issues related to capital efficiency and market risk hinder DeFi's further development. Uniswap V3, a leading and groundbreaking DEX project, addresses capital efficiency by enabling LPs to concentrate their liquidity within specific price ranges for deposited assets. Nevertheless, this approach exacerbates market risk, as LPs earn trading fees only when asset prices are within these predetermined brackets. To mitigate this issue, this paper introduces a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) solution designed to adaptively adjust these price ranges, maximizing profits and mitigating market risks. Our approach also neutralizes price-change risks by hedging the liquidity position through a rebalancing portfolio in a centralized futures exchange. The DRL policy aims to optimize trading fees earned by LPs against associated costs, such as gas fees and hedging expenses, which is referred to as loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR). Using simulations with a profit-and-loss (PnL) benchmark, our method demonstrates superior performance in ETH/USDC and ETH/USDT pools compared to existing baselines. We believe that this strategy not only offers investors a valuable asset management tool but also introduces a new incentive mechanism for DEX designers.

In the classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective of maximizing the damage caused. In this paper, we consider the network defending problem against contagious attacks, e.g., the attack at a node u spreads to the neighbors of u and can cause damage at multiple nodes. Existing works that study shared resources assume that the resource allocated to a node can be shared or duplicated between neighboring nodes. However, in the real world, sharing resource naturally leads to a decrease in defending power of the source node, especially when defending against contagious attacks. Therefore, we study the model in which resources allocated to a node can only be transferred to its neighboring nodes, which we refer to as a reallocation process. We show that the problem of computing optimal defending strategy is NP -hard even for some very special cases. For positive results, we give a mixed integer linear program formulation for the problem and a bi-criteria approximation algorithm. Our experimental results demonstrate that the allocation and reallocation strategies our algorithm computes perform well in terms of minimizing the damage due to contagious attacks.

This article presents an architecture for multi-agent task allocation and task execution, through the unification of a market-inspired task-auctioning system with Behavior Trees for managing and executing lower level behaviors. We consider the scenario with multi-stage tasks, such as 'pick and place', whose arrival times are not known a priori. In such a scenario, a coordinating architecture is expected to be reactive to newly arrived tasks and the resulting rerouting of agents should be dependent on the stage of completion of their current multi-stage tasks. In the novel architecture proposed in this article, a central auctioning system gathers bids (cost-estimates for completing currently available tasks) from all agents, and solves a combinatorial problem to optimally assign tasks to agents. For every agent, it's participation in the auctioning system and execution of an assigned multi-stage task is managed using behavior trees, which switch among several well-defined behaviors in response to changing scenarios. The auctioning system is run at a fixed rate, allowing for newly added tasks to be incorporated into the auctioning system, which makes the solution reactive and allows for the rerouting of some agents (subject to the states of the behavior trees). We demonstrate that the proposed architecture is especially well-suited for multi-stage tasks, where high costs are incurred when rerouting agents who have completed one or more stages of their current tasks. The scalability analysis of the proposed architecture reveals that it scales well with the number of agents and number of tasks. The proposed framework is experimentally validated in multiple scenarios in a lab environment. A video of a demonstration can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/ZdEkoOOlB2g}.

Complex, multi-objective missions require the coordination of heterogeneous robots at multiple inter-connected levels, such as coalition formation, scheduling, and motion planning. This challenge is exacerbated by dynamic changes, such as sensor and actuator failures, communication loss, and unexpected delays. We introduce Dynamic Iterative Task Allocation Graph Search (D-ITAGS) to \textit{simultaneously} address coalition formation, scheduling, and motion planning in dynamic settings involving heterogeneous teams. D-ITAGS achieves resilience via two key characteristics: i) interleaved execution, and ii) targeted repair. \textit{Interleaved execution} enables an effective search for solutions at each layer while avoiding incompatibility with other layers. \textit{Targeted repair} identifies and repairs parts of the existing solution impacted by a given disruption, while conserving the rest. In addition to algorithmic contributions, we provide theoretical insights into the inherent trade-off between time and resource optimality in these settings and derive meaningful bounds on schedule suboptimality. Our experiments reveal that i) D-ITAGS is significantly faster than recomputation from scratch in dynamic settings, with little to no loss in solution quality, and ii) the theoretical suboptimality bounds consistently hold in practice.