We study the problem of learning in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt an η fraction of the training examples with the goal of causing failure on a specific test point. In the realizable setting, prior work established that the optimal error under such instance-targeted poisoning attacks scales as Θ(dη), where d is the VC dimension of the hypothesis class [Hanneke, Karbasi, Mahmoody, Mehalel, and Moran (NeurIPS 2022)]. In this work, we resolve the corresponding question in the agnostic setting. We show that the optimal excess error is eΘ( dη), answering one of the main open problems left by Hanneke et al. To achieve this rate, it is necessary to use randomized learners: Hanneke et al. showed that deterministic learners can be forced to suffer error close to 1 even under small amounts of poisoning.

Data errors, corruptions, and poisoning attacks during training pose a major threat to the reliability of modern AI systems. While extensive effort has gone into empirical mitigations, the evolving nature of attacks and the complexity of data require a more principled, provable approach to robustly learn on such data--and to understand how perturbations influence the final model. Hence, we introduce MIBPCert, a novel certification method based on mixed-integer bilinear programming (MIBP) that computes sound, deterministic bounds to provide provable robustness even under complex threat models. By computing the set of parameters reachable through perturbed or manipulated data, we can predict all possible outcomes and guarantee robustness. To make solving this optimization problem tractable, we propose a novel relaxation scheme that bounds each training step without sacrificing soundness. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach to continuous and discrete data, as well as different threat models--including complex ones that were previously out of reach.

Membership inference tests aim to determine whether a particular data point was included in a language model's training set. However, recent works have shown that such tests often fail under the strict definition of membership based on exact matching, and have suggested relaxing this definition to include semantic neighbors as members as well. In this work, we show that membership inference tests are still unreliable under this relaxation -- it is possible to poison the training dataset in a way that causes the test to produce incorrect predictions for a target point. We theoretically reveal a trade-off between a test's accuracy and its robustness to poisoning. We also present a concrete instantiation of this poisoning attack and empirically validate its effectiveness. Our results show that it can degrade the performance of existing tests to well below random.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge but are vulnerable to corpus poisoning and contamination attacks, which can compromise output integrity. Existing defenses often apply aggressive filtering, leading to unnecessary loss of valuable information and reduced reliability in generation. To address this problem, we propose a two-stage semantic filtering and conflict-free framework for trustworthy RAG. In the first stage, we perform a joint filter with semantic and cluster-based filtering which is guided by the Entity-intent-relation extractor (EIRE). EIRE extracts entities, latent objectives, and entity relations from both the user query and filtered documents, scores their semantic relevance, and selectively adds valuable documents into the clean retrieval database. In the second stage, we proposed an EIRE-guided conflict-aware filtering module, which analyzes semantic consistency between the query, candidate answers, and retrieved knowledge before final answer generation, filtering out internal and external contradictions that could mislead the model. Through this two-stage process, SeCon-RAG effectively preserves useful knowledge while mitigating conflict contamination, achieving significant improvements in both generation robustness and output trustworthiness. Extensive experiments across various LLMs and datasets demonstrate that the proposed SeCon-RAG markedly outperforms state-of-the-art defense methods.

Neural networks are powered by an implicit bias: a tendency of gradient descent to fit training data in a way that generalizes to unseen data. A recent class of neural network models gaining increasing popularity is structured state space models (SSMs). Prior work argued that the implicit bias of SSMs leads to generalization in a setting where data is generated by a low dimensional teacher. In this paper, we revisit the latter setting, and formally establish a phenomenon entirely undetected by prior work on the implicit bias of SSMs. Namely, we prove that while implicit bias leads to generalization under many choices of training data, there exist special examples whose inclusion in training completely distorts the implicit bias, to a point where generalization fails. This failure occurs despite the special training examples being labeled by the teacher, i.e., having clean labels! We empirically demonstrate the phenomenon, with SSMs trained independently and as part of non-linear neural networks. In the area of adversarial machine learning, disrupting generalization with cleanly labeled training examples is known as clean-label poisoning. Given the proliferation of SSMs, we believe that delineating their susceptibility to clean-label poisoning, and developing methods for overcoming this susceptibility, are critical research directions to pursue.

Generative large language models (LLMs) have achieved state-of-the-art results on a wide range of tasks, yet they remain susceptible to backdoor attacks: carefully crafted triggers in the input can manipulate the model to produce adversary-specified outputs. While prior research has predominantly focused on backdoor risks in vision and classification settings, the vulnerability of LLMs in open-ended text generation remains underexplored.

A.1 Scenario with only stragglers The hyperparameter settings for Sageflow are shown in Table 1. For the schemes ignore stragglers and wait for stragglers combined with FedAvg, we decayed the learning rate during training. For the FedAsync scheme of [7], we take a polynomial strategy with hyperparameters a= 0.5, α= 0.8, and decayed γ during training. A.2 Scenario with only adversaries Data poisoning and model poisoning attacks: Table 2 describes the hyperparameters for Sageflow with only adversaries, under data poisoning and model poisoning attacks. For RFA of [5], the maximum iteration is set to 10. In this setup, the learning rate is decayed for all three schemes (Sageflow, RFA, FedAvg).

While federated learning (FL) allows efficient model training with local data at edge devices, among major issues still to be resolved are: slow devices known as stragglers and malicious attacks launched by adversaries. While the presence of both of these issues raises serious concerns in practical FL systems, no known schemes or combinations of schemes effectively address them at the same time. We propose Sageflow, staleness-aware grouping with entropy-based filtering and loss-weighted averaging, to handle both stragglers and adversaries simultaneously. Model grouping and weighting according to staleness (arrival delay) provides robustness against stragglers, while entropy-based filtering and loss-weighted averaging, working in a highly complementary fashion at each grouping stage, counter a wide range of adversary attacks. A theoretical bound is established to provide key insights into the convergence behavior of Sageflow. Extensive experimental results show that Sageflow outperforms various existing methods aiming to handle stragglers/adversaries.