PCWorld reports that Microsoft's August update patches a significant number of security vulnerabilities, including one Windows Winsock flaw already being actively exploited by attackers in the wild. The update covers critical risks across Windows, Office, Exchange Server, and cloud services, with some flaws allowing remote code execution or full account takeover without user interaction. Users are strongly advised to install these updates immediately to protect their systems from potential exploitation. As part of August's Patch Tuesday, Microsoft released security updates that address 398 new vulnerabilities. Alongside Windows and Office, other products and services are also affected: Teams, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Windows Defender, Visual Studio, and Microsoft's cloud services. Microsoft classifies 42 of the vulnerabilities as critical. Among the remainder, all but one are classified as high risk. One Windows flaw is already being exploited in the wild, while two vulnerabilities were already publicly known beforehand. The next scheduled Patch Tuesday will be on September 8th, 2026.

I wore the world's first HDR10 smart glasses TCL's new E Ink tablet beats the Remarkable and Kindle Anker's new charger is one of the most unique I've ever seen I wore the world's first HDR10 smart glasses TCL's new E Ink tablet beats the Remarkable and Kindle Anker's new charger is one of the most unique I've ever seen The exploited zero-day flaw could allow an attacker to gain system privileges on a Windows PC. One vulnerability has already been exploited in the wild. Microsoft continues its onslaught against security vulnerabilities, fixing a whopping 421 bugs in August's Patch Tuesday update. But looking beyond the sheer number, Windows users should install this month's update, as it patches a zero-day flaw that's already been exploited by attackers. Aimed at Windows 11 25H2/24H2, Windows 11 23H2, and Windows 10, the 421 vulnerabilities encompass a range of Microsoft products, including Office, Exchange, Azure, and SharePoint.

DOGE Used AI for Housing Policy. The Government Won't Say How In response to a public records request, HUD has withheld documents about DOGE's use of AI--in part by citing a privilege that doesn't exist. Members of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) who were working at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) used artificial intelligence to inform policy decisions. Now, the agency appears to be denying Freedom of Information Act requests for information on the development and use of AI tools, and the way they informed policy decisions, according to documents obtained by a FOIA request by Democracy Forward, a nonprofit legal organization. Last year, WIRED reported that Christopher Sweet, who was then a third-year student at the University of Chicago, had joined the DOGE team at HUD, along with Scott Langmack, who came to DOGE from a property technology startup called Kukun. Sweet's primary focus, according to HUD employees who spoke to WIRED at the time, was on using artificial intelligence to identify agency rules for potential rescission, or contract cancellations, as part of a similar effort across the government .

Breakthroughs, discoveries, and DIY tips sent six days a week. Wealth confers privilege, and for many people during the Middle Ages, this privilege extended into the afterlife . The trend often mirrored their relationship with religion before their deaths, too--nobility and knights frequently ensured they sat in the front pews of services. Money is only one facet of social relations, however. Communities have long discriminated against and ostracized residents with debilitating illnesses--especially those with outward physical effects.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents show considerable promise for automating complex tasks using contextual reasoning; however, interactions involving multiple agents and the system's susceptibility to prompt injection and other forms of context manipulation introduce new vulnerabilities related to privacy leakage and system exploitation. This position paper argues that the well-established design principles in information security, which are commonly referred to as security principles, should be employed when deploying LLM agents at scale. Design principles such as defense-in-depth, least privilege, complete mediation, and psychological acceptability have helped guide the design of mechanisms for securing information systems over the last five decades, and we argue that their explicit and conscientious adoption will help secure agentic systems. To illustrate this approach, we introduce AgentSandbox, a conceptual framework embedding these security principles to provide safeguards throughout an agent's life-cycle. We evaluate with state-of-the-art LLMs along three dimensions: benign utility, attack utility, and attack success rate. AgentSandbox maintains high utility for its intended functions under both benign and adversarial evaluations while substantially mitigating privacy risks. By embedding secure design principles as foundational elements within emerging LLM agent protocols, we aim to promote trustworthy agent ecosystems aligned with user privacy expectations and evolving regulatory requirements.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

