We define and study the problem of predicting the solution to a linear program (LP) given only partial information about its objective and constraints. This generalizes the problem of learning to predict the purchasing behavior of a rational agent who has an unknown objective function, that has been studied under the name "Learning from Revealed Preferences. We give mistake bound learning algorithms in two settings: in the first, the objective of the LP is known to the learner but there is an arbitrary, fixed set of constraints which are unknown. Each example is defined by an additional known constraint and the goal of the learner is to predict the optimal solution of the LP given the union of the known and unknown constraints. This models the problem of predicting the behavior of a rational agent whose goals are known, but whose resources are unknown. In the second setting, the objective of the LP is unknown, and changing in a controlled way. The constraints of the LP may also change every day, but are known. An example is given by a set of constraints and partial information about the objective, and the task of the learner is again to predict the optimal solution of the partially known LP.

Modern methods for explainable machine learning are designed to describe how models map inputs to outputs--without deep consideration of how these explanations will be used in practice. This paper argues that explanations should be designed and evaluated with a specific end in mind. We describe how to formalize this end in a framework based in statistical decision theory. We show how this functionally-grounded approach can be applied across diverse use cases, such as clinical decision support, providing recourse, or debugging. We demonstrate its use to characterize the maximum "boost" in performance on a particular task that an explanation could provide an idealized decision-maker, preventing misuse due to ambiguity by forcing researchers to specify concrete use cases that can be analyzed in light of models of expected explanation use. We argue that evaluation should meld theoretical and empirical perspectives on the value of explanation, and contribute definitions that span these perspectives.

We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment to study people's perception of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) alignment in the context of economic decision-making. Using a panel of economic problems spanning the domains of risk, time preference, social preference, and strategic interactions, we ask human subjects to make choices for themselves and to predict the choices made by GenAI on behalf of a human user. We find that people overestimate the degree of alignment between GenAI's choices and human choices. In every problem, human subjects' average prediction about GenAI's choice is substantially closer to the average human-subject choice than it is to the GenAI choice. At the individual level, different subjects' predictions about GenAI's choice in a given problem are highly correlated with their own choices in the same problem. We explore the implications of people overestimating GenAI alignment in a simple theoretical model.

We define and study the problem of predicting the solution to a linear program (LP) given only partial information about its objective and constraints. This generalizes the problem of learning to predict the purchasing behavior of a rational agent who has an unknown objective function, that has been studied under the name "Learning from Revealed Preferences". We give mistake bound learning algorithms in two settings: in the first, the objective of the LP is known to the learner but there is an arbitrary, fixed set of constraints which are unknown. Each example is defined by an additional known constraint and the goal of the learner is to predict the optimal solution of the LP given the union of the known and unknown constraints. This models the problem of predicting the behavior of a rational agent whose goals are known, but whose resources are unknown.

As machine learning systems become more widely deployed, including in settings such as resume screening, hiring, lending, and recommendation systems, people have begun to respond to them strategically. Often, this takes the form of "gaming the system" or using an algorithmic system's rules and procedures to manipulate it and achieve desired outcomes. Examples include Uber drivers coordinating the times they log on and off the app to impact its surge pricing algorithm (Möhlmann and Zalmanson, 2017), and Twitter (Burrell et al., 2019) and Facebook (Eslami et al., 2016) users' decisions regarding how to interact with content given the platforms' curation algorithms. Game theoretical modeling and analysis have been used in recent years to formally analyze such strategic responses of humans to algorithms (e.g., Hardt et al. (2016); Milli et al. (2019); Liu et al. (2020); see also Related Work). However, these existing works assume standard models of decision making, where agents are fully rational when responding to algorithms; yet, humans exhibit different forms of cognitive biases in decision making (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). Motivated by this, we explore the impacts behavioral biases on agents' strategic responses to algorithms. We begin by proposing an extension of existing models of strategic classification to account for behavioral biases.

