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Two Cases of Deduction with Non-referring Descriptions

Raclavský, Jiří

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Formal reasoning with non-denoting terms, esp. non-referring descriptions such as "the King of France", is still an under-investigated area. The recent exception being a series of papers e.g. by Indrzejczak, Zawidzki and K\"rbis. The present paper offers an alternative to their approach since instead of free logic and sequent calculus, it's framed in partial type theory with natural deduction in sequent style. Using a Montague- and Tich\'y-style formalization of natural language, the paper successfully handles deduction with intensional transitives whose complements are non-referring descriptions, and derives Strawsonian rules for existential presuppositions of sentences with such descriptions.


A logic for reasoning with inconsistent knowledge -- A reformulation using nowadays terminology (2024)

Roos, Nico

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occur due to not fully reliable sources of information. In order to reason with inconsistent knowledge, it is not possible to view a set of premisses as absolute truths as is done in predicate logic. Viewing the set of premisses as a set of assumptions, however, it is possible to deduce useful conclusions from an inconsistent set of premisses. In this paper a logic for reasoning with inconsistent knowledge is described. This logic is a generalization of the work of N. Rescher [15]. In the logic a reliability relation is used to choose between incompatible assumptions. These choices are only made when a contradiction is derived. As long as no contradiction is derived, the knowledge is assumed to be consistent. This makes it possible to define an argumentation-based deduction process for the logic. For the logic a semantics based on the ideas of Y. Shoham [22, 23], is defined. It turns out that the semantics for the logic is a preferential semantics according to the definition S. Kraus, D. Lehmann and M. Magidor [12]. Therefore the logic is a logic of system P and possesses all the properties of an ideal non-monotonic logic.


Towards an efficient prover for the C1 paraconsistent logic

Neto, Adolfo, Kaestner, Celso A. A., Finger, Marcelo

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The KE inference system is a tableau method developed by Marco Mondadori which was presented as an improvement, in the computational efficiency sense, over Analytic Tableaux. In the literature, there is no description of a theorem prover based on the KE method for the C1 paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logics have several applications, such as in robot control and medicine. These applications could benefit from the existence of such a prover. We present a sound and complete KE system for C1, an informal specification of a strategy for the C1 prover as well as problem families that can be used to evaluate provers for C1. The C1 KE system and the strategy described in this paper will be used to implement a KE based prover for C1, which will be useful for those who study and apply paraconsistent logics.


Truth and probability

Ramsey, F. P.

Classics

All this might anyhow be called metaphysics; but it is regarded as logic when adduced as bearing on an unsolved problem, not simply as information interesting for its own sake. The only one of these which is a distinct science is evidently (2). THE UTILITY OF LOGIC That of (1) above and of (3) are evident: the interesting ones are (2) and (4).