We show our framework's flexibility by providing a comprehensive

While the success of large language models (LLMs) increases demand for machine-generated text, current pay-per-token pricing schemes create a misalignment of incentives known in economics as moral hazard: Text-generating agents have strong incentive to cut costs by preferring a cheaper model over the cutting-edge one, and this can be done "behind the scenes" since the agent performs inference internally. In this work, we approach this issue from an economic perspective, by proposing a pay-for-performance, contract-based framework for incentivizing quality. We study a principal-agent game where the agent generates text using costly inference, and the contract determines the principal's payment for the text according to an automated quality evaluation. Since standard contract theory is inapplicable when internal inference costs are unknown, we introduce cost-robust contracts. As our main theoretical contribution, we characterize optimal cost-robust contracts through a direct correspondence to optimal composite hypothesis tests from statistics, generalizing a result of Saig et al. (NeurIPS'23). We evaluate our framework empirically by deriving contracts for a range of objectives and LLM evaluation benchmarks, and find that cost-robust contracts sacrifice only a marginal increase in objective value compared to their cost-aware counterparts.

Congestion pricing, while adopted by many cities to alleviate traffic congestion, raises concerns about widening socioeconomic disparities due to its disproportionate impact on low-income travelers. In this study, we address this concern by proposing a new class of congestion pricing schemes that not only minimize congestion levels but also incorporate an equity objective to reduce cost disparities among travelers with different willingness-to-pay. Our analysis builds on a congestion game model with heterogeneous traveler populations. We present four pricing schemes that account for practical considerations, such as the ability to charge differentiated tolls to various traveler populations and the option to toll all or only a subset of edges in the network. We evaluate our pricing schemes in the calibrated freeway network of the San Francisco Bay Area. We demonstrate that the proposed congestion pricing schemes improve both efficiency (in terms of reduced average travel time) and equity (the disparities of travel costs experienced by different populations) compared to the current pricing scheme. Moreover, our pricing schemes also generate a total revenue comparable to the current pricing scheme. Our results further show that pricing schemes charging differentiated prices to traveler populations with varying willingness-to-pay lead to a more equitable distribution of travel costs compared to those that charge a homogeneous price to all.

Mobility systems often suffer from a high price of anarchy due to the uncontrolled behavior of selfish users. This may result in societal costs that are significantly higher compared to what could be achieved by a centralized system-optimal controller. Monetary tolling schemes can effectively align the behavior of selfish users with the system-optimum. Yet, they inevitably discriminate the population in terms of income. Artificial currencies were recently presented as an effective alternative that can achieve the same performance, whilst guaranteeing fairness among the population. However, those studies were based on behavioral models that may differ from practical implementations. This paper presents a data-driven approach to automatically adapt artificial-currency tolls within repetitive-game settings. We first consider a parallel-arc setting whereby users commute on a daily basis from an individual origin to an individual destination, choosing a route in exchange of an artificial-currency price or reward, while accounting for the impact of the choices of the other users on travel discomfort. Second, we devise a model-based reinforcement learning controller that autonomously learns the optimal pricing policy by interacting with the proposed framework considering the closeness of the observed aggregate flows to a desired system-optimal distribution as a reward function. Our numerical results show that the proposed data-driven pricing scheme can effectively align the users' flows with the system optimum, significantly reducing the societal costs with respect to the uncontrolled flows (by about 15% and 25% depending on the scenario), and respond to environmental changes in a robust and efficient manner.

Incentive mechanism is crucial for federated learning (FL) when rational clients do not have the same interests in the global model as the server. However, due to system heterogeneity and limited budget, it is generally impractical for the server to incentivize all clients to participate in all training rounds (known as full participation). The existing FL incentive mechanisms are typically designed by stimulating a fixed subset of clients based on their data quantity or system resources. Hence, FL is performed only using this subset of clients throughout the entire training process, leading to a biased model because of data heterogeneity. This paper proposes a game theoretic incentive mechanism for FL with randomized client participation, where the server adopts a customized pricing strategy that motivates different clients to join with different participation levels (probabilities) for obtaining an unbiased and high performance model. Each client responds to the server's monetary incentive by choosing its best participation level, to maximize its profit based on not only the incurred local cost but also its intrinsic value for the global model. To effectively evaluate clients' contribution to the model performance, we derive a new convergence bound which analytically predicts how clients' arbitrary participation levels and their heterogeneous data affect the model performance. By solving a non-convex optimization problem, our analysis reveals that the intrinsic value leads to the interesting possibility of bidirectional payment between the server and clients. Experimental results using real datasets on a hardware prototype demonstrate the superiority of our mechanism in achieving higher model performance for the server as well as higher profits for the clients.