Agent-based models (ABMs) are simulation models used in economics to overcome some of the limitations of traditional frameworks based on general equilibrium assumptions. However, agents within an ABM follow predetermined, not fully rational, behavioural rules which can be cumbersome to design and difficult to justify. Here we leverage multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) to expand the capabilities of ABMs with the introduction of fully rational agents that learn their policy by interacting with the environment and maximising a reward function. Specifically, we propose a 'Rational macro ABM' (R-MABM) framework by extending a paradigmatic macro ABM from the economic literature. We show that gradually substituting ABM firms in the model with RL agents, trained to maximise profits, allows for a thorough study of the impact of rationality on the economy. We find that RL agents spontaneously learn three distinct strategies for maximising profits, with the optimal strategy depending on the level of market competition and rationality. We also find that RL agents with independent policies, and without the ability to communicate with each other, spontaneously learn to segregate into different strategic groups, thus increasing market power and overall profits. Finally, we find that a higher degree of rationality in the economy always improves the macroeconomic environment as measured by total output, depending on the specific rational policy, this can come at the cost of higher instability. Our R-MABM framework is general, it allows for stable multi-agent learning, and represents a principled and robust direction to extend existing economic simulators.

ALEX (Autonomous Local Energy eXchange) is an economy-driven, transactive local energy market where each participating building is represented by a rational agent. Relying solely on building-level information, this agent minimizes its electricity bill by automating distributed energy resource utilization and trading. This study examines ALEX's capabilities to align participant and grid-stakeholder interests and assesses ALEX's impact on short- and long-term intermittence using a set of community net-load metrics, such as ramping rate, load factor, and peak load. The policies for ALEX's rational agents are generated using dynamic programming through value iteration in conjunction with iterative best response. This facilitates comparing ALEX and a benchmark energy management system, which optimizes building-level self-consumption, ramping rate, and peak net load. Simulations are performed using the open-source CityLearn2022 dataset to provide a pathway for benchmarking by future studies. The experiments demonstrate that ALEX enables the coordination of distributed energy resources across the community. Remarkably, this community-level coordination occurs even though the system is populated by agents who only access building-level information and selfishly maximize their own relative profit. Compared to the benchmark energy management system, ALEX improves across all metrics.

Under what circumstances can a system be said to have beliefs and goals, and how do such agency-related features relate to its physical state? Recent work has proposed a notion of interpretation map, a function that maps the state of a system to a probability distribution representing its beliefs about an external world. Such a map is not completely arbitrary, as the beliefs it attributes to the system must evolve over time in a manner that is consistent with Bayes' theorem, and consequently the dynamics of a system constrain its possible interpretations. Here we build on this approach, proposing a notion of interpretation not just in terms of beliefs but in terms of goals and actions. To do this we make use of the existing theory of partially observable Markov processes (POMDPs): we say that a system can be interpreted as a solution to a POMDP if it not only admits an interpretation map describing its beliefs about the hidden state of a POMDP but also takes actions that are optimal according to its belief state. An agent is then a system together with an interpretation of this system as a POMDP solution. Although POMDPs are not the only possible formulation of what it means to have a goal, this nevertheless represents a step towards a more general formal definition of what it means for a system to be an agent.

In real life auctions, a widely observed phenomenon is the winner's curse -- the winner's high bid implies that the winner often over-estimates the value of the good for sale, resulting in an incurred negative utility. The seminal work of Eyster and Rabin [Econometrica'05] introduced a behavioral model aimed to explain this observed anomaly. We term agents who display this bias "cursed agents". We adopt their model in the interdependent value setting, and aim to devise mechanisms that prevent the cursed agents from obtaining negative utility. We design mechanisms that are cursed ex-post IC, that is, incentivize agents to bid their true signal even though they are cursed, while ensuring that the outcome is individually rational -- the price the agents pay is no more than the agents' true value. Since the agents might over-estimate the good's value, such mechanisms might require the seller to make positive transfers to the agents to prevent agents from over-paying. For revenue maximization, we give the optimal deterministic and anonymous mechanism. For welfare maximization, we require ex-post budget balance (EPBB), as positive transfers might lead to negative revenue. We propose a masking operation that takes any deterministic mechanism, and imposes that the seller would not make positive transfers, enforcing EPBB. We show that in typical settings, EPBB implies that the mechanism cannot make any positive transfers, implying that applying the masking operation on the fully efficient mechanism results in a socially optimal EPBB mechanism. This further implies that if the valuation function is the maximum of agents' signals, the optimal EPBB mechanism obtains zero welfare. In contrast, we show that for sum-concave valuations, which include weighted-sum valuations and l_p-norms, the welfare optimal EPBB mechanism obtains half of the optimal welfare as the number of agents grows large.