Recommendation systems (RSs) are increasingly used to guide job seekers on online platforms, yet the algorithms currently deployed are typically optimized for predictive objectives such as clicks, applications, or hires, rather than job seekers' welfare. We develop a job-search model with an application stage in which the value of a vacancy depends on two dimensions: the utility it delivers to the worker and the probability that an application succeeds. The model implies that welfare-optimal RSs rank vacancies by an expected-surplus index combining both, and shows why rankings based solely on utility, hiring probabilities, or observed application behavior are generically suboptimal, an instance of the inversion problem between behavior and welfare. We test these predictions and quantify their practical importance through two randomized field experiments conducted with the French public employment service. The first experiment, comparing existing algorithms and their combinations, provides behavioral evidence that both dimensions shape application decisions. Guided by the model and these results, the second experiment extends the comparison to an RS designed to approximate the welfare-optimal ranking. The experiments generate exogenous variation in the vacancies shown to job seekers, allowing us to estimate the model, validate its behavioral predictions, and construct a welfare metric. Algorithms informed by the model-implied optimal ranking substantially outperform existing approaches and perform close to the welfare-optimal benchmark. Our results show that embedding predictive tools within a simple job-search framework and combining it with experimental evidence yields recommendation rules with substantial welfare gains in practice.

We formulate a supervised learning problem, referred to as continuous ranking, where a continuous real-valued label Y is assigned to an observable r.v. X taking its values in a feature space X and the goal is to order all possible observations x in X by means of a scoring function s: X R so that s(X) and Y tend to increase or decrease together with highest probability. This problem generalizes bi/multi-partite ranking to a certain extent and the task of finding optimal scoring functions s(x) can be naturally cast as optimization of a dedicated functional criterion, called the IROC curve here, or as maximization of the Kendall τ related to the pair (s(X), Y). From the theoretical side, we describe the optimal elements of this problem and provide statistical guarantees for empirical Kendall τ maximization under appropriate conditions for the class of scoring function candidates. We also propose a recursive statistical learning algorithm tailored to empirical IROC curve optimization and producing a piecewise constant scoring function that is fully described by an oriented binary tree. Preliminary numerical experiments highlight the difference in nature between regression and continuous ranking and provide strong empirical evidence of the performance of empirical optimizers of the criteria proposed.

Scorio.jl is a Julia package for evaluating and ranking systems from repeated responses to shared tasks. It provides a common tensor-based interface for direct score-based, pairwise, psychometric, voting, graph, and listwise methods, so the same benchmark can be analyzed under multiple ranking assumptions. We describe the package design, position it relative to existing Julia tools, and report pilot experiments on synthetic rank recovery, stability under limited trials, and runtime scaling.

The app reads your email inbox and your meeting calendar, then gives you a short audio summary. It can help you spend less time scrolling, but of course, there are privacy drawbacks to consider.

Neuron interpretation offers valuable insights into how knowledge is structured within a deep neural network model.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/