Subjective expected utility theory assumes that decision-makers possess unlimited computational resources to reason about their choices; however, virtually all decisions in everyday life are made under resource constraints---i.e.

Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward function of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot be resolved by observing the agent's policy in enough environments. This paper shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decompose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even with a reasonable simplicity prior/Occam's razor on the set of decompositions, we cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high regret. To address this, we need simple `normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively from observations.

Toaddressthis, we need simple'normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively fromobservations.

Blame attribution isoneofthekeyaspects ofaccountable decision making, asit provides means to quantify the responsibility of an agent for a decision making outcome. Inthis paper,we study blame attribution inthe contextof cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making.

This paper investigates bias in GLLM annotations by conceptually replicating manual annotations of Boukes (2024). Using various GLLMs (Llama3.1:8b, Llama3.3:70b, GPT4o, Qwen2.5:72b) in combination with five different prompts for five concepts (political content, interactivity, rationality, incivility, and ideology). We find GLLMs perform adequate in terms of F1 scores, but differ from manual annotations in terms of prevalence, yield substantively different downstream results, and display systematic bias in that they overlap more with each other than with manual annotations. Differences in F1 scores fail to account for the degree of bias.

Subjective expected utility theory assumes that decision-makers possess unlimited computational resources to reason about their choices; however, virtually all decisions in everyday life are made under resource constraints---i.e.

Subjective expected utility theory assumes that decision-makers possess unlimited computational resources to reason about their choices; however, virtually all decisions in everyday life are made under resource constraints--i.e.

Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward function of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot be resolved by observing the agent's policy in enough environments. This paper shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decompose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even with a reasonable simplicity prior/Occam's razor on the set of decompositions, we cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high regret. To address this, we need simple `normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively from observations.