Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to manipulate the ranking list. However, the ideal attack opportunity and the excessive adversarial capability cause the existing methods to be impractical. To fully explore the potential risks, we leverage an online attack on the vulnerable data collection process. Since it is independent of rank aggregation and lacks effective protection mechanisms, we disrupt the data collection process by fabricating pairwise comparisons without knowledge of the future data or the true distribution. From the game-theoretic perspective, the confrontation scenario between the online manipulator and the ranker who takes control of the original data source is formulated as a distributionally robust game that deals with the uncertainty of knowledge. Then we demonstrate that the equilibrium in the above game is potentially favorable to the adversary by analyzing the vulnerability of the sampling algorithms such as Bernoulli and reservoir methods. According to the above theoretical analysis, different sequential manipulation policies are proposed under a Bayesian decision framework and a large class of parametric pairwise comparison models. For attackers with complete knowledge, we establish the asymptotic optimality of the proposed policies. To increase the success rate of the sequential manipulation with incomplete knowledge, a distributionally robust estimator, which replaces the maximum likelihood estimation in a saddle point problem, provides a conservative data generation solution. Finally, the corroborating empirical evidence shows that the proposed method manipulates the results of rank aggregation methods in a sequential manner.

We study the problem of online rank elicitation, assuming that rankings of a set of alternatives obey the Plackett-Luce distribution. Following the setting of the dueling bandits problem, the learner is allowed to query pairwise comparisons between alternatives, i.e., to sample pairwise marginals of the distribution in an online fashion. Using this information, the learner seeks to reliably predict the most probable ranking (or top-alternative). Our approach is based on constructing a surrogate probability distribution over rankings based on a sorting procedure, for which the pairwise marginals provably coincide with the marginals of the Plackett-Luce distribution.

Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons has shown promising results in elections, sports competitions, recommendations, and information retrieval. However, little attention has been paid to the security issue of such algorithms, in contrast to numerous research work on the computational and statistical characteristics. Driven by huge profits, the potential adversary has strong motivation and incentives to manipulate the ranking list. Meanwhile, the intrinsic vulnerability of the rank aggregation methods is not well studied in the literature. To fully understand the possible risks, we focus on the purposeful adversary who desires to designate the aggregated results by modifying the pairwise data in this paper. From the perspective of the dynamical system, the attack behavior with a target ranking list is a fixed point belonging to the composition of the adversary and the victim. To perform the targeted attack, we formulate the interaction between the adversary and the victim as a game-theoretic framework consisting of two continuous operators while Nash equilibrium is established. Then two procedures against HodgeRank and RankCentrality are constructed to produce the modification of the original data. Furthermore, we prove that the victims will produce the target ranking list once the adversary masters the complete information. It is noteworthy that the proposed methods allow the adversary only to hold incomplete information or imperfect feedback and perform the purposeful attack. The effectiveness of the suggested target attack strategies is demonstrated by a series of toy simulations and several real-world data experiments. These experimental results show that the proposed methods could achieve the attacker's goal in the sense that the leading candidate of the perturbed ranking list is the designated one by the adversary.

Given a number of pairwise preferences of items, a common task is to rank all the items. Examples include pairwise movie ratings, New Yorker cartoon caption contests, and many other consumer preferences tasks. What these settings have in common is two-fold: a scarcity of data (it may be costly to get comparisons for all the pairs of items) and additional feature information about the items (e.g., movie genre, director, and cast). In this paper we modify a popular and well studied method, RankCentrality for rank aggregation to account for few comparisons and that incorporates additional feature information. This method returns meaningful rankings even under scarce comparisons. Using diffusion based methods, we incorporate feature information that outperforms state-of-the-art methods in practice. We also provide improved sample complexity for RankCentrality in a variety of sampling schemes.

We study the problem of online rank elicitation, assuming that rankings of a set of alternatives obey the Plackett-Luce distribution. Following the setting of the dueling bandits problem, the learner is allowed to query pairwise comparisons between alternatives, i.e., to sample pairwise marginals of the distribution in an online fashion. Using this information, the learner seeks to reliably predict the most probable ranking (or top-alternative). Our approach is based on constructing a surrogate probability distribution over rankings based on a sorting procedure, for which the pairwise marginals provably coincide with the marginals of the Plackett-Luce distribution.