In recent years, dynamic agent-based population models, which model every inhabitant of a country as a statistically representative agent, have been gaining in popularity for decision support. This is mainly due to their high degree of flexibility with respect to their area of application. GEPOC ABM is one of these models. Developed in 2015, it is now a well-established decision support tool and has been successfully applied for a wide range of population-level research questions ranging from health-care to logistics. At least in part, this success is attributable to continuous improvement and development of new methods. While some of these are very application- or implementation-specific, others can be well transferred to other population models. The focus of the present work lies on the presentation of three selected transferable innovations. We illustrate an innovative time-update concept for the individual agents, a co-simulation-inspired simulation strategy, and a strategy for accurate model parametrisation. We describe these methods in a reproducible manner, explain their advantages and provide ideas on how they can be transferred to other population models.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of today's most relevant emergent technologies. In view thereof, this paper proposes that more attention should be paid to the philosophical aspects of AI technology and its use. It is argued that this deficit is generally combined with philosophical misconceptions about the growth of knowledge. To identify these misconceptions, reference is made to the ideas of the philosopher of science Karl Popper and the physicist David Deutsch. The works of both thinkers aim against mistaken theories of knowledge, such as inductivism, empiricism, and instrumentalism. This paper shows that these theories bear similarities to how current AI technology operates. It also shows that these theories are very much alive in the (public) discourse on AI, often called Bayesianism. In line with Popper and Deutsch, it is proposed that all these theories are based on mistaken philosophies of knowledge. This includes an analysis of the implications of these mistaken philosophies for the use of AI in science and society, including some of the likely problem situations that will arise. This paper finally provides a realistic outlook on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and three propositions on A(G)I and philosophy (i.e., epistemology).

Instead of providing an explanation networks (ANNs), which are effective at approximating of a phenomenon, models trained this way present complex functions but often lack transparency us with yet another phenomenon that needs an explanation and explanatory power. It highlights the [Wiegreffe and Pinter, 2019; Jain and Wallace, 2019]. 'problem of induction'--the philosophical issue Thus, despite the recent surge in the field of'explainable that past observations may not necessarily predict AI' [Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017], which attempts to provide future events, a challenge that ML models face some insight in to the generalizations made by trained models, when encountering new, unseen data. The paper argues it may be the case that the underlying problem of induction for the importance of not just making predictions and a lack of good explanations will remain so long as but also providing good explanations, a feature we use machine induction as the primary path in AI. that current models often fail to deliver.

Automatically solving puzzle instances in the game The Witness can guide players toward solutions and help puzzle designers generate better puzzles. In the latter case such an Artificial Intelligence puzzle solver can inform a human puzzle designer and procedural puzzle generator to produce better instances. The puzzles, however, are combinatorially difficult and search-based solvers can require large amounts of time and memory. We accelerate such search by automatically learning a human-explainable predicate that predicts whether a partial path to a Witness-type puzzle is not completable to a solution path. We prove a key property of the learned predicate which allows us to use it for pruning successor states in search thereby accelerating search by an average of six times while maintaining completeness of the underlying search. Conversely given a fixed search time budget per puzzle our predicate-accelerated search can solve more puzzle instances of larger sizes than the baseline search.

Continued model-based decision support is associated with particular challenges, especially in long-term projects. Due to the regularly changing questions and the often changing understanding of the underlying system, the models used must be regularly re-evaluated, -modelled and -implemented with respect to changing modelling purpose, system boundaries and mapped causalities. Usually, this leads to models with continuously growing complexity and volume. In this work we aim to reevaluate the idea of the model family, dating back to the 1990s, and use it to promote this as a mindset in the creation of decision support frameworks in large research projects. The idea is to generally not develop and enhance a single standalone model, but to divide the research tasks into interacting smaller models which specifically correspond to the research question. This strategy comes with many advantages, which we explain using the example of a family of models for decision support in the COVID-19 crisis and corresponding success stories. We describe the individual models, explain their role within the family, and how they are used - individually and with each other.

Machine learning operates at the intersection of statistics and computer science. This raises the question as to its underlying methodology. While much emphasis has been put on the close link between the process of learning from data and induction, the falsificationist component of machine learning has received minor attention. In this paper, we argue that the idea of falsification is central to the methodology of machine learning. It is commonly thought that machine learning algorithms infer general prediction rules from past observations. This is akin to a statistical procedure by which estimates are obtained from a sample of data. But machine learning algorithms can also be described as choosing one prediction rule from an entire class of functions. In particular, the algorithm that determines the weights of an artificial neural network operates by empirical risk minimization and rejects prediction rules that lack empirical adequacy. It also exhibits a behavior of implicit regularization that pushes hypothesis choice toward simpler prediction rules. We argue that taking both aspects together gives rise to a falsificationist account of artificial neural networks.

Learning complex programs through inductive logic programming (ILP) remains a formidable challenge. Existing higher-order enabled ILP systems show improved accuracy and learning performance, though remain hampered by the limitations of the underlying learning mechanism. Experimental results show that our extension of the versatile Learning From Failures paradigm by higher-order definitions significantly improves learning performance without the burdensome human guidance required by existing systems. Our theoretical framework captures a class of higher-order definitions preserving soundness of existing subsumption-based pruning methods.

Inductive logic programming is a type of machine learning in which logic programs are learned from examples. This learning typically occurs relative to some background knowledge provided as a logic program. This dissertation introduces bottom preprocessing, a method for generating initial constraints on the programs an ILP system must consider. Bottom preprocessing applies ideas from inverse entailment to modern ILP systems. Inverse entailment is an influential early ILP approach introduced with Progol. This dissertation also presents $\bot$-Popper, an implementation of bottom preprocessing for the modern ILP system Popper. It is shown experimentally that bottom preprocessing can reduce learning times of ILP systems on hard problems. This reduction can be especially significant when the amount of background knowledge in the problem is large.

Francis Bacon popularized the idea that science is based on a process of induction by which repeated observations are, in some unspecified way, generalized to theories based on the assumption that the future resembles the past. This idea was criticized by Hume and others as untenable leading to the famous problem of induction. It wasn't until the work of Karl Popper that this problem was solved, by demonstrating that induction is not the basis for science and that the development of scientific knowledge is instead based on the same principles as biological evolution. Today, machine learning is also taught as being rooted in induction from big data. Solomonoff induction implemented in an idealized Bayesian agent (Hutter's AIXI) is widely discussed and touted as a framework for understanding AI algorithms, even though real-world attempts to implement something like AIXI immediately encounter fatal problems. In this paper, we contrast frameworks based on induction with Donald T. Campbell's universal Darwinism. We show that most AI algorithms in use today can be understood as using an evolutionary trial and error process searching over a solution space. In this work we argue that a universal Darwinian framework provides a better foundation for understanding AI systems. Moreover, at a more meta level the process of development of all AI algorithms can be understood under the framework of universal Darwinism.

We introduce an inductive logic programming approach that combines classical divide-and-conquer search with modern constraint-driven search. Our anytime approach can learn optimal, recursive, and large programs and supports predicate invention. Our experiments on three domains (classification, inductive general game playing, and program synthesis) show that our approach can increase predictive accuracies and reduce learning times.