Neuron interpretation offers valuable insights into how knowledge is structured within a deep neural network model.

Visible-infrared person re-identification (VIReID) is widely used in fields such as video surveillance and intelligent transportation, imposing higher demands on model security. In practice, the adversarial attacks based on VIReID aim to disrupt output ranking and quantify the security risks of models. Although numerous studies have been emerged on adversarial attacks and defenses in fields such as face recognition, person re-identification, and pedestrian detection, there is currently a lack of research on the security of VIReID systems. To this end, we propose to explore the vulnerabilities of VIReID systems and prevent potential serious losses due to insecurity. Compared to research on single-modality ReID, adversarial feature alignment and modality differences need to be particularly emphasized. Thus, we advocate for feature-level adversarial attacks to disrupt the output rankings of VIReID systems.

In voting theory, when voters have ranked preferences over candidates, the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem essentially rules out the existence of reasonable strategyproof methods for picking a winner. What if we weaken strategyproofness to only hold for Bayesian voters with beliefs over others' preferences? When voters believe other participants' rankings are drawn independently from a fixed distribution, the impossibility persists. However, it is quite reasonable for a voter to believe that other votes are correlated, either to each other or to their own ranking. We consider such beliefs induced by classic probabilistic models in social choice such as the Mallows, Placket-Luce, and Thurstone-Mosteller models. We single out the plurality rule (choosing the candidate ranked first most often) as a particularly promising choice as it is strategyproof for a large class of beliefs containing the specific ones we introduce. Further, we show that plurality is unique among positional scoring rules in having this property: no other scoring rule is strategyproof for beliefs induced by the Mallows model when there are a sufficient number of voters. Finally, we give examples of prominent non-scoring voting rules failing to be strategyproof on beliefs in this class, further bolstering the case for plurality.

The ability to collect a large dataset of human preferences from text-to-image users is usually limited to companies, making such datasets inaccessible to the public. To address this issue, we create a web app that enables text-to-image users to generate images and specify their preferences. Using this web app we build Pick-a-Pic, a large, open dataset of text-to-image prompts and real users' preferences over generated images. We leverage this dataset to train a CLIP-based scoring function, PickScore, which exhibits superhuman performance on the task of predicting human preferences. Then, we test PickScore's ability to perform model evaluation and observe that it correlates better with human rankings than other automatic evaluation metrics. Therefore, we recommend using PickScore for evaluating future text-to-image generation models, and using Pick-a-Pic prompts as a more relevant dataset than MS-COCO. Finally, we demonstrate how PickScore can enhance existing text-to-image models via ranking.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have seen widespread adoption due to their ability to follow user instructions well.Developing these LLMs involves a complex yet poorly understood workflow requiring training with human feedback. Replicating and understanding this instruction-following process faces three major challenges: the high cost of data collection, the lack of trustworthy evaluation, and the absence of reference method implementations. We address these bottlenecks with AlpacaFarm, a simulator that enables research and development for learning from feedback at a low cost. First, we design LLM based simulator for human feedback that is 45x cheaper than crowdworkers and displays high agreement with humans. Second, we identify an evaluation dataset representative of real-world instructions and propose an automatic evaluation procedure. Third, we contribute reference implementations for several methods (PPO, best-of-n, expert iteration, among others) that learn from pairwise feedback. Finally, as an end-to-end validation of AlpacaFarm, we train and evaluate eleven models on 10k pairs of human feedback and show that rankings of models trained in AlpacaFarm match rankings of models trained on human data. As a demonstration of the research possible in AlpacaFarm, we find that methods that use a reward model can substantially improve over supervised fine-tuning and that our reference PPO implementation leads to a +10% win-rate improvement against Davinci003.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called $\alpha$-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or $\alpha$-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

To be well-behaved, systems that process preference data must satisfy certain conditions identified by economic decision theory and by social choice theory. In ML, preferences and rankings are commonly learned by fitting a probabilistic model to noisy preference data. The behavior of this learning process from the view of economic theory has previously been studied for the case where the data consists of rankings. In practice, it is more common to have only pairwise comparison data, and the formal properties of the associated learning problem are more challenging to analyze. We show that a large class of random utility models (including the Thurstone-Mosteller Model), when estimated using the MLE, satisfy a Pareto efficiency condition. These models also satisfy a strong monotonicity property, which implies that the learning process is responsive to input data. On the other hand, we show that these models fail certain other consistency conditions from social choice theory, and in particular do not always follow the majority opinion. Our results inform existing and future applications of random utility models for societal decision making.