To govern smart contracts running on Ethereum, multiple Ethereum Request for Comment (ERC) standards have been developed, each having a set of rules to guide the behaviors of smart contracts. Violating the ERC rules could cause serious security issues and financial loss, signifying the importance of verifying smart contracts follow ERCs. Today's practices of such verification are to manually audit each single contract, use expert-developed program-analysis tools, or use large language models (LLMs), all of which are far from effective in identifying ERC rule violations. This paper introduces SymGPT, a tool that combines the natural language understanding of large language models (LLMs) with the formal guarantees of symbolic execution to automatically verify smart contracts' compliance with ERC rules. To develop SymGPT, we conduct an empirical study of 132 ERC rules from three widely used ERC standards, examining their content, security implications, and natural language descriptions. Based on this study, we design SymGPT by first instructing an LLM to translate ERC rules into a defined EBNF grammar. We then synthesize constraints from the formalized rules to represent scenarios where violations may occur and use symbolic execution to detect them. Our evaluation shows that SymGPT identifies 5,783 ERC rule violations in 4,000 real-world contracts, including 1,375 violations with clear attack paths for stealing financial assets, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, SymGPT outperforms six automated techniques and a security-expert auditing service, underscoring its superiority over current smart contract analysis methods.

Bias-transforming methods of fairness-aware machine learning aim to correct a non-neutral status quo with respect to a protected attribute (PA). Current methods, however, lack an explicit formulation of what drives non-neutrality. We introduce privilege scores (PS) to measure PA-related privilege by comparing the model predictions in the real world with those in a fair world in which the influence of the PA is removed. At the individual level, PS can identify individuals who qualify for affirmative action; at the global level, PS can inform bias-transforming policies. After presenting estimation methods for PS, we propose privilege score contributions (PSCs), an interpretation method that attributes the origin of privilege to mediating features and direct effects. We provide confidence intervals for both PS and PSCs. Experiments on simulated and real-world data demonstrate the broad applicability of our methods and provide novel insights into gender and racial privilege in mortgage and college admissions applications.

Generative AI agents, software systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), are emerging as a promising approach to automate cybersecurity tasks. Among the others, penetration testing is a challenging field due to the task complexity and the diverse strategies to simulate cyber-attacks. Despite growing interest and initial studies in automating penetration testing with generative agents, there remains a significant gap in the form of a comprehensive and standard framework for their evaluation and development. This paper introduces AutoPenBench, an open benchmark for evaluating generative agents in automated penetration testing. We present a comprehensive framework that includes 33 tasks, each representing a vulnerable system that the agent has to attack. Tasks are of increasing difficulty levels, including in-vitro and real-world scenarios. We assess the agent performance with generic and specific milestones that allow us to compare results in a standardised manner and understand the limits of the agent under test. We show the benefits of AutoPenBench by testing two agent architectures: a fully autonomous and a semi-autonomous supporting human interaction. We compare their performance and limitations. For example, the fully autonomous agent performs unsatisfactorily achieving a 21% Success Rate (SR) across the benchmark, solving 27% of the simple tasks and only one real-world task. In contrast, the assisted agent demonstrates substantial improvements, with 64% of SR. AutoPenBench allows us also to observe how different LLMs like GPT-4o or OpenAI o1 impact the ability of the agents to complete the tasks. We believe that our benchmark fills the gap with a standard and flexible framework to compare penetration testing agents on a common ground. We hope to extend AutoPenBench along with the research community by making it available under https://github.com/lucagioacchini/auto-pen-bench.

Hacking poses a significant threat to cybersecurity, inflicting billions of dollars in damages annually. To mitigate these risks, ethical hacking, or penetration testing, is employed to identify vulnerabilities in systems and networks. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have shown potential across various domains, including cybersecurity. However, there is currently no comprehensive, open, end-to-end automated penetration testing benchmark to drive progress and evaluate the capabilities of these models in security contexts. This paper introduces a novel open benchmark for LLM-based automated penetration testing, addressing this critical gap. We first evaluate the performance of LLMs, including GPT-4o and Llama 3.1-405B, using the state-of-the-art PentestGPT tool. Our findings reveal that while Llama 3.1 demonstrates an edge over GPT-4o, both models currently fall short of performing fully automated, end-to-end penetration testing. Next, we advance the state-of-the-art and present ablation studies that provide insights into improving the PentestGPT tool. Our research illuminates the challenges LLMs face in each aspect of Pentesting, e.g. enumeration, exploitation, and privilege escalation. This work contributes to the growing body of knowledge on AI-assisted cybersecurity and lays the foundation for future research in automated penetration testing using large language models.