Tensor network methods have been a key ingredient of advances in condensed matter physics and have recently sparked interest in the machine learning community for their ability to compactly represent very high-dimensional objects. Tensor network methods can for example be used to efficiently learn linear models in exponentially large feature spaces [Stoudenmire and Schwab, 2016]. In this work, we derive upper and lower bounds on the VC dimension and pseudo-dimension of a large class of tensor network models for classification, regression and completion. Our upper bounds hold for linear models parameterized by arbitrary tensor network structures, and we derive lower bounds for common tensor decomposition models~(CP, Tensor Train, Tensor Ring and Tucker) showing the tightness of our general upper bound. These results are used to derive a generalization bound which can be applied to classification with low rank matrices as well as linear classifiers based on any of the commonly used tensor decomposition models. As a corollary of our results, we obtain a bound on the VC dimension of the matrix product state classifier introduced in [Stoudenmire and Schwab, 2016] as a function of the so-called bond dimension~(i.e.

This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce t -level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution F over bidders' valuations, there exists a t -level auction with small t and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of t -level auctions has modest pseudo-dimension (for polynomial t) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.

This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce t-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution F over bidders' valuations, there exists a t-level auction with small t and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of t-level auctions has modest pseudo-dimension (for polynomial t) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.

Tensor network methods have been a key ingredient of advances in condensed matter physics and have recently sparked interest in the machine learning community for their ability to compactly represent very high-dimensional objects. Tensor network methods can for example be used to efficiently learn linear models in exponentially large feature spaces [Stoudenmire and Schwab, 2016]. In this work, we derive upper and lower bounds on the VC dimension and pseudo-dimension of a large class of tensor network models for classification, regression and completion. Our upper bounds hold for linear models parameterized by arbitrary tensor network structures, and we derive lower bounds for common tensor decomposition models (CP, Tensor Train, Tensor Ring and Tucker) showing the tightness of our general upper bound. These results are used to derive a generalization bound which can be applied to classification with low rank matrices as well as linear classifiers based on any of the commonly used tensor decomposition models.

Advances in computational power and AI have increased interest in reinforcement learning approaches to inventory management. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for these approaches and investigates the benefits of restricting to policy structures that are well-established by decades of inventory theory. In particular, we prove generalization guarantees for learning several well-known classes of inventory policies, including base-stock and (s, S) policies, by leveraging the celebrated Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) theory. We apply the concepts of the Pseudo-dimension and Fat-shattering dimension from VC theory to determine the generalizability of inventory policies, that is, the difference between an inventory policy's performance on training data and its expected performance on unseen data. We focus on a classical setting without contexts, but allow for an arbitrary distribution over demand sequences and do not make any assumptions such as independence over time. We corroborate our supervised learning results using numerical simulations. Managerially, our theory and simulations translate to the following insights. First, there is a principle of "learning less is more" in inventory management: depending on the amount of data available, it may be beneficial to restrict oneself to a simpler, albeit suboptimal, class of inventory policies to minimize overfitting errors. Second, the number of parameters in a policy class may not be the correct measure of overfitting error: in fact, the class of policies defined by T time-varying base-stock levels exhibits a generalization error comparable to that of the two-parameter (s, S) policy class. Finally, our research suggests situations in which it could be beneficial to incorporate the concepts of base-stock and inventory position into black-box learning machines, instead of having these machines directly learn the order quantity actions.

This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce t-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution F over bidders' valuations, there exists a t-level auction with small t and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of t-level auctions has modest pseudodimension (for polynomial t) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.

This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce t-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution F over bidders' valuations, there exists a t-level auction with small t and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of t-level auctions has modest pseudo-dimension (for polynomial t) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.

This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce t-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution F over bidders’ valuations, there exists a t-level auction with small t and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of t-level auctions has modest pseudo-dimension (for polynomial t) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.