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Improving Policy-Constrained Kidney Exchange via Pre-Screening

Neural Information Processing Systems

In barter exchanges, participants swap goods with one another without exchanging money; these exchanges are often facilitated by a central clearinghouse, with the goal of maximizing the aggregate quality (or number) of swaps. Barter exchanges are subject to many forms of uncertainty--in participant preferences, the feasibility and quality of various swaps, and so on. Our work is motivated by kidney exchange, a real-world barter market in which patients in need of a kidney transplant swap their willing living donors, in order to find a better match. Modern exchanges include 2-and 3-way swaps, making the kidney exchange clearing problem NP-hard. Planned transplants often \emph{fail} for a variety of reasons--if the donor organ is rejected by the recipient's medical team, or if the donor and recipient are found to be medically incompatible.


Review for NeurIPS paper: Improving Policy-Constrained Kidney Exchange via Pre-Screening

Neural Information Processing Systems

Weaknesses: I have the following concerns about the paper: 1. This paper introduces an algorithm to find a suboptimal query strategy, and it does not provide an algorithm to find the optimal matching. For finding the best query strategy, we need to know the optimal matching policy as a function of the query edges. This paper assumes that after selecting a specific query, the optimal matching and the maximum utility are available to the decision-maker. More precisely, this paper assumes that V S(q) is available to the decision-maker.


Improving Policy-Constrained Kidney Exchange via Pre-Screening

Neural Information Processing Systems

In barter exchanges, participants swap goods with one another without exchanging money; these exchanges are often facilitated by a central clearinghouse, with the goal of maximizing the aggregate quality (or number) of swaps. Barter exchanges are subject to many forms of uncertainty--in participant preferences, the feasibility and quality of various swaps, and so on. Our work is motivated by kidney exchange, a real-world barter market in which patients in need of a kidney transplant swap their willing living donors, in order to find a better match. Modern exchanges include 2- and 3-way swaps, making the kidney exchange clearing problem NP-hard. Planned transplants often \emph{fail} for a variety of reasons--if the donor organ is rejected by the recipient's medical team, or if the donor and recipient are found to be medically incompatible.